If…, then how…
If a service cannot be back within its recovery time, how do we keep the business running?
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The short answer
- Recommendation
- Run a workaround the business owner agreed in advance, which keeps the harm below Severe until the service returns. Start it as soon as the plan is invoked, and escalate to the crisis lead when it nears its limit.
- Reasoning
- Some services will not be back in time, whatever the plan says, and after a destructive attack most will not. A workaround agreed in advance keeps the harm below Severe meanwhile. It starts at invocation, before anyone knows how slow recovery will be. Marking an untried workaround as untried stops anyone relying on it before it has been shown to work. The workaround carries the shortfall; the objective gap still needs a change that closes it.
- Considerations
- What a workaround needs are dependencies too. One that relies on a system the attack also takes down is no workaround.
- No one should hold two roles that must act in the same hour. If the business owner leads the crisis, the person they named starts the workaround.
- Plan on an untried workaround lasting less than its plan says. A workaround that keeps data on paper adds to the reconciliation after recovery, so keep the paper.
- If the service is heading past its maximum tolerable downtime, the approver is told: the board, or a board risk committee it has delegated to; the management board in a two-tier structure; executive management where there is no board.
The decision, step by step
Select any step for the reasoning behind it and where the pack covers it.
- Start
- Step
- Decision
- Outcome
Keyboard: Tab to a step, arrow keys move along the flow, Enter pins its explanation, + and − zoom, 0 fits the diagram, Esc closes. The text version below has the same content.
Where a step quotes a number, it is the default in the CISO Times pack. Your own standard may set a different one.
Read as text
The same flow written out: each step, its reasoning and where the pack covers it. 21 steps.
Start
A critical service will not be back within its recovery time
Some services will not be back in time, whatever the plan says, and after a destructive attack most will not. You may learn it from a test or the objectives checks, or in the middle of an outage. Either way the business keeps running on a workaround agreed in advance.
- Then: Is the service down now?
In the pack
- P22-A02 Business Continuity & ICT Resilience PolicyImpact analysis and objectives (rule RR-06)
- P22-A05 Cyber Recovery Plan TemplateThe workaround (rule RR-06)
Decision
Is the service down now?
If it is down, or expected to be, go straight to the crisis branch: there is no time to design a workaround from scratch. If you found the shortfall in a test, a dependency review or the cyber recovery time, you have time to prepare the workaround properly.
- Yes, or expected to be: The crisis lead invokes the plan; the workaround starts at once
- No, found in planning or a test: Record the shortfall as an objective gap
In the pack
- P22-A05 Cyber Recovery Plan TemplateWhen the plan starts (rule RR-17)
Step
Record the shortfall as an objective gap
A failed objectives check, or an objective a test missed, is an objective gap. By the pack's default its owner agrees the change that closes it within 10 working days, with a due date, and the service's risk owner is told so the risk is reassessed. The workaround carries the service until the change is made.
In the pack
- P22-A02 Business Continuity & ICT Resilience PolicyTesting and review (rule RR-15)
- P22-A04 Critical Service Recovery Objectives Matrix (RTO, RPO, MTD)Objective Gaps (rule RR-15)
Decision
Would it be back within its maximum tolerable downtime?
Compare the time a test took, and the time after a destructive attack, with the maximum tolerable downtime (MTD). Beyond the recovery time but within the MTD, the service needs its workaround. Beyond the MTD, it cannot recover in time. In the pack's example, dispatch would take 17 hours after an attack against an 8-hour RTO and a 24-hour MTD.
- Yes: The business owner records the workaround and who starts it
- No, or not known: Plan a partial and a long-term option as well
In the pack
- P22-A04 Critical Service Recovery Objectives Matrix (RTO, RPO, MTD)Checks (rule MX-05)
- P22-A03 Cyber Recovery Operating ProcedureWhy dispatch needs 17 hours after an attack, against an objective of 8 (rule MX-05)
Step
Plan a partial and a long-term option as well
A service that would be back only after its MTD cannot recover in time as things stand: harm reaches Severe before it returns. The gap closes only when its checks pass or the business owner re-agrees the objective on a new analysis. Until then, plan which part of the service comes back first, and what you would use if the primary recovery is not feasible soon: another platform, supplier or site, or a lasting manual process.
In the pack
- P22-A05 Cyber Recovery Plan TemplateShort-term, partial and long-term options
- P22-A09 Resilience Readiness DashboardDashboard (rule RRM-05)
- P22-A04 Critical Service Recovery Objectives Matrix (RTO, RPO, MTD)Objective Gaps (rule RR-15)
Step
The business owner records the workaround and who starts it
The business owner writes and accepts it. It says how much of the service it keeps, how long it can run before harm reaches Severe, who starts it and who runs it, what it needs, and how it ends. For example, dispatch from printed pick lists of the next day's orders, printed each evening. If the owner will be leading the crisis, name someone else to start it in the first hour.
In the pack
- P22-A05 Cyber Recovery Plan TemplateThe workaround (rule RR-06)
- P22-A08 Crisis & Recovery Responsibility MatrixRole Holders (rule RR-19)
- P22-A08 Crisis & Recovery Responsibility MatrixResponsibilities (rule RA-02)
Decision
Would the workaround still run if an attack took the systems?
What the workaround needs are dependencies too. A workaround that relies on a system the attack also takes down is no workaround: phones on the same network, or a system that waits for the same foundations. If you cannot tell, take the cautious branch.
- Yes: Has it been tried with the people who would run it?
- No, or not known: Change it so it needs nothing the attack would take
In the pack
- P22-A05 Cyber Recovery Plan TemplateThe workaround
Step
Change it so it needs nothing the attack would take
Move what it depends on outside the systems at risk, as the pack's example does with pick lists printed in advance each evening. Then record what the workaround needs as dependencies of the service, so the register shows them.
In the pack
- P22-A05 Cyber Recovery Plan TemplateThe workaround
- P22-A07 Resilience Dependency RegisterRegister (rule RR-09)
Decision
Has it been tried with the people who would run it?
Only a trial shows that the phones, the forms and the people are there. Try it in a drill or on a quiet day. A trial does not count as a recovery test; it is the only way to know the workaround works. In the pack's example, four of five workarounds were untried.
- Yes: Keep it in the plan with its limit and last trial date
- No: Record it as untried in the plan and book a trial
In the pack
- P22-A05 Cyber Recovery Plan TemplateThe workaround (rule RR-06)
- P22-A04 Critical Service Recovery Objectives Matrix (RTO, RPO, MTD)Objectives (rule RR-06)
Outcome
Record it as untried in the plan and book a trial
Marking it untried stops anyone relying on it before it has been shown to work. Book a trial, perhaps alongside the service's next recovery test, so the plan can show how long the workaround really lasts.
In the pack
- P22-A02 Business Continuity & ICT Resilience PolicyImpact analysis and objectives (rule RR-06)
- P22-A03 Cyber Recovery Operating ProcedureThe planned test, RV-2027-03
Outcome
Keep it in the plan with its limit and last trial date
Record when it was last tried, how, and what was learned, and how long it keeps harm below Severe. Keep a copy of the plan where it can be reached when the main systems are down. Review it with the plan after every test and real recovery.
In the pack
- P22-A05 Cyber Recovery Plan TemplateThe workaround (rule RR-06)
- P22-A02 Business Continuity & ICT Resilience PolicyTesting and review (rule RR-16)
Step
The crisis lead invokes the plan; the workaround starts at once
The crisis lead invokes the service's continuity plan and logs the time; the recovery time counts from the decision to recover. The workaround starts at invocation, before anyone knows how slow recovery will be. If an attack is the cause or may be, nothing is restored or reconnected until the incident manager agrees.
In the pack
- P22-A05 Cyber Recovery Plan TemplateFirst hour of this plan (rule RA-04)
- P22-A03 Cyber Recovery Operating ProcedurePartial and degraded running (rule RR-06)
Decision
Is the business owner free to start it in the first hour?
No one should hold two roles that must act in the same hour. A business owner who is also the crisis lead, or holds another first-hour role, cannot start the workaround as well. In the pack's example, online ordering's owner leads the crisis, so a manager they named starts its workaround.
- Yes: Run it, and keep every paper record for reconciliation
- No, or not known: The person named for the first hour starts it
In the pack
- P22-A02 Business Continuity & ICT Resilience PolicyRoles and decisions (rule RR-19)
- P22-A08 Crisis & Recovery Responsibility MatrixRole Holders (rule RR-19)
Step
The person named for the first hour starts it
Use the name in the plan. If nobody was named, or that person cannot be reached, someone must still start it: the service's deputy business owner is the natural choice, and your plan should say so. Record in the crisis log who acted. Starting the workaround cannot wait until the crisis lead is free.
In the pack
- P22-A08 Crisis & Recovery Responsibility MatrixRole Holders (rule RR-19)
- P22-A08 Crisis & Recovery Responsibility MatrixFirst Hours
Step
Run it, and keep every paper record for reconciliation
Tell the people who run it how long it may need to last. A workaround that keeps data on paper adds to the reconciliation after recovery, so keep the paper. Plan on an untried workaround lasting less than its plan says.
In the pack
- P22-A03 Cyber Recovery Operating ProcedurePartial and degraded running (rule RR-06)
- P22-A05 Cyber Recovery Plan TemplateFirst hour of this plan (rule RA-04)
Decision
Will the workaround last until the service returns?
Compare how long the workaround can keep harm below Severe with the recovery's target time. Recheck at every crisis team update. If it is untried, or you cannot tell, take the cautious branch.
- Yes: Switch back on the plan's criteria; reconcile; record the gap
- No, or not known: The business owner tells the crisis lead, who may change the order
In the pack
- P22-A03 Cyber Recovery Operating ProcedurePartial and degraded running
- P22-A03 Cyber Recovery Operating ProcedureWhen to escalate (rules RR-06, RR-08)
Step
The business owner tells the crisis lead, who may change the order
When a workaround nears its limit, its business owner tells the crisis lead. The crisis lead sets the recovery order and may move this service earlier, recording why. The order normally runs foundations first, then services by recovery time, shortest first.
In the pack
- P22-A03 Cyber Recovery Operating ProcedurePartial and degraded running (rule RR-08)
- P22-A08 Crisis & Recovery Responsibility MatrixResponsibilities (rule RA-08)
- P22-A02 Business Continuity & ICT Resilience PolicyCyber recovery (rule RR-08)
Decision
Is it still heading past its maximum tolerable downtime?
After any change to the order, check again whether the service and its workaround together will keep harm below Severe until it returns. If not, or you cannot tell, escalate.
- No: Bring back the most important part first
- Yes, or not known: Add people, supplier help or partial service; tell the approver
In the pack
- P22-A03 Cyber Recovery Operating ProcedureWhen to escalate (rules RR-06, RR-17)
Outcome
Add people, supplier help or partial service; tell the approver
The crisis lead decides what else can be done: more people, a supplier's help, a partial service. The approver is told: the board, or a board risk committee it has delegated to; the management board in a two-tier structure; executive management where there is no board. Record each decision in the crisis log.
In the pack
- P22-A03 Cyber Recovery Operating ProcedureWhen to escalate (rules RR-06, RR-17)
- P22-A05 Cyber Recovery Plan TemplateShort-term, partial and long-term options
Step
Bring back the most important part first
Part of a service can return before the whole: one site first, reading orders before taking them, one warehouse at reduced volume. Each part passes the return-to-service gates for the systems it uses, the business owner confirms what users can and cannot do, and the crisis log records it with its own time.
In the pack
- P22-A03 Cyber Recovery Operating ProcedurePartial and degraded running
Outcome
Switch back on the plan's criteria; reconcile; record the gap
The workaround ends when the service runs normally again and the business owner has confirmed it works. Enter and reconcile the backlog it built up. A recovery time a real recovery missed is an objective gap, and the plan is reviewed with what was learned.
In the pack
- P22-A05 Cyber Recovery Plan TemplateWhen the plan stops (rule RR-18)
- P22-A02 Business Continuity & ICT Resilience PolicyTesting and review (rules RR-15, RR-16)
Practical checklist
- Record the shortfall as an objective gap with an owner and due date, and tell the service's risk owner.
- Have the business owner record the workaround: how much it keeps, how long it can run, who starts it, what it needs and how it ends.
- Check the workaround needs nothing an attack would take, and change it if it does.
- Try it with the people who would run it, or record it as untried and book a trial.
- In a crisis, start it as soon as the crisis lead invokes the plan.
- Recheck at every crisis team update whether it will last until the service returns, and tell the crisis lead when it nears its limit.
- Bring back the most important part of the service first where you can.
- Switch back when the business owner confirms the service works, then enter and reconcile the backlog.
Evidence to have ready
- The workaround in the service's plan, with its limit, who starts it, what it needs and its last trial date, or untried.
- The objective gap with its owner, closing change and due date.
- The crisis log: invocation time, who started the workaround, changes to the recovery order and why.
- Any escalation as the service neared its maximum tolerable downtime, and who was told.
- The reconciliation of the backlog the workaround built up, and the plan review after recovery.
Assumptions
- Each critical service has a business owner who has agreed its maximum tolerable downtime, recovery time and recovery point.
- Someone is named as crisis lead, with a deputy, and can invoke a service's continuity plan.
- Copies of the plans and contact lists can be reached when the main systems are down.
Not covered here
- A critical supplier whose recovery time is longer than the service can wait. That is “If a critical supplier's recovery time is longer than our service can wait, then what do we do?”.
- Agreeing the recovery time and data-loss targets in the first place. That is “How do we agree recovery time and data-loss targets with the business?”.
- Deciding whether to restore or rebuild systems after ransomware. That is “If ransomware has encrypted production, do we restore or rebuild?”.
- Who takes each decision during the crisis, and who stands in. That is “Who decides what during a crisis, and who stands in when they cannot?”.
Related questions
- If a critical supplier is unavailable, can the service continue?
- If a critical supplier's recovery time is longer than our service can wait, then what do we do?
- Who decides what during a crisis, and who stands in when they cannot?
- When do we test recovery, and how much testing is enough?
- How do we agree recovery time and data-loss targets with the business?