If…, then how…
If remediation deadlines are routinely missed, do we change the deadline, the capacity or the scope?
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The short answer
- Recommendation
- Check that the misses are real, then find where they sit before you choose a lever. Fix ownership or capacity for concentrated misses, fix asset data for inflated priorities, and retire unsupported systems. Only then add capacity or have the approver agree a longer deadline tested against real volumes.
- Reasoning
- A standard that is routinely missed is worse for audit than a realistic one that is met, but the misses point to different causes. A few owners carrying most of them is a capacity or ownership problem. Misses spread across a priority can mean unknown inputs pushed findings into short deadlines, because unknown exposure counts as internet-facing and unknown criticality as Critical. Unsupported systems produce findings no deadline can meet. Lowering priorities, scanning less or renewing exceptions without review make the figures look better while the exposure stays the same.
- Considerations
- The 90% adherence signal, the 5% Priority 1 signal, the 10% adjustment signal and the one-fifth test are the defaults in the CISO Times vulnerability pack. Your own standard may set different ones.
- A priority may be lowered only when an accepted control changes one of its inputs, never to avoid a missed deadline.
- Where the payment card standard applies, critical patches are expected within one month of release. That month runs from release, not detection, so check outside deadlines before you lengthen your own.
- A fall in open findings alongside a fall in scan coverage is not an improvement.
The decision, step by step
Select any step for the reasoning behind it and where the pack covers it.
- Start
- Step
- Decision
- Outcome
- Loop back
Keyboard: Tab to a step, arrow keys move along the flow, Enter pins its explanation, + and − zoom, 0 fits the diagram, Esc closes. The text version below has the same content.
Where a step quotes a number, it is the default in the CISO Times pack. Your own standard may set a different one.
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The same flow written out: each step, its reasoning and where the pack covers it. 17 steps.
Start
Remediation deadlines are routinely missed
A standard that is routinely missed is worse for audit than a realistic one that is met. The pack treats a priority that stays below 90% adherence as a sign that its deadline or the capacity behind it is wrong. The misses are evidence. The question is which lever they point to.
In the pack
- P01-A04 Vulnerability Risk Rating & SLA ModelEvery quarter
- P01-A02 Vulnerability & Exposure Management Standard5.2 Remediation deadlines
Decision
Is someone proposing to lower priorities or scan less?
These are the tempting shortcuts, and they change the figures without changing the risk. Lowering a priority, rating fewer findings Priority 1 or 2 by narrowing what counts as critical, dropping systems from scanning, or renewing exceptions without review all make adherence look better while exposure stays the same.
- Yes: Don't lower priorities or shrink scope to meet deadlines
- No: Look at adherence and time to fix, by priority, over time
In the pack
- P01-A08 Vulnerability Management Metrics WorkbookMetric Definitions
- P03-A04 Board Metric Selection CatalogueMetric Catalogue (rule BM-02)
Outcome
Don't lower priorities or shrink scope to meet deadlines
A priority may be lowered only when a control changes one of its inputs, never to avoid a missed deadline. A fall in open findings alongside a fall in scan coverage is not an improvement. A rising number of exceptions can hide falling adherence. Set the shortcut aside and look at the real causes.
In the pack
- P01-A02 Vulnerability & Exposure Management Standard5.2 Remediation deadlines (rule VM-10)
- P01-A04 Vulnerability Risk Rating & SLA ModelRules for applying the model (rule RM-07)
- P01-A08 Vulnerability Management Metrics WorkbookMetric Definitions
Step
Look at adherence and time to fix, by priority, over time
Use several periods, because one period rarely tells you much and a handful of closures swings the average. An average time to fix above the deadline means the typical finding is late. Also look at findings now overdue, by priority and owner, and at the age of the oldest.
In the pack
- P01-A08 Vulnerability Management Metrics WorkbookMetric Definitions
- P01-A08 Vulnerability Management Metrics WorkbookTrend
- P01-A08 Vulnerability Management Metrics WorkbookInstructions
Decision
Do the figures measure what they should?
Check three things before acting on them. Deadlines must count from first detection, and rescans must keep that date. A finding counts as fixed on the date a rescan or other objective evidence confirms it; a closed ticket is not enough. The scanner review must say the figures are ready to report. If any of these is uncertain, answer no.
- Yes: Are the misses concentrated in a few owners or systems?
- No, or not known: Correct how the figures are produced, then measure again
In the pack
- P01-A07 Vulnerability Scanner Configuration Review ChecklistChecklist
- P01-A08 Vulnerability Management Metrics WorkbookInstructions
Step
Correct how the figures are produced, then measure again
Restore original detection dates, close findings only on verified evidence, and fix the scanner checks that affect the figures. The result may be better or worse than you thought. Either way, it is the one to decide on.
- Then: Look at adherence and time to fix, by priority, over time (back to an earlier step)
In the pack
- P01-A07 Vulnerability Scanner Configuration Review ChecklistResults & Sign-off
- P01-A02 Vulnerability & Exposure Management Standard6. Remediation and verification (rule VM-13)
Decision
Are the misses concentrated in a few owners or systems?
Group the overdue findings by asset owner, team, service provider and system. A few names carrying most of the misses is a different problem from misses spread evenly across the estate.
- Yes: Treat it as a capacity or ownership problem for those owners
- No, they are spread: Is the priority mix inflated by missing asset data?
In the pack
- P01-A08 Vulnerability Management Metrics WorkbookTracker Data
Outcome
Treat it as a capacity or ownership problem for those owners
Findings escalated often usually point to a capacity problem. Disputed ownership is the most common reason findings go unfixed, so settle it and correct the inventory. Escalate on the fixed rule and ask for a decision: more time or people, a compensating control, or an exception. For a service provider, use the deadlines in its agreement.
In the pack
- P01-A03 Vulnerability Triage & Remediation Operating ProcedureEscalation
- P01-A03 Vulnerability Triage & Remediation Operating ProcedureDecision points
Decision
Is the priority mix inflated by missing asset data?
Unknown exposure counts as internet-facing and unknown criticality as Critical, so gaps in the inventory push findings into short deadlines. The pack's quarterly signals: Priority 1 regularly above 5% of new findings, many inputs defaulted because they were unknown, or more than 10% of findings raised or lowered. If you have not checked, answer yes.
- Yes, or not known: Fix the inventory and keep the defaults, then measure again
- No: Are old or unsupported systems behind many of the misses?
In the pack
- P01-A04 Vulnerability Risk Rating & SLA ModelEvery quarter
- P01-A04 Vulnerability Risk Rating & SLA ModelInputs
Step
Fix the inventory and keep the defaults, then measure again
Have asset owners confirm exposure and criticality for the systems carrying defaulted inputs. Findings then fall to their real priority through the proper route. Softening the defaults instead would make every gap in the inventory cheaper to leave open.
- Then: Look at adherence and time to fix, by priority, over time (back to an earlier step)
In the pack
- P01-A04 Vulnerability Risk Rating & SLA ModelInputs
- P01-A04 Vulnerability Risk Rating & SLA ModelRules for applying the model (rule RM-03)
Decision
Are old or unsupported systems behind many of the misses?
Systems the vendor no longer supports often produce findings that cannot be fixed on any deadline. They inflate the misses for reasons capacity cannot solve. If you do not know which systems are unsupported, answer yes and find out.
- Yes, or not known: Reduce scope by retiring them, with exceptions until then
- No: Does a regulation or contract fix the deadline that is missed?
In the pack
- P01-A02 Vulnerability & Exposure Management Standard6. Remediation and verification (rule VM-15)
- P01-A05 Scan Coverage & Asset Scope RegisterScope Register
Outcome
Reduce scope by retiring them, with exceptions until then
This is the honest way to change scope: remove the exposure. Record each unsupported system with its compensating controls and a planned retirement date, and review it at least quarterly. Findings it cannot fix go through the exception process in the meantime. A retired system's findings close once the inventory and retirement records are updated and the system no longer answers scans.
In the pack
- P01-A02 Vulnerability & Exposure Management Standard6. Remediation and verification (rule VM-15)
- P01-A02 Vulnerability & Exposure Management Standard7. Exceptions
- P01-A08 Vulnerability Management Metrics WorkbookInstructions
- P01-A03 Vulnerability Triage & Remediation Operating ProcedureWhat evidence closes a finding
Decision
Does a regulation or contract fix the deadline that is missed?
Some deadlines are set from outside. Where the payment card standard applies, patches for critical vulnerabilities are expected within one month of the patch's release. That month runs from release, not from detection, so a finding found late can miss it even inside the pack's 30-day Priority 3 deadline. Check your own regulatory and contractual commitments too. If you are not sure, answer yes.
- Yes, or not known: Take a capacity decision to management
- No: Test the deadline against recent real volumes
In the pack
- P01-A04 Vulnerability Risk Rating & SLA ModelQuestions auditors commonly ask
- P01-A02 Vulnerability & Exposure Management Standard5.2 Remediation deadlines
Step
Test the deadline against recent real volumes
Rate the last three months of findings and count how many would have missed their deadline with the capacity you actually have. Use the pack's test from before approval: if more than a fifth of Priority 2 and 3 findings would be overdue, add capacity or agree a longer deadline. Remember that deadlines do not reflect effort; a platform upgrade and a one-line change get the same one.
In the pack
- P01-A04 Vulnerability Risk Rating & SLA ModelBefore approval
- P01-A04 Vulnerability Risk Rating & SLA ModelLimitations
Decision
Could realistic extra capacity meet the current deadline?
Capacity includes people and time, and also process: a reliable patch cycle, a weekly triage that assigns owners, and fixes made at the source, such as an outdated build image. If you cannot tell whether more capacity would work, try it before lengthening the deadline.
- Yes, or not known: Take a capacity decision to management
- No: Propose a longer deadline to the approver, backed by evidence
In the pack
- P01-A09 Vulnerability Programme Maturity Self-AssessmentQuestions
- P01-A09 Vulnerability Programme Maturity Self-AssessmentDimensions & Weights
Outcome
Take a capacity decision to management
Put the figures, the cause and the options to management: more people, agreed maintenance windows, or process changes. In the pack's self-assessment, a mature programme is one where repeated overdue findings lead management to change capacity or process. The same self-assessment shows which part of the programme to strengthen first.
In the pack
- P01-A09 Vulnerability Programme Maturity Self-AssessmentQuestions
- P01-A09 Vulnerability Programme Maturity Self-AssessmentResults
- P01-A10 Vulnerability Posture Management Briefing Deck
Outcome
Propose a longer deadline to the approver, backed by evidence
The approver of the standard approves its deadlines. Change the standard and the rating method in the same approval, with the evidence from the re-test. Keep reporting adherence against the new deadline. A realistic deadline that is met is easier to defend than one that is routinely missed.
In the pack
- P01-A02 Vulnerability & Exposure Management Standard3. Roles and responsibilities
- P01-A04 Vulnerability Risk Rating & SLA ModelPurpose
- P01-A04 Vulnerability Risk Rating & SLA ModelReview
Practical checklist
- Set aside any proposal to lower priorities, narrow what counts as critical or drop systems from scanning.
- Look at adherence and average time to fix by priority over several periods, with overdue findings by owner.
- Confirm deadlines count from first detection and findings close only on verified evidence. Correct the figures if not, and measure again.
- Group overdue findings by owner, team, service provider and system, and escalate concentrated misses for a decision.
- Have asset owners confirm exposure and criticality where inputs were defaulted, and keep the defaults.
- Record unsupported systems with compensating controls and a retirement date, and send their findings to the exception process.
- Rate the last three months of findings against the deadline with the capacity you actually have.
- Take a capacity decision to management, or propose a longer deadline to the approver with the re-test evidence.
Evidence to have ready
- Deadline adherence and time to fix by priority over several periods, with the scanner review that says the figures are ready to report.
- The breakdown of overdue findings by owner and system, and the escalations and decisions that followed.
- The re-test of three months of findings against the deadline.
- The approver's approval of any changed deadline, made in the standard and the rating method together.
Assumptions
- You rate findings by priority with deadlines counted from first detection, as “How do we decide what to fix first when the scanner shows thousands of findings?” describes, and you measure deadline adherence.
- The thresholds shown are the defaults in the CISO Times vulnerability pack. Your own standard may set different ones.
Not covered here
- Setting deadlines for the first time. That is “How do we set remediation deadlines the business will actually agree to?”.
- What to do about one finding that cannot be fixed in time. That is “If an exploited vulnerability can't be patched today, then what?” and “When does a deviation from policy need a formal exception?”.
- How to present the figures to executives. That is “How do we report vulnerability posture to executives without quoting CVE counts?”.
Related questions
- How do we set remediation deadlines the business will actually agree to?
- How do we report vulnerability posture to executives without quoting CVE counts?
- If an exploited vulnerability can't be patched today, then what?
- If the fix depends on a supplier who won't patch, then how do we manage it?
- How do we tell whether our security programme is mature, and which gaps matter?