How do we…
How do we decide where we need encryption and how we manage keys and certificates under ISO 27001?
Add to board memoOpen the memo
The short answer
- Recommendation
- Set where encryption is required from your classification, check that platform defaults are really on, allow only current algorithms from a published source, and keep an inventory of keys and certificates with owners and expiry dates. Keep keys apart from their data and test recovery.
- Reasoning
- Most cryptography failures are management failures. Certificates expire unnoticed, keys sit beside the data they protect, outdated protocols stay on and nobody can recover a lost key. A short rule that says where encryption is required, which algorithms are allowed and who owns each key is easy to sample, and the sample finds what a policy statement hides.
- Considerations
- The standard's text is paywalled. The control is described from the pack's Library and public guides, which are secondary.
- The pack names no algorithm baseline. NIST SP 800-131A and national guidance are examples; the standard should name the source you follow.
- Legal duties on encryption, and any limits on strong cryptography in some countries, need counsel. This is not legal advice.
- A provider's encryption is not your control until you have checked your settings.
The decision, step by step
Select any step for the reasoning behind it and where the pack covers it.
- Start
- Step
- Decision
- Outcome
- Loop back
Keyboard: Tab to a step, arrow keys move along the flow, Enter pins its explanation, + and − zoom, 0 fits the diagram, Esc closes. The text version below has the same content.
Where a step quotes a number, it is the default in the CISO Times pack. Your own standard may set a different one.
Read as text
The same flow written out: each step, its reasoning and where the pack covers it. 21 steps.
Start
We must set rules for encryption and for managing keys
The control asks you to define and apply rules for using cryptography, including managing keys. Encryption that is on but badly managed fails in a few ways: certificates that expire unnoticed, keys stored beside the data they protect and outdated protocols left enabled. These are the Library's named mistakes.
In the pack
- P08-A03 Annex A Control Implementation LibraryControl Library
Decision
Does a law or a contract require specific encryption, or limit it?
Some laws, sector rules and customer contracts name what must be encrypted, and a few countries restrict the import or use of strong cryptography. The standard asks that the rules follow the law. If you have not checked, answer yes and ask legal or compliance.
- Yes, or not known: Record each requirement and its source, and take the stricter
- No: List where encryption is required, from your classification
In the pack
- P08-A03 Annex A Control Implementation LibraryControl Library
Step
Record each requirement and its source, and take the stricter
Add the duty to the register of legal and contractual requirements, with the clause or article it comes from. Where two duties differ, apply the stricter. Counsel confirms which apply; this is not legal advice.
In the pack
- P08-A05 Mandatory ISMS Documentation ChecklistAnnex A Documents
Step
List where encryption is required, from your classification
Work from the levels in your classification scheme: laptops and phones, data in transit, sensitive data at rest and backups. The handling matrix is a good place to say which level needs what. Write the rule per place, not as one sentence for everything.
In the pack
- P15-A03 Classification Level Handling Rules MatrixHandling matrix
- P23-A04 Backup Coverage & Retention MatrixInstructions
Decision
Do platforms encrypt by default: disks, cloud storage, connections?
Many platforms encrypt at rest and in transit unless turned off. A default is a control only if you have checked it is on for your tenant. If you have not checked, answer no.
- Yes: Record that the default is the control and where you checked it
- No, or not known: Turn it on, or record the gap and who accepts the risk
In the pack
- P08-A03 Annex A Control Implementation LibraryControl Library
Step
Turn it on, or record the gap and who accepts the risk
Enable encryption where the system supports it. Where it cannot be enabled, record the gap as an exception with a compensating control and an expiry, approved by the person with authority to accept the risk.
In the pack
- P02-A02 Security Exception & Waiver StandardWhen an exception is needed
Step
Record that the default is the control and where you checked it
Name the setting and the date you checked it, for each platform. A statement that the provider encrypts is not evidence of your settings. Check again when the provider changes the service.
In the pack
- P08-A03 Annex A Control Implementation LibraryControl Library
Step
Allow only current algorithms and protocols, from a published source
Pick a published baseline rather than inventing one. NIST SP 800-131A on algorithm transitions and the NCSC's and BSI's guidance are examples. The pack does not name one, so say in the standard which source you follow and who watches it for change.
In the pack
- P08-A03 Annex A Control Implementation LibraryControl Library
Decision
Are outdated protocols or weak settings still enabled anywhere?
Old versions of TLS, weak ciphers and expired algorithms are on the Library's list of mistakes. Scans of your exposed services will show them. If you have not scanned, answer yes.
- Yes, or not known: Disable them, or log an exception with a date
- No: Is every key, certificate and secret listed with owner and expiry?
In the pack
- P08-A03 Annex A Control Implementation LibraryControl Library
Step
Disable them, or log an exception with a date
Turn the weak setting off. If a legacy system needs it, record the exception, name a compensating control such as network limits and set the date it must go. The patching pack's end-of-life register is a useful model.
In the pack
- P17-A07 End-of-Life Software & Unsupported System RegisterInstructions
Decision
Is every key, certificate and secret listed with owner and expiry?
The Library's evidence is a certificate and key inventory with expiry dates. Without one, certificates expire unnoticed and nobody knows who may use a key. If you hold keys in several tools and have no single list, answer no.
- Yes: Are keys kept apart from the data they protect?
- No, or not known: Build the inventory: owner, location and expiry for each
In the pack
- P08-A03 Annex A Control Implementation LibraryControl Library
Step
Build the inventory: owner, location and expiry for each
Include TLS certificates, signing keys, API keys, database and disk keys, backup keys and the keys cloud services hold for you. Start from the places that issue them. Pull expiry dates from the systems rather than typing them.
In the pack
- P08-A03 Annex A Control Implementation LibraryControl Library
- P25-A02 Generative AI Security StandardSecrets
Decision
Are keys kept apart from the data they protect?
Keys stored beside the data they protect is a named mistake: whoever takes the data takes the key. A vault, a managed key service or a hardware module keeps them apart. If a key sits in the same account, file share or repository as its data, answer no.
- Yes: Set renewal, rotation, retirement and what to do if a key is exposed
- No, or not known: Move keys to a vault or managed key service with its own access list
In the pack
- P08-A03 Annex A Control Implementation LibraryControl Library
- P25-A02 Generative AI Security StandardSecrets
Step
Move keys to a vault or managed key service with its own access list
Give the key store its own administrators and its own logs. Limit who can use and who can export a key, and review that list when people leave or change role. Remove keys from code, tickets and chat.
In the pack
- P14-A02 Privileged Access StandardAccounts and credentials
Step
Set renewal, rotation, retirement and what to do if a key is exposed
Set a renewal date or automatic renewal for each certificate, an alert well before expiry and a rotation interval by risk. Write the steps to revoke and replace a key that may be exposed, and who decides. Rehearse them once. Say how keys are created, and how a retired key is destroyed so that it cannot be used again.
In the pack
- P08-A03 Annex A Control Implementation LibraryControl Library
Decision
If a key is lost, can the data still be recovered?
Encryption that nobody can undo is data loss waiting to happen. Backups encrypted with a key held only in the backup console are the classic case. If you have not tested recovery without the usual key holder, answer no.
- Yes: Check settings on a sample of systems and walk through the inventory
- No, or not known: Keep a recovery copy outside the estate, reachable by two named people
In the pack
- P23-A03 Backup Operations & Restore Test ProcedureKeys and the way into the backup system
Step
Keep a recovery copy outside the estate, reachable by two named people
Store a sealed copy or a split key outside the estate it protects, where at least two named people can reach it when the usual holder is away or the main systems are down. Whether you also require two people to use it is your own risk decision. Have someone who is not the usual administrator recover a key from the register, and record the date. The backup case has its own question.
In the pack
- P23-A03 Backup Operations & Restore Test ProcedureKeys and the way into the backup system
Step
Check settings on a sample of systems and walk through the inventory
Pick a few systems, including a cloud one, and confirm the encryption setting and protocol versions match the standard. Pick a few certificates and confirm owner, expiry and renewal. The auditor's sample is the same.
In the pack
- P08-A03 Annex A Control Implementation LibraryControl Library
Decision
Did the sample find a system or certificate that breaks the rules?
Any breach shows the rules are not yet applied. If you did not sample, answer yes.
- Yes, or not known: Fix them, update the inventory, then sample again
- No: Encryption rules set, keys managed and sampled
In the pack
- P08-A03 Annex A Control Implementation LibraryControl Library
Step
Fix them, update the inventory, then sample again
Correct the setting, add what was missing to the inventory and take a fresh sample. Repeat until a sample passes.
- Then: Check settings on a sample of systems and walk through the inventory (back to an earlier step)
In the pack
- P08-A03 Annex A Control Implementation LibraryControl Library
Outcome
Encryption rules set, keys managed and sampled
Keep the standard, the inventory with expiry dates and the sample result. Do not say all data is encrypted unless the sample covered each place the standard names, and do not describe a provider's encryption as your own control without checking your settings.
In the pack
- P08-A03 Annex A Control Implementation LibraryControl Library
Practical checklist
- Record any law or contract that requires or limits encryption, with its source.
- List where encryption is required, by classification level.
- Check that default encryption is on for your tenant and record where you checked.
- Allow only current algorithms and protocols from a named source, and remove weak settings.
- Build a key and certificate inventory with owners and expiry, and keep keys apart from data.
- Set renewal and rotation, test recovery of a lost key, and sample systems.
Evidence to have ready
- The cryptography standard, naming the source it follows.
- Encryption settings for a sample of systems.
- The key and certificate inventory with owners and expiry dates.
- Records of a recovery test and of renewals.
Assumptions
- You have a classification scheme or can say which data is sensitive.
- You can list the platforms and cloud services that hold or move the data in scope.
- Someone owns each key and certificate, or can be named.
Not covered here
- Classifying information into levels. That is “How do we classify information without everything ending up "Confidential"?”.
- Losing the key or console password for backups. That is “If we lose the key or the console password for our backups, then how do we get in?”.
- Closing weaknesses scanners find. That is “How do we decide what to fix first when the scanner shows thousands of findings?”.
- Legal advice on encryption duties in a country. Take that from counsel.
Related questions
- How do we classify information without everything ending up "Confidential"?
- If we lose the key or the console password for our backups, then how do we get in?
- How do we know our scanning covers everything it should?
- How do we build a register of legal, regulatory and contractual requirements that stands up to an ISO 27001 audit?
- How do we use our cloud providers' certificates and reports in our ISMS scope and Statement of Applicability?