Board Metric Selection Catalogue
Lists candidate board metrics with the question each answers, its failure modes, and an explicit recommendation on whether it belongs at board level.
Available soon
- Format
- Excel
- Size
- 68 KB
- Length
- 10 sheets
- Version
- 1.0
- Updated
What's inside
- Instructions
- Metric Catalogue
- Choose Yours
- Selection Check
- Lists
- Definitions
- Framework References
Preview
The workbook's sheets as you will receive them, with its example rows and the values its formulas calculate. Highlighted [[text]] is for you to replace; rows marked EXAMPLE are for you to delete. Wide sheets scroll sideways. The cover, document control and changelog sheets are in the file.
Instructions
How to use this workbook
| Step | What to do |
|---|---|
| 1 | Read the Metric Catalogue. Each row is one measure with a stable ID: BM-01 to BM-08 are the pack's board measures (8 recommended 'Board'); CM-01 onwards are the candidates weighed against them — 10 'Executive only', 9 'Operational only' and 8 'Avoid'. Filter on Theme, Recommendation or Applies where. |
| 2 | The test every board measure must pass is rule BR-03: "A measure reaches the board only if it answers a question the board asks and has a stated target or tolerance (see the Board Metric Selection Catalogue)." The 'How it misleads' and 'Main weakness' columns show why most measures fail it at board level, and what can still go wrong with those that pass. |
| 3 | Tailor the catalogue once, when you adopt it: change a recommendation only with a recorded reason, and add measures of your own on the blank rows with a new ID (CM-28 onwards). Keep the IDs you have, so selections and past reports still point to the right row. |
| 4 | On Choose Yours, delete the EXAMPLE rows, then pick your board measures by Metric ID. Start from BM-01 to BM-08: BM-01 answers the question every report opens with (BR-02). Name, recommendation, question and direction fill in. |
| 5 | For each measure you choose, write the target (the level you aim for) and the tolerance (the worst level the board accepts before it must act), and name the owner who answers for the figure. Record the data source in your organisation. Each cycle the measure is then reported as 'On target', 'Below target, within tolerance', 'Outside tolerance', 'No target set' (BR-04). |
| 6 | Clear every Check on Choose Yours that does not say OK, then read the Selection Check sheet. It warns when you have chosen more measures than your limit (set there; the pack suggests [[8]]), any measure marked Avoid or Operational only, or a measure with no target or no owner. |
| 7 | Ask the board or committee [[e.g. Board, or its Audit & Risk Committee]] to agree the selection, targets and tolerances. Then copy the chosen measures into the Measures list of the Board Reporting Data Collection Workbook, which collects the figures every cycle (BR-08). |
| 8 | Review the selection once a year with the Board Reporting Effectiveness Self-Check (BR-10): drop measures the board no longer asks about, and change targets as the risk appetite changes. |
Legend
Yellow cells are inputs. Everything else is calculated or fixed — do not overwrite formulas.
| EXAMPLE | Rows marked EXAMPLE in the first column show how a completed row looks. Delete them before approval. |
The four parts of every report (BR-01): Position — Where do we stand against the risk appetite the board set? Direction — Is it getting better or worse, and why? Exposure — What could hurt us most, and how likely is it now? Ask — What do you need the board to decide, note or fund? The 'Report part' column says where a board measure is shown; the Board Reporting Narrative Model explains each part.
The catalogue rows are the template's content, not examples: keep, change or remove them as you tailor it. Only the rows on Choose Yours marked EXAMPLE are to be deleted.
Tailoring — small organisation: five or six board measures are usually enough. Start with BM-01, BM-02, BM-04, BM-06 and BM-07. If you have no exception register, leave BM-03 out until you do rather than report zero; say so in the report.
Tailoring — regulated entity (NIS2, DORA): the management body approves and oversees the risk-management measures and can be held liable (NIS2 Art 20(1)), and under DORA it sets the ICT risk tolerance (Art 5(2)). Keep BM-01 with a tolerance the board has approved in writing, keep BM-04 so major ICT-related incidents reach the board (DORA Art 5(2)(i)), and keep BM-08 with the board's own training shown separately (NIS2 Art 20(2); DORA Art 5(4)).
Tailoring — IT run by a service provider: most figures come from the provider. Make each chosen measure a reporting obligation in the contract, with the definition from this catalogue, and name an owner inside your organisation who checks the figure. Provider reports often lead with CM-02, CM-23 or CM-24; ask for the board measures instead.
Colour in the Recommendation and Check columns only repeats the words beside it.
Metric Catalogue
35 measures: the 8 board measures (BM) first, then the candidates (CM) by theme. Tailor once (Instructions, step 3); add your own on the blank rows.
| Metric ID | Measure | Theme | Question it answers | Definition — how it is calculated | Typical data source | Better when | How it misleads | Main weakness | Recommendation | Reason for the recommendation | Report part | Suggested target or tolerance | Applies where | Framework cross-references |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| BM-01 | Risks outside appetite | Risk and appetite | Are we within the risk appetite we set? | Two counts at the reporting date: top risks in the risk register assessed above the risk appetite the board set, and top risks assessed past their own tolerance limit. Shown as 'n of N top risks above appetite; n past tolerance'. The position follows from them (POSITION_RULE). | Risk register | Lower | Only as honest as the risk assessment behind it: a risk can be re-scored or split to fall under appetite, and a short register looks good. Meaningless if the appetite is vague. | Gaming | Board | Answers the board's first question (BR-02) directly, against limits the board set itself. The position is worked out, not judged: Outside tolerance if any top risk is past its own tolerance limit; otherwise Outside appetite, within tolerance if any top risk is above appetite; otherwise Within appetite. Keep the scoring method stable and report any re-scoring of a top risk. | Position | 0 top risks above appetite; 0 past their own tolerance limit (each top risk carries its tolerance limit in the register) | All organisations | NIST CSF GV.RM-02; DORA Art 5(2) |
| BM-02 | Critical exposure fixed on time | Vulnerabilities and exposure | Are the weaknesses attackers use being closed fast enough? | Of the critical-priority weaknesses (exploited, or on internet-facing or critical systems) due to be fixed in the period, the percentage fixed and verified by their deadline. | Vulnerability remediation tracker (P01) | Higher | Depends on what counts as critical: narrowing the definition raises the figure. Says nothing about systems that are not scanned, so keep scan coverage in the appendix. | Gaming | Board | Measures the weaknesses attackers actually use, against a deadline, so a fall means real exposure is rising. The Vulnerability & Exposure Management pack (P01) produces it. | Exposure | [[95]]% by the agreed deadline | All organisations | ISO/IEC 27001 Cl 9.1; NIST CSF GV.OV-03 |
| BM-03 | Expired or high-risk exceptions | Accepted risk | Where have we knowingly accepted risk, and is it still under control? | The number of security exceptions (knowingly accepted risks) that passed their expiry date in the period without being renewed or closed first, shown with the number still open and how many of those are rated High. | Security exception register (P02) | Lower | Falls to zero if exceptions are renewed without review, or never raised at all: a register nobody uses shows a perfect score. | Gaming | Board | Shows where the organisation has chosen to live with risk and whether those decisions are still under control. The Security Exception, Waiver & Segregation of Duties pack (P02) produces it. | Exposure | 0 expired; every open High exception approved at the right level | All organisations | NIST CSF GV.RM-02; ISO/IEC 27001 Cl 9.1 |
| BM-04 | Significant incidents and time to contain | Incidents and detection | Have we been hurt, and how quickly did we recover? | The number of significant incidents in the period (under your incident classification) and, for each, the hours from detection to containment. Report the count and the longest time to contain. | Incident log | Lower | Lagging: it shows harm already done. The count can be kept down by classifying incidents as less severe, and a quarter with none says little about readiness. | Lagging | Board | The board must know when the organisation has been hurt and how well it responded (BR-07; DORA Art 5(2)(i) for major ICT-related incidents). Pair it with BM-06 for readiness. | Exposure | Every significant incident contained within [[24]] hours | All organisations | DORA Art 5(2); NIS2 Art 20(1) |
| BM-05 | Critical suppliers assessed | Suppliers | Are the suppliers we depend on held to our standard? | The percentage of critical suppliers (those whose failure or compromise would stop a critical service) assessed against your security requirements in the last 12 months. | Third-party register | Higher | An assessment can be a questionnaire returned and never read, and the figure says nothing about what was found. The list of critical suppliers can shrink to improve it. | Gaming | Board | Much of an organisation's exposure now sits with its suppliers. This shows whether they are held to its standard; material findings are reported under Exposure. | Exposure | [[100]]% within 12 months | All organisations | ISO/IEC 27001 Cl 9.1; NIST CSF GV.OV-03 |
| BM-06 | Critical services restored in tests | Resilience and recovery | Could we recover our most important services, and have we proved it? | The percentage of critical services whose recovery was tested in the last 12 months and restored within their recovery time objective. | Recovery test records | Higher | A test of an easy service, or a paper exercise, can be counted as a pass. With annual tests the figure changes rarely. | Gaming | Board | Proves recovery rather than assuming it, and answers 'could we recover?' in terms of services the board recognises. | Exposure | [[100]]% tested and restored within objective each year | All organisations | ISO/IEC 27001 Cl 9.1; DORA Art 5(2) |
| BM-07 | Security programme delivery | Programme and investment | Is the plan the board funded being delivered? | The percentage of security programme milestones due in the period that were delivered on time, against the plan the board approved. | Programme plan | Higher | Milestones can be re-planned to stay 'on time', and delivery is not the same as risk reduced. Report every re-baselining. | Gaming | Board | Shows whether the plan and money the board approved are being delivered, which is the board's main lever. Link each late milestone to the risk it was meant to reduce. | Direction | [[90]]% of milestones on time | All organisations | ISO/IEC 27001 Cl 6.2; NIST CSF GV.RR-03 |
| BM-08 | Board and staff security training | People and behaviour | Do we, and our people, know enough to judge and act on cyber risk? | The percentage of staff who completed required security training in the last 12 months, with board members' own training shown separately (NIS2 Art 20(2); DORA Art 5(4)). | Training records | Higher | Completion is not competence: a click-through course scores 100%. Vanity when reported without any measure of behaviour. | Vanity | Board | Training of the management body is a legal duty for regulated entities, and staff completion shows the baseline is in place. Pair it with CM-04 (phishing report rate) below board level for behaviour. | Direction | [[95]]% of staff; every board member each year | All organisations | NIS2 Art 20(2); DORA Art 5(4) |
| CM-01 | Security incidents logged (all severities) | Incidents and detection | How many security incidents did we have? | The count of every security incident logged in the period, whatever its severity. | Incident log | Lower | A rise can mean better detection and a fall can mean worse; the count depends on how incidents are classified and can be managed down by reclassifying them. Minor events swamp the ones that matter. | Lacks context | Operational only | Useful for staffing the response team. The board needs significant incidents and how fast they were contained (BM-04), not the volume of minor ones. | Not in the board report | — | All organisations | ISO/IEC 27001 Cl 9.1 |
| CM-02 | Attacks blocked | Threat activity | How many attacks did our defences stop? | The number of connections, messages or files blocked by firewalls, email filtering or endpoint protection in the period. | Security tool consoles | — | Always large and always 'good'; it measures the internet's background noise, not the risk to the organisation. No level can be a target, and it says nothing about the attacks that were not blocked. | Vanity | Avoid | No decision the board could take depends on it, and it suggests a safety that the figure cannot show. Use threat context in words in the Exposure section instead. | Not in the board report | — | All organisations | — |
| CM-03 | Phishing emails received or quarantined | Threat activity | How much phishing is aimed at us? | The number of emails classified as phishing or malicious by the email filter in the period. | Email filtering reports | — | Moves with attackers' campaigns and the filter's settings, not with the organisation's risk. It has no target and a rise tells the board nothing it can act on. | Vanity | Avoid | Volume of attack is context, not performance. If phishing matters, report whether staff report it (CM-04) and the incidents it caused (BM-04). | Not in the board report | — | All organisations | — |
| CM-04 | Phishing report rate | People and behaviour | Do our people spot and report suspicious messages? | Of the simulated phishing messages sent in the period, the percentage reported by the recipient through the reporting button or process. | Phishing simulation results | Higher | Depends on how hard the simulated messages are; easy tests inflate it. Comparable over time only if difficulty is held steady. | Gaming | Executive only | A better behaviour measure than click rate, and the natural partner to training completion (BM-08). Too detailed for every board report. | Appendix, if the board asks | — | All organisations | ISO/IEC 27001 Cl 9.1 |
| CM-05 | Phishing simulation click rate | People and behaviour | How many staff fall for phishing? | Of the simulated phishing messages sent in the period, the percentage whose link was clicked. | Phishing simulation results | Lower | Easily managed by sending easier or harder tests; a low figure invites complacency and a high one blames staff. Clicks alone do not show harm. | Gaming | Operational only | Helps whoever runs awareness training target it. At executive level, report the phishing report rate (CM-04) instead. | Not in the board report | — | All organisations | — |
| CM-06 | Open vulnerabilities (raw count) | Vulnerabilities and exposure | How many vulnerabilities do we have? | The number of open findings from vulnerability scans at the reporting date, all severities. | Vulnerability scanner | Lower | Counts a low-risk finding the same as one being exploited. It rises when scanning improves and falls when systems drop out of the scan. | Lacks context | Operational only | A workload figure for IT. The board form is critical exposure fixed on time (BM-02). | Not in the board report | — | All organisations | — |
| CM-07 | Percentage of systems patched | Vulnerabilities and exposure | Are our systems up to date? | The percentage of systems with all available patches applied, without regard to how critical the system or the patch is. | Patch management tool | Higher | A high figure hides the few critical, internet-facing systems that are not patched; systems outside the tool are not counted at all. | Lacks context | Avoid | Gives false comfort. Measure the critical weaknesses fixed on time (BM-02), which weights by what attackers use. | Not in the board report | — | All organisations | — |
| CM-08 | Mean time to remediate (all vulnerabilities) | Vulnerabilities and exposure | How long do we take to fix vulnerabilities? | The average days from detection to verified fix for all vulnerabilities closed in the period. | Vulnerability remediation tracker (P01) | Lower | An average hides the long tail of old, dangerous findings, and closing many easy findings pulls it down. | Lacks context | Operational only | Useful per priority for the team managing remediation. At board level use BM-02. | Not in the board report | — | All organisations | ISO/IEC 27001 Cl 9.1 |
| CM-09 | Security spend as a percentage of IT budget | Programme and investment | Are we spending enough on security? | Security spending in the year divided by total IT spending. | Finance | — | Says nothing about whether the money reduces risk; the ratio changes when IT spending changes, and what counts as 'security' varies. Benchmarks are rarely comparable. | No target | Avoid | Invites a debate about a ratio rather than about risk. Put spending in the Ask, tied to the risk it reduces (BR-06), and track delivery with BM-07. | Not in the board report | — | All organisations | — |
| CM-10 | Security budget spent against plan | Programme and investment | Are we spending the security budget as planned? | Security spending to date as a percentage of the budget planned to date. | Finance | — | Spending on plan is not delivering on plan; under-spend can be good or bad. | Lacks context | Executive only | A finance control for the executive sponsor. The board sees delivery (BM-07) and any funding ask. | Appendix, if the board asks | — | All organisations | ISO/IEC 27001 Cl 6.2 |
| CM-11 | Overall security maturity score | Assurance and compliance | How mature is our security? | A single score from a maturity assessment against a framework, for example 3.1 on a scale of 1 to 5. | Maturity or gap assessment | Higher | A composite that hides where the gaps are, moves slowly and can be raised by changing the assessor or the scoring. The link to risk is indirect. | Lacks context | Executive only | Worth taking to the board's yearly deep dive with a target profile agreed in advance. As a quarterly measure it barely moves. | Appendix, if the board asks | — | Larger organisations | NIST CSF GV.OV-03 |
| CM-12 | Percentage of controls compliant | Assurance and compliance | How compliant are we? | The percentage of controls in a framework or policy set assessed as implemented. | Compliance assessment | Higher | Every control counts the same, so ninety easy controls hide ten that matter. It rewards ticking boxes and looks like assurance. | Gaming | Avoid | Tells the board neither where the risk is nor what to decide. Report the material gaps as risks under Exposure. | Not in the board report | — | All organisations | — |
| CM-13 | External security rating | Assurance and compliance | How do outsiders rate our security? | A score from an outside-in rating service, based on what it can observe of the organisation's internet-facing systems. | External rating service | Higher | Built on the provider's own method and on what is visible from outside; it can be moved by fixing cosmetic findings, and it misses most of what matters inside. | Gaming | Avoid | Customers or insurers may quote it, so know yours, but do not steer by it. Explain it in words if the board asks. | Not in the board report | — | All organisations | — |
| CM-14 | Overdue audit and assessment findings | Assurance and compliance | Are we fixing what auditors and assessors found? | The number of findings from internal audit, external audit and regulatory assessments that are past their agreed date, at the reporting date. | Audit findings tracker | Lower | Counts a minor finding the same as a serious one, and dates can be extended to keep the count down. | Gaming | Executive only | The audit committee usually tracks audit actions itself. A serious overdue finding belongs in Exposure as a risk. | Appendix, if the board asks | — | Regulated entities (NIS2, DORA) | ISO/IEC 27001 Cl 9.1 |
| CM-15 | Multi-factor authentication coverage | Identity and access | Is strong sign-in in place where it matters most? | The percentage of remote-access, email and privileged accounts that require multi-factor authentication. | Identity provider reports | Higher | Accounts outside the identity provider, and exemptions granted 'temporarily', are easily left out of the denominator. | Gaming | Executive only | A strong control measure. It reaches the board when a gap is a top risk, then through BM-01 and Exposure. | Appendix, if the board asks | — | All organisations | ISO/IEC 27001 Cl 9.1 |
| CM-16 | Privileged access reviewed on time | Identity and access | Do we know who holds the keys to our systems? | The percentage of privileged accounts whose access was reviewed and confirmed within the required interval. | Access review records | Higher | A review can be a rubber stamp, and the figure says nothing about what was removed. | Gaming | Executive only | Belongs with the executive or risk committee as a control check. | Appendix, if the board asks | — | All organisations | — |
| CM-17 | Leavers' access removed on time | Identity and access | Do people lose access when they leave? | The percentage of leavers whose accounts were disabled within the required time of their leaving date. | HR leaver list and directory records | Higher | Depends on HR telling IT in time; contractors and supplier accounts are often missed. | Lacks context | Operational only | A process check for IT and HR. | Not in the board report | — | All organisations | — |
| CM-18 | Endpoint protection coverage | Vulnerabilities and exposure | Are all our devices protected? | The percentage of known laptops, desktops and servers reporting to the endpoint protection tool. | Endpoint protection console and asset inventory | Higher | Only as good as the inventory it is compared with; unknown devices are invisible. | Lacks context | Operational only | A hygiene measure for the IT team. | Not in the board report | — | All organisations | — |
| CM-19 | Asset inventory coverage | Vulnerabilities and exposure | Do we know what we own? | Devices and systems seen on the network or in the cloud that are recorded in the asset inventory, as a percentage of all seen. | Asset inventory and discovery scans | Higher | Depends on how complete discovery is, which is the thing being measured. | Lacks context | Operational only | Underpins every other figure but is not a board question. | Not in the board report | — | All organisations | — |
| CM-20 | Unsupported software on critical systems | Vulnerabilities and exposure | Are we running critical services on software that no longer gets security fixes? | The number of critical systems running an operating system or application past its end of support. | Asset inventory | Lower | Can be kept low by leaving systems out of the critical list. | Gaming | Executive only | Often the root of a funding ask. Take it to the board as a risk and an Ask, not as a standing measure. | Appendix, if the board asks | — | All organisations | — |
| CM-21 | Backup success rate | Resilience and recovery | Are our backups working? | The percentage of scheduled backup jobs that completed successfully in the period. | Backup system reports | Higher | A completed job is not a restorable backup, and backups the attacker can reach are no protection. | Vanity | Operational only | The board form is critical services restored in tests (BM-06). | Not in the board report | — | All organisations | — |
| CM-22 | Mean time to detect significant incidents | Incidents and detection | How quickly do we notice an attack? | The average hours from the start of a significant incident to its detection, for incidents closed in the period. | Incident log | Lower | Few data points, so one incident swings it; the start time is often an estimate made afterwards. | Lagging | Executive only | Worth tracking by the executive; explains BM-04 when detection was the problem. | Appendix, if the board asks | — | Organisations with an in-house security team | — |
| CM-23 | Security alerts handled | Incidents and detection | How busy is our security monitoring? | The number of alerts triaged by the security monitoring team or service in the period. | Security monitoring service reports | — | Measures effort, not outcome; more alerts can mean worse tuning. Reports from a managed service often lead with it. | Vanity | Avoid | Activity is not assurance. Ask the service for significant incidents and containment times (BM-04). | Not in the board report | — | All organisations | — |
| CM-24 | Security tasks or tickets closed | Programme and investment | How much has the security team done? | The number of security tickets, tasks or projects closed in the period. | Ticketing system | — | Rewards splitting work into small tickets and says nothing about risk reduced. | Vanity | Avoid | A list of activity is not a direction (BR-01). Report delivery against the approved plan (BM-07). | Not in the board report | — | All organisations | — |
| CM-25 | Penetration test findings | Assurance and compliance | What did the latest penetration test find? | The number of findings from the latest penetration test, by severity. | Penetration test report | Lower | Depends on the test's scope, the tester and the time allowed; a narrow test finds little. | Lacks context | Operational only | Serious findings become risks in the register and appear through BM-01 and BM-02. | Not in the board report | — | All organisations | — |
| CM-26 | Regulatory incident notifications made on time | Incidents and detection | Do we tell regulators in time when we must? | Of the incidents that required a notification to a regulator or authority in the period, the percentage notified within the legal deadline. | Incident log and notification records | Higher | Usually zero or one event a year, so the percentage swings between 0% and 100%. | Lagging | Executive only | A late notification is reported to the board at once as bad news (BR-07); as a standing measure it rarely moves. | Appendix, if the board asks | — | Regulated entities (NIS2, DORA) | NIS2 Art 20(1); DORA Art 5(2)(i) |
| CM-27 | Cyber insurance cover against estimated loss | Risk and appetite | Would our insurance cover a serious incident? | The limit of cyber insurance cover as a percentage of the estimated loss from the most severe plausible incident. | Insurance policy and risk scenario analysis | Higher | The loss estimate is uncertain and exclusions matter more than the limit. | Lacks context | Executive only | A yearly deep-dive question at renewal, not a quarterly measure. | Appendix, if the board asks | — | Larger organisations | NIST CSF GV.RM-02 |
Choose Yours
Your board measures: up to [[8]], each with a target, a tolerance and an owner (BR-03). Yellow columns are yours. The seven EXAMPLE rows show passes and failures — delete them first.
| Example | Metric ID | Measure (calc) | Recommendation (calc) | Report part (calc) | Why our board needs it — the question in our words | Target | Tolerance | Better when (calc) | Owner (role) | Data source in our organisation | Selection no. (calc) | Check (calc) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EXAMPLE | BM-01 | Risks outside appetite | Board | Position | Are we inside the appetite we approved in March? | 0 top risks above appetite | 0 top risks past their own tolerance limit | Lower | Head of Risk | Risk register, quarter-end review | 1 | OK |
| EXAMPLE | BM-02 | Critical exposure fixed on time | Board | Exposure | Are we closing the holes attackers use, fast enough? | 95% fixed within 14 calendar days | 80% | Higher | IT Operations Manager | Vulnerability remediation tracker | 2 | OK |
| EXAMPLE | BM-04 | Significant incidents and time to contain | Board | Exposure | Have we been hurt, and how fast did we contain it? | Contained within 24 hours | 48 hours | Lower | Information Security Manager | Incident log | 3 | OK |
| EXAMPLE | BM-06 | Critical services restored in tests | Board | Exposure | Could we get the online ordering service back? | 4 of 4 critical services each year (50%, 2 of 4, by Q3) | 25% | Higher | IT Operations Manager | Recovery test records | 4 | OK |
| EXAMPLE | BM-07 | Security programme delivery | Board | Direction | Is the plan we funded being delivered? | 100% (9 of 9 milestones by quarter end) | 75% | Higher | Security Programme Manager | Security programme plan | 5 | OK |
| EXAMPLE | CM-15 | Multi-factor authentication coverage | Executive only | Appendix, if the board asks | 100% of remote and admin accounts | Higher | IT Operations Manager | Identity provider report | 6 | Executive only — say why the board needs it | ||
| EXAMPLE | CM-02 | Attacks blocked | Avoid | Not in the board report | The previous report always showed it | — | Firewall reports | 7 | Marked Avoid — choose a board measure |
Selection Check
Selection check
The whole selection on Choose Yours against the pack's rules. Every line should say 'Meets the check' before the board is asked to agree the measures.
| Most measures the board sees | 8 | [[8]] is the pack's suggestion — set your own limit. |
Checks
| Check | Result | Status | What it means |
|---|---|---|---|
| Measures chosen | 7 | Meets the check | Warns above the limit in C5. More measures than the board can discuss in its time is the commonest way reports stop being read (BR-03). |
| Measures marked Avoid | 1 | Action needed | Replace each with the board measure its reason names. |
| Measures marked Operational only | 0 | Meets the check | Keep them on the operational dashboard, not in the board report. |
| Measures with no target | 1 | Action needed | BR-03: a measure reaches the board only with a stated target. A tolerance is strongly advised: without one, any miss of the target reads as 'Outside tolerance'. |
| Measures with no owner | 1 | Action needed | Someone must answer for each figure when the board asks. |
| Measures chosen more than once | 0 | Meets the check | Keep one row per measure. |
| Rows with a check to resolve | 2 | Action needed | Any row on Choose Yours whose Check does not say OK. |
| BM-01 Risks outside appetite chosen | 1 | Meets the check | Every report opens by saying whether you are within appetite (BR-02); BM-01 is the measure that answers it. |
| Overall | 4 | Not ready | The number of checks above that do not yet say 'Meets the check'. |
Your selection by report part
| Report part | Measures | Share of selection | Question the part answers |
|---|---|---|---|
| Position | 1 | 14% | Where do we stand against the risk appetite the board set? |
| Direction | 1 | 14% | Is it getting better or worse, and why? |
| Exposure | 3 | 43% | What could hurt us most, and how likely is it now? |
| Appendix, if the board asks | 1 | 14% | Executive measures, shown only where they explain a board measure (BR-05). |
The Ask part carries decisions, not measures (BR-06). EXAMPLE rows on Choose Yours are counted until you delete them.
Lists
| Recommendation | Weakness | ReportPart | Theme | AppliesWhere | BetterWhen |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Board | Vanity | Position | Risk and appetite | All organisations | Higher |
| Executive only | Gaming | Direction | Vulnerabilities and exposure | Regulated entities (NIS2, DORA) | Lower |
| Operational only | Lagging | Exposure | Accepted risk | Organisations with an in-house security team | — |
| Avoid | No target | Appendix, if the board asks | Incidents and detection | Larger organisations | |
| Lacks context | Not in the board report | Suppliers |
Resilience and recovery
Programme and investment
People and behaviour
Identity and access
Threat activity
Assurance and compliance
Definitions
Definitions
| Term | Meaning in this workbook |
|---|---|
| Board measure | A figure reported to the board every cycle. It passes BR-03: it answers a question the board asks and carries a target or tolerance the board has agreed. |
| Recommendation — Board | Answers a question the board asks, can carry a target or tolerance the board sets, and moves when risk moves. Report it every cycle. |
| Recommendation — Executive only | Useful to the executive or a risk committee, but too detailed or too narrow for the board. Report it below board level; bring it to the board only when it explains a board measure. |
| Recommendation — Operational only | Helps the team that runs the control manage its work. It says little about risk to the organisation. Keep it on the operational dashboard. |
| Recommendation — Avoid | Misleads as a headline measure at any level above the team: it rewards the wrong thing, cannot carry a meaningful target, or looks like assurance when it is not. |
| Weakness — Vanity | Looks impressive and always moves the right way, but no decision would change because of it (for example, attacks blocked). |
| Weakness — Gaming | Can be improved by changing what is counted rather than by reducing risk (for example, narrowing what counts as critical). |
| Weakness — Lagging | Shows harm or failure only after it has happened, so it cannot warn the board in time on its own. |
| Weakness — No target | No level can be called good or bad, so the board cannot judge it and can only ask 'so what?'. |
| Weakness — Lacks context | A count or average with no denominator, weighting or comparison, so a rise or fall can mean opposite things. |
| Target | The level the organisation aims for, for example 95% fixed on time. |
| Tolerance | The worst level the board will accept before it must act, not just be told — for example 90%. Under DORA the management body sets the ICT risk tolerance (Art 5(2)). |
| Status — On target | At or better than its target. One of the words a board measure is reported with each cycle (BR-04). |
| Status — Below target, within tolerance | Short of its target but inside the tolerance the board set; a plan and date are given. One of the words a board measure is reported with each cycle (BR-04). |
| Status — Outside tolerance | Beyond the limit at which the board said it must act, not just be told; an ask follows (BR-06). One of the words a board measure is reported with each cycle (BR-04). |
| Status — No target set | Reported without a target: it should not reach the board until one is set (BR-03). One of the words a board measure is reported with each cycle (BR-04). |
| Position — Within appetite | Every top risk is assessed at or below the level of risk the board has said it is willing to accept. The status words for BM-01, which answers BR-02. |
| Position — Outside appetite, within tolerance | At least one top risk is above appetite but below the tolerance limit, with a plan and a date to bring it back. The status words for BM-01, which answers BR-02. |
| Position — Outside tolerance | At least one risk is above the tolerance limit: the point at which the board said it must act, not just be told. The status words for BM-01, which answers BR-02. |
| Position rule | How BM-01's two counts give the position: Outside tolerance if any top risk is past its own tolerance limit; otherwise Outside appetite, within tolerance if any top risk is above appetite; otherwise Within appetite. BM-01 therefore has no single tolerance figure; each top risk carries its own tolerance limit in the risk register. |
| Risk appetite | The amount and type of risk the board is willing to accept in pursuit of its objectives, set by the board. |
| Report part | Where a board measure is shown in the report, in the order BR-01 sets: Position, Direction, Exposure, Ask. Measures below board level go in the appendix or not in the report at all. |
| Better when | Whether a higher or a lower value is an improvement. '—' marks a measure where neither is, which is itself a sign it cannot carry a target. |
| Metric ID | The measure's stable reference: BM for the pack's board measures, CM for the other candidates. Keep IDs when you tailor the catalogue. |
| Critical service | A service whose loss would stop the organisation meeting its main obligations to customers, regulators or the public. Your business impact analysis names them. |
| Owner | The person, by role, who answers for a measure's figure when the board asks about it. |
| BR-nn, BM-nn | Reporting rules and board measures defined in the Board Reporting Narrative Model. |
| (calc) | A column or cell the workbook calculates. Do not type or paste over it. |
| EXAMPLE row | A worked example on Choose Yours showing how a completed row looks, including two that fail the checks. Delete before approval. |
Framework References
Framework references
These references indicate relevance only and do not reproduce the text of any standard.
| Framework | Reference | Supported by |
|---|---|---|
| ISO/IEC 27001:2022 | Clause 9.1 — Monitoring, measurement, analysis and evaluation | Metric Catalogue: what is measured, how, from which source; Choose Yours |
| ISO/IEC 27001:2022 | Clause 6.2 — Information security objectives and planning to achieve them | Choose Yours: target, tolerance and owner for each board measure |
| NIST CSF 2.0 | GV.OV-03 — “Organizational cybersecurity risk management performance is evaluated and reviewed for adjustments needed” | Board measures BM-01 to BM-08; Selection Check |
| NIST CSF 2.0 | GV.RM-02 — “Risk appetite and risk tolerance statements are established, communicated, and maintained” | BM-01, BM-03; the Tolerance column on Choose Yours |
| NIS2 — Directive (EU) 2022/2555 | Article 20(1) — management bodies approve the cybersecurity risk-management measures, oversee their implementation and can be held liable for infringements | The selection as the measures through which the management body oversees implementation |
| NIS2 — Directive (EU) 2022/2555 | Article 20(2) — members of management bodies are required to follow training to identify risks and assess cybersecurity risk-management practices | BM-08: management body training shown separately |
| DORA — Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 | Article 5(2) — the management body defines, approves, oversees and is responsible for the ICT risk management framework, bears ultimate responsibility for ICT risk and sets the risk tolerance | BM-01 against the risk tolerance the management body sets; the Tolerance column |
| DORA — Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 | Article 5(4) — members of the management body keep up to date with sufficient knowledge and skills to understand and assess ICT risk, including through regular training | BM-08: management body knowledge and training |
Editions referenced: ISO/IEC 27001:2022 incl. Amd 1:2024; NIST CSF 2.0; Directive (EU) 2022/2555 (NIS2); Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 (DORA)