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CISO Times

Intelligence for the people behind the defence.

The CISO Decision Brief

If…, then how…

If we lose the key or the console password for our backups, then how do we get in?

8 decision pointsThe pack behind this answer: Backup & Restore Assurance

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The short answer

Recommendation
Tell the backup owner now, and the incident manager if anyone could have removed the key. Then use the planned way in: the key register's named holders, the supplier through your offline contact, or a break-glass account. If no copy decrypts, treat the data set as having no backup.
Reasoning
A backup that cannot be decrypted, or a console no one can sign into, is lost, and a restore test finds this late. The keys and recovery credentials are meant to be kept outside the estate that is backed up, where at least two named people can reach them when production is down. A missing key can also be an attacker's work, since attackers look for the backups first. Prove any recovered key against a real copy before you rely on it.
Considerations
  • A production administrator account is not the way in. Backup administration is meant to be separate from the production sign-in directory.
  • Declare any break-glass use at the time, then have its actions reviewed and the credential changed within 1 working day, by the privileged access standard's default.
  • If the same key unlocks every copy of a data set, losing it loses them all.
  • Where the loss meets a live recovery, the incident manager and the recovery plan decide which copy to use.

The decision, step by step

Select any step for the reasoning behind it and where the pack covers it.

  • Start
  • Step
  • Decision
  • Outcome

Keyboard: Tab to a step, arrow keys move along the flow, Enter pins its explanation, + and − zoom, 0 fits the diagram, Esc closes. The text version below has the same content.

Where a step quotes a number, it is the default in the CISO Times pack. Your own standard may set a different one.

Read as text

The same flow written out: each step, its reasoning and where the pack covers it. 17 steps.
  1. Start

    A backup key, console password or recovery credential cannot be found

    A backup that cannot be decrypted, or a console no one can sign into, is lost. A restore test finds this failure late, so the first rule is to say so now and not wait for the next test. This flow gets you back in if the way in was planned, and says what to do if it was not.

    In the pack

  2. Step

    Tell the backup owner now; do not wait for the next test

    The pack says to treat a backup whose key cannot be found as lost and to tell the backup owner now. The backup owner is accountable for the backup system, its protection and its restore tests. Note when you found the loss and which keys, consoles or data sets it touches, so the owner can see what is affected.

    In the pack

  3. Decision

    Could someone without authority have reached, removed or changed it?

    A missing key or a password that no longer works can be an attacker's work, since attackers look for the backups first. Look for a changed password, an unexpected sign-in, a deleted key or a deleted backup set. Answer yes if you cannot rule it out.

    In the pack

  4. Outcome

    Tell the incident manager at once; P09 takes over

    A backup copy that has been deleted, changed or reached by someone who should not have it goes to the incident manager at once. The incident plan decides what is stopped, what is protected and what is restored, and who decides each. This flow changes none of that. Where the loss meets a live recovery, the choice of copy is P22's and P09's.

    In the pack

  5. Decision

    Does the key register name its location and two holders?

    The keys and recovery credentials for the backup system are meant to be kept outside the estate that is backed up, with at least two named people able to reach them when production is down. The key register records where each one is kept and who those people are. Answer no if there is no register, the entry is missing, or you cannot reach it without a production system.

    In the pack

  6. Step

    Have a named holder recover it without any production system

    The named person goes to the place the register gives, which is outside the backed-up estate, and recovers the key or credential. Keep the matrix, the suppliers' contacts and the instructions on paper or offline with the incident response plan, so you can open them when the main systems are down. Write down the date.

    In the pack

  7. Decision

    Does it decrypt a copy or sign in to the console?

    Check the recovered key against a real copy, not against the register's say-so. A key that is found but does not open the copy gives you no way in, so carry on to the next route. Try a copy of a critical data set first, and check its integrity before you restore it.

    In the pack

  8. Decision

    Does a supplier run the backups or the console?

    A supplier that runs a backup runs part of your procedure. Ask what the contract says about getting the way in back. The contract should give a restore time no longer than the service's recovery time. Where the supplier holds the console, ask the supplier through the contact you keep offline. Answer yes if any part is run by a supplier.

    In the pack

  9. Step

    Ask the supplier to restore access, via your offline contact

    Use the supplier contact held where it can be reached when the main systems are down. Ask what the contract says about recovering access to the console or the key it holds, and how long it takes. If the supplier gives no restore time, or will not share its restore results, record a failed check and press for a contract change.

    In the pack

  10. Decision

    Does the console's tenant have a break-glass account?

    Backup administration is meant to be separate from the production sign-in directory, so a production administrator account is not the way in. If the console signs in through its own cloud identity tenant or administration portal, your privileged access standard may require break-glass accounts for it. Using one means declaring the use before or at the time of use, then a review of what it did and a credential change, each within 1 working day by the privileged access pack's default.

    In the pack

  11. Step

    Use break-glass, declare it, change the credential after

    Break-glass accounts are for the day the normal route fails and for nothing else. Declare the use to the person the standard names before signing in, or at once after, and confirm that the alert fired. Within 1 working day, by the privileged access pack's default, have every action reviewed against the stated reason, and change the password and reseal it.

    In the pack

  12. Decision

    Does another copy of each affected data set decrypt and restore?

    A critical data set should have at least three copies on two kinds of storage, with one immutable or offline. A different copy with its own reachable key may still be good, so try it. Check its integrity before you restore, and restore it into an isolated place. If the same key unlocks every copy of a data set, the answer is no.

    In the pack

  13. Outcome

    No backup for the data set: tell its owner the same day

    A backup whose key cannot be found is treated as lost. The pack's rule for a failed job that leaves a data set outside its recovery point is that the data owner is told the same day and decides whether the service can carry the exposure until a good copy exists. Apply the same here. Take a new backup now with its key kept as the pack says, and raise a finding for the protection controls that failed. If this meets a live recovery, the incident manager and the recovery plan decide which copy to use.

    In the pack

  14. Step

    Fix the gap: register entry, two holders, a place outside the estate

    Write the key into the key register with where it is kept and two named people who can reach it when production is down. Keep a copy of the matrix, the suppliers' contacts and the instructions to recover keys where they can be opened without the main systems. Raise a finding for any protection control that was not met or not checked; an unchecked protection is an unproven one.

    In the pack

  15. Outcome

    You are in; prove the way in at the next test with someone else

    In the next restore test, a named person who is not the usual backup administrator recovers a key from the register and decrypts a copy, and writes down the date. That is the proof the pack asks for, and it shows the register is true. Check also that the matrix, contacts and instructions open from where they are kept.

    In the pack

  16. Decision

    Did that give you the key or a way into the console?

    Test it the same way as a key you found: does it decrypt a copy or sign you in to the console? If the supplier says it is done but you cannot sign in, treat it as not done and try the next route.

  17. Decision

    Did the break-glass account give you a way in?

    Sign in and open a backup you can read. Declare the use, and change the credential afterwards, as the step before says. If it does not work, treat the way in as lost and check whether another copy still restores.

Practical checklist

  1. Tell the backup owner now, with which keys, consoles and data sets are affected.
  2. Tell the incident manager at once if anyone without authority could have reached, removed or changed it.
  3. Have a named holder from the key register recover the key without any production system.
  4. Test the key or credential against a real copy or the console sign-in.
  5. If that fails, ask the supplier through your offline contact, or use a break-glass account.
  6. If no route works, try another copy, and tell the data owner the same day if none decrypts.
  7. Fix the key register: where each key is kept and two named holders who can reach it.
  8. Prove the way in at the next restore test, with someone other than the usual administrator.

Evidence to have ready

  • When the loss was found, what it touched and when the backup owner was told.
  • The key register entry, with where the key is kept and its two named holders.
  • Any break-glass use, with its declaration, the review of its actions and the credential change.
  • The finding raised for each protection control that failed.
  • The date a named person other than the usual administrator recovered a key and decrypted a copy in a test.

Assumptions

  • Your backup keys and recovery credentials are meant to be kept outside the estate that is backed up, and you have a key register or can build one.
  • Someone is named as owner of the backup system, and each data set has an owner.
  • The figures here are the pack's defaults, which your own backup standard and privileged access standard may change.

Not covered here