Break-Glass Account Control Checklist
Verifies emergency accounts are secured, monitored, tested and reset after every use.
Available soon
- Format
- Excel
- Size
- 74 KB
- Length
- 13 sheets
- Version
- 2.0
- Updated
What's inside
What changed
- 2.0
Rewritten to the depth of the other CISO Times packs: each account's tests, next test due and count against PA-12; the ten checks for every account with evidence and follow-up; each use timed against PA-12's deadlines with the review delay in working days; the five after-use steps with the example's completion; and a Summary with readiness, PAM-06 and a signature block.
- 1.0
Published.
Preview
The workbook's sheets as you will receive them, with its example rows and the values its formulas calculate. Highlighted [[text]] is for you to replace; rows marked EXAMPLE are for you to delete. Wide sheets scroll sideways. The cover, document control and changelog sheets are in the file.
Instructions
How to use this workbook
| Step | What to do |
|---|---|
| 1 | Set the as-at date and the values PA-12 sets at the top of the Summary sheet. The EXAMPLE uses 2026-09-30. |
| 2 | List each break-glass account on Accounts and tests: its platform, system, owner, where its credential is kept and its second factor. The count check compares the accounts on each system with the number PA-12 sets. |
| 3 | Test every account every [[3]] months: open the safe with two people, sign in, confirm the alert reached the named people, change the password, and reseal. Record the date, whether sign-in worked, the minutes the alert took and the reseal date. The next test due calculates. |
| 4 | Run the 10 checks for every account on Account checks at every test and after every use, as the standard sets them, and look at them again at each control review. Look at the evidence, not at what people say. A Fail or Not applicable needs its evidence or reason; a Fail needs a finding. |
| 5 | Record every use on Uses the day it happens: who used it, why, when it started and ended, when and to whom it was declared, when the alert arrived, when the credential was changed and when the session was reviewed. The deadlines and the on-time checks calculate. |
| 6 | Record each of the five steps on After use as it is done, with the evidence. The record is closed only when the cause is fixed and the Head of Information Security has reviewed the session. |
| 7 | Read the Summary: readiness for each account, PAM-06 for the quarter, and the sign-off. A use not reviewed within [[1]] working day puts PAM-06 outside tolerance: it goes to the next executive committee with its plan. |
| 8 | To clear the EXAMPLE, delete the contents of the Example column and of every yellow cell on the four working sheets. Keep the checks, the after-use steps and the formulas. |
Legend
Yellow cells are inputs. Everything else is calculated or fixed — do not overwrite formulas.
| EXAMPLE | Rows marked EXAMPLE in the first column show how a completed row looks. Delete them before approval. |
EXAMPLE: a wholesale distributor with about 900 staff, three warehouses and an online ordering service that takes 60% of its orders, as at 30 Sep 2026. It holds 2 break-glass accounts on its cloud identity tenant and 1 on its directory, all tested on 14 Sep 2026. On 5 Sep 2026 a sign-in policy change locked every administrator out, and Beth Owen used bg-cloud-01. The use was declared and the credential changed in time, but nobody reviewed the session until 25 Sep 2026: each side thought the other would (PF-02). The Head of Information Security is now named as the reviewer of every use.
Adapting for a small organisation: keep the number PA-12 sets even if you have one administrator; the second cloud account is what saves you when the first is the one locked out. One safe and one second-site envelope are enough.
Adapting for a regulated entity (NIS2, DORA): the checklist is the record that emergency access is assigned only when needed and controlled (Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1774 Article 21(a) and (e)(ii)). Keep every test and every use record.
Adapting where a service provider runs your IT: the provider may hold the on-call role, as in the EXAMPLE. Your Head of IT still owns the accounts and the safe, the alert still reaches your own people, and the review is never left to the provider.
Accounts and tests
One row per break-glass account (PA-12). Yellow columns are inputs; white columns calculate against the as-at date on the Summary sheet.
| Example | Account | Platform | System ID | Owner | Credential kept | Second factor | Previous test | Last test | Sign-in worked | Alert after (minutes) | Resealed on | Tested by | Next test due (calc) | Test status (calc) | Gap between tests (calc) | Resealed (calc) | On this system (calc) | PA-12 sets (calc) | Count check, BG-01 (calc) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EXAMPLE | bg-emergency | On-premises directory | PS-01 | Mark Ellis | Sealed in the safe | 15 Jun 2026 | 14 Sep 2026 | Yes | 2 | 14 Sep 2026 | Mark Ellis, with Ruth Okafor | 14 Dec 2026 | Tested | Within 3 months | In time | 1 | 1 | As PA-12 sets | |
| EXAMPLE | bg-cloud-01 | Cloud identity tenant | PS-02 | Mark Ellis | Sealed in the safe (password and security key) | Sealed security key | 16 Jun 2026 | 14 Sep 2026 | Yes | 2 | 14 Sep 2026 | Mark Ellis, with Ruth Okafor | 14 Dec 2026 | Tested | Within 3 months | In time | 2 | 2 | As PA-12 sets |
| EXAMPLE | bg-cloud-02 | Cloud identity tenant | PS-02 | Mark Ellis | Sealed in the safe (password and security key) | Sealed security key | 16 Jun 2026 | 14 Sep 2026 | Yes | 2 | 14 Sep 2026 | Mark Ellis, with Ruth Okafor | 14 Dec 2026 | Tested | Within 3 months | In time | 2 | 2 | As PA-12 sets |
Account checks
The 10 checks for every break-glass account, at every test and after every use, and again at each control review (CT-11 in the Privileged Access Control Review Workbook passes only if every check here passes). The check and rule columns are fixed; add blank rows for a new account.
| Example | Account | Check ID | Check | Rule | Result | Evidence, or the reason for a Fail or Not applicable | Checked on | Finding | Follow-up (calc) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EXAMPLE | bg-emergency | BG-01 | The number of break-glass accounts is the number PA-12 sets for the platform, no more | PA-12 | Pass | 2 on the cloud identity tenant (PS-02) and 1 on the directory (PS-01): the numbers PA-12 sets | 24 Sep 2026 | OK | |
| EXAMPLE | bg-emergency | BG-02 | Each is a cloud-only or local account, not synchronised, not tied to one person's device or phone | PA-12 | Pass | Account settings read at the test: not synchronised, and no person's device, phone or second factor registered | 24 Sep 2026 | OK | |
| EXAMPLE | bg-emergency | BG-03 | Each is left out only of the sign-in policies that could lock every administrator out, and the exclusion is recorded | PA-12 | Pass | Sign-in policy exclusions listed at the test: only the policies that could lock every administrator out | 24 Sep 2026 | OK | |
| EXAMPLE | bg-emergency | BG-04 | Its credential is sealed in the safe, in numbered tamper-evident envelopes, with a second set at a second site | PA-12 | Pass | Envelope numbers checked at the test on 14 Sep 2026, and resealed the same day | 24 Sep 2026 | OK | |
| EXAMPLE | bg-emergency | BG-05 | Every sign-in raises an alert to the named people, and the alert fired at the last test | PA-12 | Pass | The alert reached the named people 2 minutes after the test sign-in | 24 Sep 2026 | OK | |
| EXAMPLE | bg-emergency | BG-06 | It was tested within the last [[3]] months: sign-in works and the alert fired | PA-12 | Pass | Tested 14 Sep 2026 by Mark Ellis, with Ruth Okafor: sign-in worked and the alert fired | 24 Sep 2026 | OK | |
| EXAMPLE | bg-emergency | BG-07 | After every use or test that opened the seal, the credential was changed and resealed within [[1]] working day | PA-10 | Pass | Changed and resealed on 14 Sep 2026, the day of the test | 24 Sep 2026 | OK | |
| EXAMPLE | bg-emergency | BG-08 | Every use was declared, and its session reviewed by the Head of Information Security within [[1]] working day | PA-12 | Not applicable | No use of this account in the quarter | 24 Sep 2026 | OK | |
| EXAMPLE | bg-emergency | BG-09 | It is in the inventory, with the Head of IT as owner | PA-01 | Pass | In the inventory as ACC-10, owner Mark Ellis (Head of IT) | 24 Sep 2026 | OK | |
| EXAMPLE | bg-emergency | BG-10 | Everyone who can open the safe is on the list, and the credential was changed when anyone on it left | PA-14 | Pass | Safe list checked at the test; the credential was last changed on 14 Sep 2026 | 24 Sep 2026 | OK | |
| EXAMPLE | bg-cloud-01 | BG-01 | The number of break-glass accounts is the number PA-12 sets for the platform, no more | PA-12 | Pass | 2 on the cloud identity tenant (PS-02) and 1 on the directory (PS-01): the numbers PA-12 sets | 24 Sep 2026 | OK | |
| EXAMPLE | bg-cloud-01 | BG-02 | Each is a cloud-only or local account, not synchronised, not tied to one person's device or phone | PA-12 | Pass | Account settings read at the test: not synchronised, and no person's device, phone or second factor registered | 24 Sep 2026 | OK | |
| EXAMPLE | bg-cloud-01 | BG-03 | Each is left out only of the sign-in policies that could lock every administrator out, and the exclusion is recorded | PA-12 | Pass | Sign-in policy exclusions listed at the test: only the policies that could lock every administrator out | 24 Sep 2026 | OK | |
| EXAMPLE | bg-cloud-01 | BG-04 | Its credential is sealed in the safe, in numbered tamper-evident envelopes, with a second set at a second site | PA-12 | Pass | Envelope numbers checked at the test on 14 Sep 2026, and resealed the same day | 24 Sep 2026 | OK | |
| EXAMPLE | bg-cloud-01 | BG-05 | Every sign-in raises an alert to the named people, and the alert fired at the last test | PA-12 | Pass | The alert reached the named people 2 minutes after the test sign-in | 24 Sep 2026 | OK | |
| EXAMPLE | bg-cloud-01 | BG-06 | It was tested within the last [[3]] months: sign-in works and the alert fired | PA-12 | Pass | Tested 14 Sep 2026 by Mark Ellis, with Ruth Okafor: sign-in worked and the alert fired | 24 Sep 2026 | OK | |
| EXAMPLE | bg-cloud-01 | BG-07 | After every use or test that opened the seal, the credential was changed and resealed within [[1]] working day | PA-10 | Pass | Changed and resealed on 14 Sep 2026, the day of the test; after BGU-2026-01 the password was changed on 7 Sep 2026 | 24 Sep 2026 | OK | |
| EXAMPLE | bg-cloud-01 | BG-08 | Every use was declared, and its session reviewed by the Head of Information Security within [[1]] working day | PA-12 | Fail | BGU-2026-01 declared by phone and the credential changed in time; the session was reviewed on 25 Sep 2026, 14 working days late | 24 Sep 2026 | PF-02 | Follow up PF-02 |
| EXAMPLE | bg-cloud-01 | BG-09 | It is in the inventory, with the Head of IT as owner | PA-01 | Pass | In the inventory as ACC-17, owner Mark Ellis (Head of IT) | 24 Sep 2026 | OK | |
| EXAMPLE | bg-cloud-01 | BG-10 | Everyone who can open the safe is on the list, and the credential was changed when anyone on it left | PA-14 | Pass | Safe list checked at the test; the credential was last changed on 14 Sep 2026 | 24 Sep 2026 | OK | |
| EXAMPLE | bg-cloud-02 | BG-01 | The number of break-glass accounts is the number PA-12 sets for the platform, no more | PA-12 | Pass | 2 on the cloud identity tenant (PS-02) and 1 on the directory (PS-01): the numbers PA-12 sets | 24 Sep 2026 | OK | |
| EXAMPLE | bg-cloud-02 | BG-02 | Each is a cloud-only or local account, not synchronised, not tied to one person's device or phone | PA-12 | Pass | Account settings read at the test: not synchronised, and no person's device, phone or second factor registered | 24 Sep 2026 | OK | |
| EXAMPLE | bg-cloud-02 | BG-03 | Each is left out only of the sign-in policies that could lock every administrator out, and the exclusion is recorded | PA-12 | Pass | Sign-in policy exclusions listed at the test: only the policies that could lock every administrator out | 24 Sep 2026 | OK | |
| EXAMPLE | bg-cloud-02 | BG-04 | Its credential is sealed in the safe, in numbered tamper-evident envelopes, with a second set at a second site | PA-12 | Pass | Envelope numbers checked at the test on 14 Sep 2026, and resealed the same day | 24 Sep 2026 | OK | |
| EXAMPLE | bg-cloud-02 | BG-05 | Every sign-in raises an alert to the named people, and the alert fired at the last test | PA-12 | Pass | The alert reached the named people 2 minutes after the test sign-in | 24 Sep 2026 | OK | |
| EXAMPLE | bg-cloud-02 | BG-06 | It was tested within the last [[3]] months: sign-in works and the alert fired | PA-12 | Pass | Tested 14 Sep 2026 by Mark Ellis, with Ruth Okafor: sign-in worked and the alert fired | 24 Sep 2026 | OK | |
| EXAMPLE | bg-cloud-02 | BG-07 | After every use or test that opened the seal, the credential was changed and resealed within [[1]] working day | PA-10 | Pass | Changed and resealed on 14 Sep 2026, the day of the test | 24 Sep 2026 | OK | |
| EXAMPLE | bg-cloud-02 | BG-08 | Every use was declared, and its session reviewed by the Head of Information Security within [[1]] working day | PA-12 | Not applicable | No use of this account in the quarter | 24 Sep 2026 | OK | |
| EXAMPLE | bg-cloud-02 | BG-09 | It is in the inventory, with the Head of IT as owner | PA-01 | Pass | In the inventory as ACC-18, owner Mark Ellis (Head of IT) | 24 Sep 2026 | OK | |
| EXAMPLE | bg-cloud-02 | BG-10 | Everyone who can open the safe is on the list, and the credential was changed when anyone on it left | PA-14 | Pass | Safe list checked at the test; the credential was last changed on 14 Sep 2026 | 24 Sep 2026 | OK |
Uses
One row per use, recorded the day it happens (PA-12). Declared before or at the sign-in; the credential changed and the session reviewed within [[1]] working day. A test that opens the seal is recorded on Accounts and tests, not here.
| Example | Use ID | Account | Used by | Why the normal route was unavailable | Started | Ended | Declared to | Declared at | Alert received at | Credential changed on | Session reviewed on | Reviewed by | Outcome of the review | Due (calc) | Declared in time (calc) | Alert fired (calc) | Changed in time (calc) | Reviewed in time (calc) | On time, all steps (calc) | Review late by, work days (calc) | Finding |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EXAMPLE | BGU-2026-01 | bg-cloud-01 | Beth Owen, the managed IT provider's on-call engineer (P06 SUP-001) | A sign-in policy change made at 22:10 required a compliant device that no administration device met, and locked every administrator out of the cloud tenant | 5 Sep 2026 | 5 Sep 2026 | Mark Ellis | 5 Sep 2026 | 5 Sep 2026 | 7 Sep 2026 | 25 Sep 2026 | Ruth Okafor | Every action matched the reason: the policy was rolled back at 22:52 and nothing else was changed. | 7 Sep 2026 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Late | No | 14 | PF-02 |
After use
The 5 steps after every use, in order (PA-12), five rows per use. Steps 1 and 2 are due at the sign-in; steps 3 and 4 within [[1]] working day; step 5 before the record is closed.
| Example | Use ID | Step | What must happen | Within | Done on | Done by | Evidence | Deadline (calc) | On time (calc) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EXAMPLE | BGU-2026-01 | 1 | The user declares the use to the Head of IT, or the Head of Information Security if the Head of IT is unavailable, with the reason, before signing in or at once after | Before or at the time of use | 5 Sep 2026 | Beth Owen, to Mark Ellis, by phone | Declared at 22:35, before the sign-in at 22:40 | 5 Sep 2026 | Yes |
| EXAMPLE | BGU-2026-01 | 2 | The alert is confirmed as received; if it did not fire, that is a finding of its own | At the time of use | 5 Sep 2026 | Mark Ellis | Alert at 22:41, 1 minute after the sign-in | 5 Sep 2026 | Yes |
| EXAMPLE | BGU-2026-01 | 3 | The Head of Information Security reviews every action the account took against the stated reason, from the log the account cannot change | [[1]] working day | 25 Sep 2026 | Ruth Okafor | Every action matched the reason: the policy was rolled back at 22:52 and nothing else was changed. | 7 Sep 2026 | Late |
| EXAMPLE | BGU-2026-01 | 4 | The password is changed, a new security key registered where one was used, and both resealed; the old envelope is kept with the record | [[1]] working day | 7 Sep 2026 | Password changed and the envelope resealed; the old envelope kept with the record | 7 Sep 2026 | Yes | |
| EXAMPLE | BGU-2026-01 | 5 | The cause is fixed so the normal route works, and the record is closed with the reviewer's name | Before the record is closed | 25 Sep 2026 | Ruth Okafor | The policy change was rolled back during the use, and re-tested before re-applying it on 24 Sep 2026 (E-05) | Before closing | Done |
| 1 | The user declares the use to the Head of IT, or the Head of Information Security if the Head of IT is unavailable, with the reason, before signing in or at once after | Before or at the time of use | |||||||
| 2 | The alert is confirmed as received; if it did not fire, that is a finding of its own | At the time of use | |||||||
| 3 | The Head of Information Security reviews every action the account took against the stated reason, from the log the account cannot change | [[1]] working day | |||||||
| 4 | The password is changed, a new security key registered where one was used, and both resealed; the old envelope is kept with the record | [[1]] working day | |||||||
| 5 | The cause is fixed so the normal route works, and the record is closed with the reviewer's name | Before the record is closed | |||||||
| 1 | The user declares the use to the Head of IT, or the Head of Information Security if the Head of IT is unavailable, with the reason, before signing in or at once after | Before or at the time of use | |||||||
| 2 | The alert is confirmed as received; if it did not fire, that is a finding of its own | At the time of use | |||||||
| 3 | The Head of Information Security reviews every action the account took against the stated reason, from the log the account cannot change | [[1]] working day | |||||||
| 4 | The password is changed, a new security key registered where one was used, and both resealed; the old envelope is kept with the record | [[1]] working day | |||||||
| 5 | The cause is fixed so the normal route works, and the record is closed with the reviewer's name | Before the record is closed | |||||||
| 1 | The user declares the use to the Head of IT, or the Head of Information Security if the Head of IT is unavailable, with the reason, before signing in or at once after | Before or at the time of use | |||||||
| 2 | The alert is confirmed as received; if it did not fire, that is a finding of its own | At the time of use | |||||||
| 3 | The Head of Information Security reviews every action the account took against the stated reason, from the log the account cannot change | [[1]] working day | |||||||
| 4 | The password is changed, a new security key registered where one was used, and both resealed; the old envelope is kept with the record | [[1]] working day | |||||||
| 5 | The cause is fixed so the normal route works, and the record is closed with the reviewer's name | Before the record is closed |
Summary
Summary and sign-off
The values PA-12 sets, readiness for each account, PAM-06 for the quarter, and the sign-off. Yellow cells are yours; everything else calculates.
Settings
| Setting | Value | Note | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| As-at date | 30 Sep 2026 | EXAMPLE: the quarter end. Type it, never a formula. | |||||
| Months between tests (PA-12) | 3 | [[3]] in the Privileged Access Standard. Change it there first. | |||||
| Working days to review and change after a use (PA-12) | 1 | [[1]], counted from the day of the use. | |||||
| Accounts for each cloud identity tenant (PA-12) | 2 | And for each administration portal that could lock every administrator out. | |||||
| Accounts for each on-premises directory (PA-12) | 1 | ||||||
| Quarter start (calc) | 1 Jul 2026 | The first day of the quarter ending in the as-at date's month: PAM-06 counts the uses from here. | |||||
Readiness by account
| Account | Test status | Pass | Fail | Not applicable | Not checked | Readiness | Next test due |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| bg-emergency | Tested | 9 | 0 | 1 | 0 | Ready | 14 Dec 2026 |
| bg-cloud-01 | Tested | 9 | 1 | 0 | 0 | Ready, with actions | 14 Dec 2026 |
| bg-cloud-02 | Tested | 9 | 0 | 1 | 0 | Ready | 14 Dec 2026 |
Not ready: the test is overdue or failed. Ready, with actions: a check failed; follow its finding. Incomplete: a check is not done. Ready: every check passed or does not apply, with the reason.
PAM-06 Break-glass uses reviewed on time
| Measure | Value | Break-glass uses in the quarter that were declared, reviewed by the Head of Information Security and followed by a credential change, each within [[1]] working day, out of all uses. Tolerance: Same as the target: every use. | |||||
| Uses in the quarter | 1 | ||||||
| Declared, reviewed and changed, each in time | 0 | ||||||
| Result | 0 of 1 | ||||||
| Target (a share, 1 = all) | 100% | A use outside tolerance goes to the next executive committee with its plan (PA-18). | |||||
| Tolerance limit | 100% | ||||||
| Status | Outside tolerance | ||||||
| Longest review delay on the Uses sheet, in working days | 14 | ||||||
Sign-off
| Role | Name | Date | Signature or approval reference | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Checked by (the person who ran the test) | [[Name]] | [[YYYY-MM-DD]] | [[Reference]] | ||||
| Reviewed by (Head of Information Security) | [[Name]] | [[YYYY-MM-DD]] | [[Reference]] | ||||
| Accepted by (Head of IT, owner of the accounts) | [[Name]] | [[YYYY-MM-DD]] | [[Reference]] | ||||
| Next test due | [[Within 3 months of the last test]] | [[YYYY-MM-DD]] | |||||
Rules
Rules this workbook applies
The rules come from the Privileged Access Standard and keep their IDs across the pack. Change a rule there, never here: this sheet quotes it.
| Rule | Requirement | Where this workbook applies it |
|---|---|---|
| PA-01 | Every privileged account, human and non-human, must be in the inventory with a named owner, its tier, its purpose, where its credential is kept and when it was last changed. An account found that is not in the inventory is disabled unless an owner claims it within [[5]] working days. For a service account, assign an interim owner within that window to control its use while dependencies are checked under PA-11; the 30-day limit is not permission to leave it uncontrolled. | Account checks, BG-09: every break-glass account in the Privileged & Service Account Inventory, with the Head of IT as owner. |
| PA-10 | Shared, service and break-glass credentials must be kept in the vault or managed by the platform, and changed as the rotation table sets, after every use where it says so, and at once on suspicion of compromise. | Account checks, BG-07; Accounts and tests: the reseal after every test. Uses: the credential changed after every use. |
| PA-12 | There must be [[2]] break-glass accounts for each cloud identity tenant and [[1]] for each on-premises directory, sealed in the safe, alerting on every sign-in and tested every [[3]] months. They are used only when the normal route is unavailable, and every use is declared, reviewed and followed by a credential change within [[1]] working day. | Accounts and tests: the count, the tests and the next test due. Account checks: BG-01 to BG-08. Uses and After use: every use declared, reviewed and followed by a credential change. |
| PA-14 | Privileged access must be removed on the day a person leaves or moves, or at once for an urgent departure. Shared, service and break-glass credentials the person could read are changed within [[1]] working day. | Account checks, BG-10: the credential changed when anyone on the safe list leaves. |
| PA-18 | Any departure from this standard must be a P02 exception, scored and approved by the approver its band sets (EX-05); a Critical exception is approved by the board or its equivalent. The headline measures are reported monthly to the security and IT leadership team. | Summary: PAM-06, reported monthly; a use outside tolerance goes to the executive committee. |
How the break-glass accounts are set up (PA-12)
| No. | What PA-12 requires | Set-up |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | [[2]] for each cloud identity tenant or administration portal that could lock every administrator out, and [[1]] for each on-premises directory | Number of accounts |
| 2 | Break-glass accounts are cloud-only accounts, not synchronised from the directory, not tied to any one person's device, phone or second factor, and excluded from any sign-in policy that could lock every administrator out. | Not tied to one person |
| 3 | [[The password and the security key sealed in numbered tamper-evident envelopes in the office safe, with a second set in the safe at a second site]]; opening the safe needs [[two people]] | Storage |
| 4 | Every sign-in alerts [[the Head of IT and the Head of Information Security]] at once, by [[email and text message]], and the alert is itself tested | Alert |
| 5 | Where a break-glass account must be left out of a sign-in policy so that a fault in that policy cannot lock everyone out, the gap is covered by the seal, the two-person safe, the alert on every sign-in, the test and the reset after use. It is never covered by leaving the account without a second factor when the platform lets a sealed security key be used. | Sign-in policy exclusions |
Lists
| Result | YesNo | Platform | SysID | SysName | CheckID |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Pass | Yes | Cloud identity tenant | PS-01 | Directory and its administrator groups | BG-01 |
| Fail | No | On-premises directory | PS-02 | Cloud identity tenant (email and office, P06 SUP-005) | BG-02 |
| Not applicable | PS-03 | Backup service console (P06 SUP-011) | BG-03 | ||
| PS-04 | Endpoint protection and device management consoles | BG-04 |
BG-05
BG-06
BG-07
BG-08
BG-09
BG-10
Definitions
Definitions
| Term | Meaning in this workbook |
|---|---|
| Break-glass account | An emergency account used only when the normal administration route is unavailable, such as when every administrator is locked out. Sealed, watched, tested and reset after every use (PA-12). |
| Use | Any sign-in to a break-glass account other than a planned test. Every use is declared, reviewed and followed by a credential change (PA-12). |
| Test | A planned sign-in, every [[3]] months, that proves the account works and the alert fires. It opens the seal, so the credential is changed and resealed after it. |
| Seal | Numbered tamper-evident envelopes holding the password and, where one is used, the security key. A broken or renumbered envelope is a finding. |
| Declared | Told to the Head of IT, or the Head of Information Security if the Head of IT is unavailable, with the reason, before signing in or at once after. |
| Session review | A check, by someone other than the administrator, that privileged activity in a period matches approved tickets and the rules, with anything unexplained followed up (PA-09). |
| Vault | Where shared, service and break-glass credentials are kept: a password manager or vault that records who opened which credential and when, open only to named administrators. A break-glass credential is also sealed in a safe. |
| Rotation | Changing a credential: a new password, secret or key, with the old one no longer working. |
| Phishing-resistant sign-in | A sign-in method that a fake sign-in page cannot capture and replay, because it proves possession of a key bound to the real site: a security key, a passkey on a managed device, or a certificate on a smart card or managed device (PA-05). |
| Working day | Monday to Friday. Add your public holidays to the WORKDAY and NETWORKDAYS formulas if you need them. A use on a Saturday is due on the next working day after it. |
| Readiness | Ready, Ready, with actions, Incomplete or Not ready, from the test status and the checks. |
| (calc) | A column or cell the workbook calculates. Do not type or paste over it. |
| EXAMPLE | A worked example: a wholesale distributor with about 900 staff, three warehouses and an online ordering service that takes 60% of its orders, as at 30 Sep 2026. Delete before use. |
Framework References
Framework references
These references indicate relevance only and do not reproduce the text of any standard.
| Framework | Reference | Supported by |
|---|---|---|
| ISO/IEC 27001:2022 | Annex A 8.2 — Privileged access rights | The whole checklist: emergency privileged access allocated, sealed, tested, used only when needed and reviewed after use |
| NIST CSF 2.0 | PR.AA-05 — “Access permissions, entitlements, and authorizations are defined in a policy, managed, enforced, and reviewed, and incorporate the principles of least privilege and separation of duties” | Account checks and Uses: emergency permissions limited to the number set, enforced by the seal and reviewed after every use |
| NIS2 — Directive (EU) 2022/2555 | Article 21(2)(j) — “the use of multi-factor authentication or continuous authentication solutions, secured voice, video and text communications and secured emergency communication systems within the entity, where appropriate” | Accounts and tests: the emergency accounts' sealed second factor, and the alert on every sign-in |
| DORA — Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1774 | Article 21(a) — “the assignment of access rights to ICT assets based on need-to-know, need-to-use and least privilege principles, including for remote and emergency access” | Uses: emergency access assigned only when the normal route is unavailable (financial entities) |
| DORA — Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1774 | Article 21(e)(ii) — “assignment of privileged, emergency, and administrator access on a need-to-use or an ad-hoc basis for all ICT systems” | Uses and After use: emergency access on an ad-hoc basis, declared, reviewed and closed (financial entities) |
| ISO/IEC 27001:2022 | Annex A 8.16 — Monitoring activities | BG-05 and Uses: every sign-in raises an alert to named people, and the alert is itself tested |
ISO/IEC 27001 references name the clause or control this document relates to. They do not say that meeting it meets any other framework's requirement.