How do we…
How do we agree recovery time and data-loss targets with the business?
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The short answer
- Recommendation
- Have each critical service's business owner agree its recovery time and data-loss targets from an impact analysis, with IT saying what is achievable and what a faster recovery costs. Then check the targets against dependencies, backups, suppliers, cyber recovery and the last test, and treat every failed check as a gap.
- Reasoning
- Only the business knows how long it can manage without a service; IT knows what a faster recovery costs. Targets set by one side alone are either unaffordable or too slow. Rating the harm at fixed times shows when an outage turns serious: the first point it reaches Severe is the maximum tolerable downtime. The recovery time sits below it to leave a margin. A service comes back no faster than its slowest dependency, and loses at least the data since its least frequent backup.
- Considerations
- The time points and intervals are the pack's defaults: harm rated at 4, 8, 24, 48, 72, 120 and 168 hours, and targets reviewed at least every 12 months. Your own policy may set others.
- Do not lower a target to fit what IT can do today. A gap closes when its checks pass, or when the business owner re-agrees the target on a new impact analysis.
- A service can pass its recovery test and still miss its target after an attack, because nothing is trusted until the foundations are rebuilt. Work out the cyber recovery time separately.
- The approver of the critical services and their targets depends on your governance: the board, or a board risk committee it has delegated to; the management board in a two-tier structure; executive management where there is no board.
The decision, step by step
Select any step for the reasoning behind it and where the pack covers it.
- Start
- Step
- Decision
- Outcome
- Loop back
Keyboard: Tab to a step, arrow keys move along the flow, Enter pins its explanation, + and − zoom, 0 fits the diagram, Esc closes. The text version below has the same content.
Where a step quotes a number, it is the default in the CISO Times pack. Your own standard may set a different one.
Read as text
The same flow written out: each step, its reasoning and where the pack covers it. 21 steps.
Start
A critical service needs agreed recovery targets
Three numbers describe how long a service can be without its systems. The maximum tolerable downtime (MTD) is the longest it can be down before the harm is Severe. The recovery time objective (RTO) is when it must be back, counted from the decision to recover it. The recovery point objective (RPO) is the most data, measured in time, it can lose. Only the business can say what it needs; IT can say what that costs.
In the pack
- P22-A02 Business Continuity & ICT Resilience PolicyImpact analysis and objectives (rules RR-03, RR-04)
- P22-A04 Critical Service Recovery Objectives Matrix (RTO, RPO, MTD)Definitions
Decision
Does the service have a named business owner?
Every critical service has a named business owner, who sets and agrees its objectives. IT proposes what is achievable; the business owner decides what is needed. Objectives set by IT alone are not agreed. If you are unsure who it is, take the cautious branch.
- Yes: Rate the harm at 4, 8, 24, 48, 72, 120 and 168 hours
- No, or not known: Name the manager whose team stops working when it stops
In the pack
- P22-A02 Business Continuity & ICT Resilience PolicyScope and critical services (rule RR-02)
- P22-A08 Crisis & Recovery Responsibility MatrixResponsibilities (rule RA-02)
Step
Name the manager whose team stops working when it stops
The business owner is usually the manager whose team stops working when the service stops. IT proposes; it does not set the objectives alone. Have someone who runs no system in scope, such as a risk manager, coordinate the workshops: they will be checking objectives that IT proposes.
In the pack
- P22-A02 Business Continuity & ICT Resilience PolicyRoles and responsibilities (rule RR-02)
Step
Rate the harm at 4, 8, 24, 48, 72, 120 and 168 hours
This is the business impact analysis. With the business owner, rate how bad an outage would be at each time point on your risk register's impact areas, such as financial, service, data, legal and reputation, and record the worst level at each point. The time points are the pack's defaults; keep one at each day of the first week. Using the risk register's scale means a service's harm is judged the same way in risk management and in recovery. Write down what drives the harm.
In the pack
- P22-A04 Critical Service Recovery Objectives Matrix (RTO, RPO, MTD)Impact Analysis (rule RR-03)
- P05-A02 Risk Assessment Methodology & Scoring ModelImpact
- P22-A05 Cyber Recovery Plan TemplateBusiness impact analysis (rule RR-03)
- P22-A02 Business Continuity & ICT Resilience PolicyThe settings (rule RR-03)
Decision
Does any area reach Severe within 168 hours?
A critical service is one whose disruption beyond its maximum tolerable downtime would cause Severe harm on the risk register's impact scale. If the harm never reaches Severe in the first week, the method gives the service no maximum. If the owner cannot say, keep the service on the list and take the cautious branch.
- Yes, or not known: Set the MTD at the first point the harm reaches Severe
- No: Raise it at the next review of the critical services list
In the pack
- P22-A02 Business Continuity & ICT Resilience PolicyScope and critical services (rule RR-01)
- P22-A04 Critical Service Recovery Objectives Matrix (RTO, RPO, MTD)Settings
Outcome
Raise it at the next review of the critical services list
On this method the service does not meet the test of a critical service. The list of critical services is approved with the policy and reviewed with the objectives, so propose the change there rather than inventing objectives for it. Check first that the harm was rated on the worst area at each point.
In the pack
- P22-A02 Business Continuity & ICT Resilience PolicyScope and critical services (rule RR-01)
Step
Set the MTD at the first point the harm reaches Severe
The MTD is the first time point at which any area reaches Severe. Every other objective is set below it. If the owner hesitates between two points, taking the earlier one is the safer judgement. In the pack's example, online ordering reaches Severe on the service area at 48 hours, which matches the risk register's scenario of ordering being offline for more than 2 days.
In the pack
- P22-A02 Business Continuity & ICT Resilience PolicyImpact analysis and objectives (rule RR-03)
- P22-A05 Cyber Recovery Plan TemplateBusiness impact analysis
Step
IT proposes achievable times and what a faster one costs
Only the business knows how long it can manage without a service; IT knows what a faster recovery costs. Bring the last recovery test's time, the backup intervals and the supplier contracts to the workshop, so the owner sees what is achievable today and what it would take to do better.
In the pack
- P22-A02 Business Continuity & ICT Resilience PolicyScope and critical services (rule RR-02)
- P22-A04 Critical Service Recovery Objectives Matrix (RTO, RPO, MTD)Instructions
Step
The owner agrees an RTO, an RPO and why that loss is bearable
The business owner agrees the RTO and the RPO, and records how the data lost would be found again, such as orders keyed again from customers' confirmations. Record the date they were agreed. An RTO equal to the maximum leaves no margin for anything to go wrong.
In the pack
- P22-A04 Critical Service Recovery Objectives Matrix (RTO, RPO, MTD)Objectives (rules RR-02, RR-04)
- P22-A02 Business Continuity & ICT Resilience PolicyImpact analysis and objectives (rule RR-04)
Decision
Is the RTO shorter than the MTD?
This is the matrix's first check, MX-01. A recovery time equal to or longer than the maximum means the service would already be causing Severe harm when it came back. Agree a shorter one.
- Yes: Check the targets against dependencies, backups and attack
- No: The owner agrees an RTO, an RPO and why that loss is bearable (back to an earlier step)
In the pack
- P22-A04 Critical Service Recovery Objectives Matrix (RTO, RPO, MTD)Checks (rule MX-01)
Step
Check the targets against dependencies, backups and attack
A service comes back no faster than its slowest dependency, and loses at least the data since its least frequent backup. Check that every system and supplier recovers within the RTO (MX-02), every data set is backed up at least as often as the RPO (MX-03), every supplier has a contracted time within the RTO (MX-04), and the cyber recovery time is within the RTO (MX-05).
In the pack
- P22-A02 Business Continuity & ICT Resilience PolicyHow each service's objectives are checked (rule MX-02 to MX-05)
- P22-A04 Critical Service Recovery Objectives Matrix (RTO, RPO, MTD)Checks
Decision
Do the dependency, backup, supplier and attack checks pass?
The cyber recovery time is the foundations' rebuild, such as the sign-in directory and the network, plus the slowest system you restore yourself. A service can pass its recovery test and still fail it: the test restored onto trusted systems, while after an attack nothing is trusted until the foundations are rebuilt. A supplier time the contract does not give fails the check. An estimate counts in the check until a recovery test measures it; plan that test (RR-14).
- Yes: Has a test in the last 12 months met the RTO?
- No, or not known: Record each failed check as a gap with an owner and due date
In the pack
- P22-A04 Critical Service Recovery Objectives Matrix (RTO, RPO, MTD)Checks (rule MX-05)
- P22-A05 Cyber Recovery Plan TemplateThe cyber recovery time (rule RR-07)
- P22-A07 Resilience Dependency RegisterFinding dependencies (rule RR-14)
Decision
Has a test in the last 12 months met the RTO?
An untested recovery time is an estimate. A recovery test recovers the service or its systems, restores its data, and measures the time and the data lost against the objectives (MX-06). A tabletop exercise is not a recovery test.
- Yes: Send the objectives for approval; review them every 12 months
- Not tested, or not known: Plan a recovery test, within 6 months if never tested
- Tested, and it missed the RTO: Record each failed check as a gap with an owner and due date
In the pack
- P22-A02 Business Continuity & ICT Resilience PolicyTesting and review (rule RR-14)
- P22-A04 Critical Service Recovery Objectives Matrix (RTO, RPO, MTD)Checks (rule MX-06)
Step
Plan a recovery test, within 6 months if never tested
Under the pack's defaults, a service never tested is tested within 6 months of its objectives being agreed, and every critical service at least every 12 months. Until then its status is Not proven: the objectives may be right, but nobody has shown they can be met. The missing test is a failed check, so record it as a gap whose change is the test, as the pack's example does for payments.
In the pack
- P22-A02 Business Continuity & ICT Resilience PolicyTesting and review (rules RR-14, RR-15)
- P22-A02 Business Continuity & ICT Resilience PolicyHow each service's objectives are checked
- P22-A04 Critical Service Recovery Objectives Matrix (RTO, RPO, MTD)Objective Gaps (rule MX-06)
Step
Record each failed check as a gap with an owner and due date
Every failed check, and every objective a test missed, is an objective gap. Its owner agrees the change that closes it within 10 working days, the pack's default, with a due date. Tell the service's risk owner, who reassesses the risk. Do not lower the objective to fit what IT can do: a gap closes when its checks pass, or when the business owner re-agrees the objective on a new impact analysis.
In the pack
- P22-A02 Business Continuity & ICT Resilience PolicyTesting and review (rule RR-15)
- P22-A04 Critical Service Recovery Objectives Matrix (RTO, RPO, MTD)Objective Gaps (rule P05 RM-10)
Decision
Could the service be back later than its RTO?
Look at the last test's time, the dependency and supplier times and the cyber recovery time. If any is longer than the RTO, or not known, the service needs a workaround. A gap in backup frequency alone loses data but does not delay the return.
- Yes, or not known: The owner records a workaround that keeps harm below Severe
- No: Will the business pay for the change that closes the gap?
In the pack
- P22-A02 Business Continuity & ICT Resilience PolicyImpact analysis and objectives (rule RR-06)
- P22-A04 Critical Service Recovery Objectives Matrix (RTO, RPO, MTD)Checks (rule MX-05)
Step
The owner records a workaround that keeps harm below Severe
A workaround runs the service, or its most important part, without its systems for a set time, such as dispatch from printed pick lists. The business owner records it, who starts it and how long it can run before harm reaches Severe. Beyond the MTD the status is Not achievable, and the workaround must hold for longer. One never tried is recorded as untried. The gap stays open until its change is done.
In the pack
- P22-A02 Business Continuity & ICT Resilience PolicyImpact analysis and objectives (rule RR-06)
- P22-A05 Cyber Recovery Plan TemplateThe workaround (rule RR-06)
- P22-A02 Business Continuity & ICT Resilience PolicyHow each service's objectives are checked
Decision
Will the business pay for the change that closes the gap?
IT prices the options, such as a faster platform, more frequent backups or a shorter contracted supplier time. The business owner weighs the cost against the harm the impact analysis showed. If nobody will commit to the cost, take the cautious branch: the gap is a risk decision, not an IT task.
- Yes: Agree the change, its owner, cost and due date
- No, or not known: Take it to the risk owner to treat or accept at the right level
In the pack
- P22-A02 Business Continuity & ICT Resilience PolicyScope and critical services (rule RR-02)
- P05-A02 Risk Assessment Methodology & Scoring ModelTreatment (rule RM-07)
Step
Agree the change, its owner, cost and due date
Record the change in your objectives matrix, and the treatment action in your risk register with an owner, a due date, a cost and the residual score expected. In the pack's example, online ordering's gap closes by rebuilding the platform's recovery and then testing it against its 24 hours.
In the pack
- P22-A04 Critical Service Recovery Objectives Matrix (RTO, RPO, MTD)Objective Gaps (rule RR-15)
- P05-A02 Risk Assessment Methodology & Scoring ModelTreatment (rule RM-07)
Outcome
Take it to the risk owner to treat or accept at the right level
The risk owner reassesses the risk and decides how to treat it. Accepting it is recorded and approved at the level the residual rating sets. Outside tolerance, only the board or its equivalent may accept: the board, or a board risk committee it has delegated to; the management board in a two-tier structure; executive management where there is no board. An objective gap is not an exception, so it needs no waiver.
In the pack
- P05-A02 Risk Assessment Methodology & Scoring ModelTreatment (rules RM-06, RM-08)
- P22-A02 Business Continuity & ICT Resilience PolicyExceptions
Outcome
Send the objectives for approval; review them every 12 months
The approver approves the critical services and their objectives with the policy: the board, or a board risk committee it has delegated to; the management board in a two-tier structure; executive management where there is no board. The business owner reviews the analysis and objectives at least every 12 months, the pack's default, and after a significant incident, a missed test, or a change to the service, its suppliers or its risks.
In the pack
- P22-A02 Business Continuity & ICT Resilience PolicyRoles and responsibilities (rule RR-01)
- P22-A02 Business Continuity & ICT Resilience PolicyImpact analysis and objectives (rule RR-05)
- P22-A04 Critical Service Recovery Objectives Matrix (RTO, RPO, MTD)Checks (rule MX-07)
Practical checklist
- Name each critical service's business owner, usually the manager whose team stops working when it stops.
- Rate the harm at each time point on your risk register's impact areas, and set the maximum tolerable downtime at the first point any area reaches Severe.
- Bring the last test's time, the backup intervals and the supplier contracts, so IT can show what is achievable and what faster would cost.
- Have the business owner agree a recovery time shorter than the maximum, a recovery point, and how the lost data would be found again.
- Check every dependency, backup interval, supplier contract time and the cyber recovery time against the targets, and check the last test met them.
- Record each failed check as a gap whose owner agrees the closing change within 10 working days by the pack's default, and tell the risk owner.
- Where the service could be back later than its recovery time, have the business owner record a workaround and who starts it.
- Send the services and their targets for approval, and review them every 12 months and after a significant incident, missed test or change.
Evidence to have ready
- The impact analysis for each critical service, with the harm rated at each time point and what drives it.
- The agreed recovery time and recovery point, with the date they were agreed and the business owner who agreed them.
- The result of each check against dependencies, backups, supplier contracts, cyber recovery time and the last test.
- Each objective gap with its owner, closing change and due date, and the risk owner's reassessment.
- Each workaround, how long it can run before harm reaches Severe, who starts it, and whether it has been tried.
Assumptions
- You keep a list of critical services, and a risk register with an impact scale whose top level is Severe or its equivalent.
- Each critical service has a manager whose team stops working when it stops, who can act as its business owner.
- The figures here are the pack's defaults, which your own policy and risk method may change.
Not covered here
- Finding everything the service depends on, in detail. That is “How do we find the dependencies that decide whether a service can meet its recovery time?”.
- Running the business while a service is down beyond its recovery time. That is “If a service cannot be back within its recovery time, how do we keep the business running?”.
- How often to test recovery, and what counts as a test. That is “When do we test recovery, and how much testing is enough?”.
- Choosing between treating, transferring, avoiding and accepting a risk. That is “How do we decide between treating, transferring, avoiding and accepting a risk?”.
Related questions
- If ransomware has encrypted production, do we restore or rebuild?
- How do we decide between treating, transferring, avoiding and accepting a risk?
- How do we find the dependencies that decide whether a service can meet its recovery time?
- If a service cannot be back within its recovery time, how do we keep the business running?
- When do we test recovery, and how much testing is enough?