Vulnerability & Exposure Management Standard
States the mandatory scanning coverage, authentication requirements, rating inputs and remediation deadlines that the organisation commits to.
Available soon
- Format
- Word
- Size
- 54 KB
- Length
- 12 pages
- Version
- 1.5
- Updated
What's inside
- 1. Purpose
- 2. Scope
- 3. Roles and responsibilities
- 4. Scanning requirements
- 5. Prioritisation and remediation deadlines
- 6. Remediation and verification
- 7. Exceptions
- 8. Reporting
- 9. Records to keep
- 10. Compliance
- 11. Review
- 12. Related documents
- 13. Adapting this template
- 14. Framework references
- Appendix A — Definitions
Preview
The document from section 1, as you will receive it. Highlighted [[text]] is for you to replace; shaded guidance boxes are for you to delete before approval. The cover and document control pages are in the file.
1. Purpose
This standard sets the minimum requirements for finding, prioritising, fixing and evidencing technical vulnerabilities in [[Organisation Name]]'s systems. It turns the commitments in the [[Information Security Policy]] into measurable rules: what must be scanned, how often, how quickly each kind of finding must be fixed, and what records must be kept.
Its aim is that the vulnerabilities most likely to be used against the organisation are fixed first, within deadlines that the business has agreed and can meet.
2. Scope
This standard applies to:
- all systems owned, managed or operated by or for [[Organisation Name]], including servers, end-user devices, network and security devices, cloud services under our administrative control, business applications and websites;
- systems operated on our behalf by service providers, where the contract gives us, or requires the provider to provide, vulnerability information;
- all employees, contractors and service providers who administer or support these systems.
Not covered here: secure software development practices ([[Secure Development Standard]]) and penetration testing ([[Security Testing Standard]]). Vulnerabilities found by either are, once reported, managed under sections 5 to 7 of this standard.
Where [[Organisation Name]] makes a product with digital elements that is made available on the EU market, an actively exploited vulnerability in that product also has to be reported under the Cyber Resilience Act (Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Article 14) from 11 September 2026: an early warning within 24 hours of becoming aware of it, a notification within 72 hours and a final report, through the EU single reporting platform to the CSIRT designated as coordinator in the Member State of its main EU establishment, and to ENISA. These reports run beside the deadlines in section 5 and do not replace them. Name who makes them, usually the product owner with Legal.
Guidance — delete before approval
If you use cloud software services (SaaS) where you have no access to the underlying systems, list them as out of scope for scanning but in scope for supplier assurance (see the Third-Party Security Policy).
3. Roles and responsibilities
Role | Responsibilities under this standard |
|---|---|
Approver [[e.g. Chief Operating Officer]] | Approves this standard and the remediation deadlines in section 5. Receives quarterly reporting. Approves Priority 1 exceptions, unless the organisation's exception standard names a more senior approver (VM-18). |
Standard owner [[e.g. Head of Information Security]] | Maintains this standard. Operates or oversees scanning. Runs the weekly triage. Reports performance. Escalates overdue findings. |
Asset owners [[e.g. IT Operations Manager, application owners]] | Fix vulnerabilities in their systems within the deadlines in section 5, or request an exception before the deadline passes. Keep asset information accurate. |
Service providers [[e.g. managed IT provider]] | Fix vulnerabilities in systems they operate within the contractual deadlines, and provide evidence of remediation on request. |
Risk owners [[defined in the risk management methodology]] | Decide whether to accept the risk of a vulnerability that cannot be fixed on time, under the exception process in section 7. |
Internal audit or independent reviewer | Periodically checks that this standard is followed and that its records are complete. |
4. Scanning requirements
4.1 Asset coverage
VM-01 Every system in scope must be recorded in the asset inventory with an owner, a criticality rating (Critical, High or Standard, see Appendix A) and whether it is reachable from the internet.
VM-02 At least 95% of in-scope systems must be successfully scanned in each scanning period. Systems that are not scanned must be listed with the reason and a date by which they will be.
VM-03 New systems must be added to the scanning scope before, or within 5 working days of, going into production.
4.2 Scan type
VM-04 Servers and end-user devices must be scanned with valid credentials (authenticated scanning) or by an installed agent, wherever the technology allows. Unauthenticated scans alone miss most missing patches and configuration weaknesses.
VM-05 At least 95% of authenticated scans must complete with successful login. Credential failures must be investigated and corrected within 5 working days.
VM-06 Internet-facing systems must also be scanned from outside the organisation's network, to show what an external attacker can reach.
4.3 Minimum scanning frequency
Asset class | Minimum frequency | Additional triggers |
|---|---|---|
Internet-facing systems (external scan) | Weekly | After any significant change; when a widely exploited vulnerability is announced |
Critical and High criticality systems (internal) | Weekly | After any significant change |
Standard criticality servers and network devices | Monthly | After any significant change |
End-user devices (laptops, desktops) | Continuous (agent) or monthly | — |
Cloud infrastructure and configuration | Continuous (posture tool) or weekly | After infrastructure changes |
Web applications and websites, internet-facing | Monthly, and before major releases | After significant functional change |
Web applications, internal only | Quarterly, and before major releases | After significant functional change |
The scan interval counts against the deadline. Because the clock can start at the vendor release date (VM-08), a flaw that sits unscanned for a month can use up most or all of a Priority 2 or Priority 3 deadline before it reaches the tracker. Deploy vendor fixes on the patch cycle without waiting for the scanner, and scan more often than the minimum above where vendors release fixes often.
VM-07 Scanning tools must receive vulnerability definition updates at least daily, and their configuration must be reviewed at least every 6 months using the [[Vulnerability Scanner Configuration Review Checklist]].
Guidance — delete before approval
These frequencies are a practical baseline for most small and mid-size organisations, and the minimum for finding new vulnerabilities. Adjust them to your risk. Proving a fix does not wait for them: a fix is confirmed by a targeted rescan of the affected systems (VM-13), so a finding can be closed within its deadline even when the next scheduled scan falls after it.
Payment card environments: PCI DSS requires internal and external vulnerability scans at least once every three months, with external scans by an approved scanning vendor. The weekly and monthly frequencies above exceed this.
DORA-regulated financial entities: Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1774, Article 10(2), requires automated vulnerability scanning at least weekly for ICT assets that support critical or important functions. Make every such asset Weekly in the table above, whatever its criticality rating here.
5. Prioritisation and remediation deadlines
5.1 How priority is set
Each finding is given a priority from 1 (most urgent) to 4, based on three questions rather than on the scanner's severity label alone:
- Is it being exploited? — the vulnerability is listed in a known-exploited catalogue such as CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities list, or credible threat information shows active attacks. Public exploit code for a High or Critical vulnerability on an internet-facing system counts as well (Appendix A).
- Can an attacker reach it? — the affected system is reachable from the internet, or from any network the organisation does not fully control, such as partner links, guest Wi-Fi or third-party connections (Appendix A).
- How severe is it technically? — the vendor or CVSS severity rating (Critical, High, Medium, Low).
The full scoring model, including how asset criticality and compensating controls adjust priority, is set out in the [[Vulnerability Risk Rating & SLA Model]]. The table below is the approved minimum.
5.2 Remediation deadlines
Priority | Typical findings | Deadline to fix | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
Priority 1 — Emergency | Exploited vulnerability on an internet-facing or Critical system; public exploit code for a High or Critical vulnerability on an internet-facing system | Mitigate within 72 hours; fix within 7 days | Treat as a potential incident. Notify the standard owner immediately. |
Priority 2 — High | Exploited vulnerability on an internal system; Critical or High severity on an internet-facing system | 14 days | Escalate to asset owner's manager if not fixed by day 10. |
Priority 3 — Medium | Critical or High severity on an internal system; Medium severity on an internet-facing system | 30 days | PCI DSS counts its one-month period for critical (or, in some readings of the standard, high-security) patches from the patch's release; check the wording of your version with your assessor. Where a vendor fix exists, this clock also starts at its release when that is earlier than detection (VM-08). |
Priority 4 — Low | Medium severity on internal systems; Low severity anywhere | 90 days | May be addressed through the normal patch cycle. |
The days are counted from the clock start (VM-08). Where a finding fits more than one row, the higher priority applies. The [[Vulnerability Risk Rating & SLA Model]] applies these rows as a decision table, including how asset criticality can raise a priority.
VM-08 Deadlines are counted in calendar days from the clock start, not from the date a ticket was raised. The clock starts on the earlier of the date the vulnerability was first detected on the system and the vendor release date. Where the vendor has published no fix, it starts on the date of first detection. The vendor release date is the date the vendor first published a fix for the vulnerability, or an advisory that names the fix, for the version running on that system. A finding already past its deadline when it is first detected is overdue from that day (VM-19). A vendor release date found after detection brings the deadline forward in the same way. When a finding's priority is raised later — for example, when it is newly listed as exploited — its new deadline is set as the [[Vulnerability Risk Rating & SLA Model]] describes (rule RM-12), and is never later than the deadline it already had.
VM-09 Where a Priority 1 vulnerability cannot be fixed within 72 hours, a compensating control (for example, blocking access, disabling the affected feature or isolating the system) must be applied within 72 hours and recorded. The 72 hours run from the moment of first detection, or from the moment the finding became Priority 1 (rule RM-12 of the [[Vulnerability Risk Rating & SLA Model]]), not from the vendor release date.
VM-10 A priority may be lowered only by the standard owner, with the reason recorded, for example when a compensating control removes internet exposure. It must not be lowered to avoid a missed deadline.
Guidance — delete before approval
Before approval, test these deadlines against your last three months of findings. If more than a fifth of Priority 2 and 3 findings would have been overdue, either add remediation capacity or agree longer deadlines now — a standard that is routinely missed is worse for audit than a realistic one that is met.
6. Remediation and verification
VM-11 Every Priority 1 to 3 finding must be recorded in the [[Vulnerability Remediation Tracker / ticketing system]] with asset, priority, owner, detection date, vendor release date (where there is a vendor fix) and deadline. Priority 4 findings may be tracked in bulk through the normal patch cycle, but keep their 90-day deadline.
VM-12 Findings are reviewed at a triage meeting at least weekly, following the [[Vulnerability Triage & Remediation Operating Procedure]].
Guidance — delete before approval
Weekly or every two weeks? Weekly is the default because the shortest deadlines are short: a Priority 2 finding must be fixed within 14 days, and escalates on day 10. A finding that waits up to two weeks for its first meeting would already be late.
A small organisation with few new findings may meet every two weeks instead. If you do, change "weekly" in VM-12 to "every two weeks" before approval, so the standard says what you actually do, and keep two things from the weekly routine: new Priority 1 and 2 findings get an owner as soon as they are found, between meetings, and anything due before the next meeting is chased now. The operating procedure's section on adapting it says how.
VM-13 A finding is closed only when a later scan confirms it is no longer present, or when other objective evidence (such as a configuration export) is attached. A ticket marked complete is not sufficient evidence on its own.
VM-14 A finding may be closed as a false positive only with recorded evidence, approved by the standard owner.
VM-15 Systems that are no longer supported by their vendor must be recorded, with compensating controls and a planned retirement date, and reviewed at least quarterly.
7. Exceptions
VM-16 If a vulnerability cannot be fixed by its deadline, the asset owner must request an exception before the deadline passes, following the [[Security Exception & Waiver Standard]]. A request made after the deadline is not an exception: the finding is overdue and is escalated under VM-19. Where the deadline had already passed on the day the finding was first detected (VM-08), the request is made at the finding's first triage meeting.
VM-17 Every exception must name a risk owner, describe the compensating controls in place, and have an expiry date no later than 90 days after approval, or the shorter maximum the organisation's exception standard sets for the exception's risk. Renewal requires a new review.
VM-18 Exceptions for Priority 1 vulnerabilities must be approved by the approver of this standard. Where the organisation's exception standard names a more senior approver for the exception's risk, that approver decides instead.
VM-19 A finding that is past its deadline without an approved exception is reported as overdue and escalated to the asset owner's manager and, if still open after a further 14 days, to the approver.
Where [[Organisation Name]] has adopted an exception standard ([[Security Exception & Waiver Standard]]), exceptions under this section are requested, decided and recorded under it, in its one register. Where it and this section differ, the more senior approver and the shorter duration apply.
Guidance — delete before approval
One exception process and one register for the whole organisation is what auditors expect to test. If you adopt the CISO Times Security Exception & Waiver Standard, an exception in its Critical band lasts at most 30 days and is approved by the board, or a board risk committee it has delegated this to; in a two-tier structure, the management board; where there is no board, such as in an owner-managed company, executive management. A Priority 1 finding whose exception scores Critical there goes to that body, not to this standard's approver.
8. Reporting
VM-20 The standard owner reports monthly to IT and security leadership, and quarterly to [[the management body / executive committee]], on at least: scan coverage; authenticated scan success rate; open findings by priority; the share fixed within deadline, for Priority 1 and Priority 2 apart; overdue findings and their age; and active exceptions. Beside the coverage figure, report how many register systems are out of scanning scope or not scanned. Beside the deadline and overdue figures, report how many findings are under an exception, and how many were closed because the system was retired.
VM-21 Reports must use the definitions in the [[Vulnerability Management Metrics Workbook]] so that figures are comparable between periods.
9. Records to keep
Record | Where held | Minimum retention |
|---|---|---|
Scan results and scan schedules | [[Scanning tool / export location]] | [[12 months]] |
Scan coverage register | [[Location]] | [[12 months after superseded]] |
Remediation tracker or tickets, with closure evidence | [[Ticketing system]] | [[3 years]] |
Exception requests and approvals | [[Exception register]] | [[3 years after expiry]] |
Monthly and quarterly reports | [[Location]] | [[3 years]] |
Approved versions of this standard | [[Document management system]] | [[Life of the ISMS + 3 years]] |
Guidance — delete before approval
Align retention with your records retention schedule. Regulated financial entities typically keep ICT risk records for at least five years; confirm your own obligations.
10. Compliance
Compliance with this standard is monitored through the reports in section 8 and checked through [[internal audit / independent review]]. Repeated failure to meet deadlines without an approved exception is escalated as described in VM-19 and may be treated under [[the disciplinary procedure / supplier performance terms]].
11. Review
This standard is reviewed at least every 12 months, and also after a significant incident caused by an unfixed vulnerability, a major change in the systems in scope, or a change in applicable regulation.
12. Related documents
Document | Relationship |
|---|---|
[[Information Security Policy]] | Parent policy |
Vulnerability Triage & Remediation Operating Procedure | How the weekly routine in section 6 is run |
Vulnerability Risk Rating & SLA Model | Full method behind the priorities in section 5 |
Scan Coverage & Asset Scope Register | Evidence for VM-01 to VM-03 |
Vulnerability Remediation Tracker | Record required by VM-11 |
Security Exception & Waiver Standard | Exception route in section 7 |
Patch Management Standard | How fixes are deployed |
13. Adapting this template
Guidance — delete before approval
Small organisation: you may merge this standard with the operating procedure into one document. Keep the deadline table (section 5.2) and requirements VM-13 and VM-16 unchanged — they are what auditors test.
Regulated financial entity: approve this standard within your ICT risk management framework and reference it there. Confirm scanning frequencies for assets supporting critical or important functions (section 4.3) and retention periods (section 9).
IT run by a service provider: copy the deadlines in section 5.2 into the service agreement or operating schedule, and require scan-based evidence of fixes (VM-13). Keep ownership of the scanner and its results in-house where possible.
Delete this section before approval.
14. Framework references
These references show where this document supports an external framework. They indicate relevance only and do not reproduce the text of any standard. Editions referenced: ISO/IEC 27001:2022 incl. Amd 1:2024; NIST CSF 2.0; Directive (EU) 2022/2555 (NIS2); Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 (DORA); PCI DSS v4.0.1; Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 (Cyber Resilience Act).
Framework | Reference | Supported by |
|---|---|---|
ISO/IEC 27001:2022 | Annex A 8.8 — Management of technical vulnerabilities | Whole standard |
ISO/IEC 27001:2022 | Annex A 5.36 — Compliance with policies, rules and standards for information security | Sections 7, 8, 10 |
NIST CSF 2.0 | PR.PS-02 — “Software is maintained, replaced, and removed commensurate with risk” | Sections 5, 6 |
NIST CSF 2.0 | ID.RA-01 — “Vulnerabilities in assets are identified, validated, and recorded” | Section 4; VM-11 |
NIS2 — Directive (EU) 2022/2555 | Article 21(2)(e) — “security in network and information systems acquisition, development and maintenance, including vulnerability handling and disclosure” | Whole standard |
DORA — Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 | Article 9 — protection and prevention, including documented policies for patches and updates (Article 9(4)(f)) | Sections 4 to 6 |
DORA — Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1774 | Article 10 — vulnerability and patch management, including automated vulnerability scanning at least weekly for ICT assets supporting critical or important functions | Sections 4.3, 5 and 6 |
Cyber Resilience Act — Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 | Article 14, applying from 11 September 2026 (Article 71(2)) — a manufacturer of a product with digital elements notifies an actively exploited vulnerability in the product, and a severe incident having an impact on the security of the product, that it becomes aware of, to the CSIRT designated as coordinator and to ENISA through the single reporting platform. Each notification is an early warning without undue delay and in any event within 24 hours of becoming aware, a notification within 72 hours, and a final report (for a vulnerability, no later than 14 days after a corrective or mitigating measure is available). The duty binds manufacturers of such products; the rest of the Regulation applies from 11 December 2027 | Section 2: an exploited vulnerability in a product the organisation makes |
PCI DSS v4.0.1 | Requirement 6.3.1 — identifying new security vulnerabilities and ranking them by risk | Section 5 |
PCI DSS v4.0.1 | Requirement 6.3.3 — installing patches for critical (or high-security, as the risk ranking defines it) vulnerabilities within one month of release; check the wording of your version with your assessor | Section 5.2 |
PCI DSS v4.0.1 | Requirement 11.3.1 — internal vulnerability scans at least every three months, with rescans to confirm fixes | Sections 4.3 and 6 |
Appendix A — Definitions
Term | Meaning in this standard |
|---|---|
Asset criticality | Critical: failure or compromise would stop a core business service or expose highly sensitive data. High: significant disruption or data exposure. Standard: all other systems. |
Authenticated scan | A scan that logs in to the target system, or uses an installed agent, so it can see installed software and configuration. |
Clock start | The clock starts on the earlier of the date the vulnerability was first detected on the system and the vendor release date. Where the vendor has published no fix, it starts on the date of first detection. Day 0 of every deadline in section 5.2 is the clock start (VM-08). |
Compensating control | A measure that reduces the risk of a vulnerability that cannot yet be fixed, such as blocking network access to the affected service. |
CVSS | Common Vulnerability Scoring System — a published method for rating the technical severity of a vulnerability. |
Exception | An approved, time-limited decision not to fix a vulnerability by its deadline, with a named risk owner and compensating controls. |
Exploited vulnerability | A vulnerability with reliable evidence of use in real attacks, such as an entry in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogue. |
Internet-facing | Reachable from the internet, directly or through a published service, without first connecting to the organisation's private network; or reachable from any network the organisation does not fully control, such as partner links, guest Wi-Fi or third-party connections. See section 5.1. |
Public exploit code | Working exploit code, or a proof of concept that attacks the vulnerability, that has been published where anyone can obtain it, such as a public code repository, an exploit database or an attack framework, and that works against the version running on the system. |
Scan coverage | The percentage of in-scope systems successfully scanned in the period. |
Vendor release date | The vendor release date is the date the vendor first published a fix for the vulnerability, or an advisory that names the fix, for the version running on that system. |