How do we…
How do we review an LLM feature or an AI agent for security before it goes live?
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The short answer
- Recommendation
- Review it after the AI intake, at a depth from 1 to 3 that the tier and the feature set, and decide Release, Release with conditions or Hold against seven release gates. Report counts of checks verified and findings open, never a score.
- Reasoning
- The review answers one question: can it go live, with the evidence on file. It follows the intake and changes none of its rules, so a stopped use is not reviewed and a use with no intake decision waits. The depth scales the effort: Tier 3, or all three risky properties, means Depth 3 and an independent tester; Tier 2, tools, memory, company data above Public or two properties mean at least Depth 2. A gate that fails holds the release. Anything open that fails no gate becomes a condition with an owner and a date.
- Considerations
- An open Critical finding needs an exception from the board, or a board risk committee it has delegated to; the management board in a two-tier structure; executive management where there is no board (RG-3). A High finding needs the Head of Information Security and the accountable executive (RG-4).
- The approvers are those of the higher of the intake tier and the depth, with the Head of Information Security as well from Depth 2 (RG-6). Nobody approves a use they own.
- The depths, days and gates are the pack's defaults, including a review within 90 calendar days of adoption for a feature already running.
- The depth routes the review. It says nothing about how the EU AI Act classifies the feature, which counsel confirms.
The decision, step by step
Select any step for the reasoning behind it and where the pack covers it.
- Start
- Step
- Decision
- Outcome
- Loop back
Keyboard: Tab to a step, arrow keys move along the flow, Enter pins its explanation, + and − zoom, 0 fits the diagram, Esc closes. The text version below has the same content.
Where a step quotes a number, it is the default in the CISO Times pack. Your own standard may set a different one.
Read as text
The same flow written out: each step, its reasoning and where the pack covers it. 22 steps.
Start
An LLM feature or agent is due to go live
The review answers one question: can it go live? The answer is Release, Release with conditions or Hold, and the evidence is on file. It applies to every feature the organisation builds, configures or switches on, including one a supplier has added to software you already run. A feature already running when the standard is adopted is reviewed too, within the pack's default of 90 calendar days.
In the pack
- P25-A03 LLM Application Security Review ProcedurePurpose
- P25-A03 LLM Application Security Review ProcedureScope
Decision
What did the P24 intake decide for this use?
The review follows the intake and does not replace it. P24 sets the tier and says whether the use may proceed, and the review depth starts from that tier. A use P24 has stopped is not reviewed. A feature a supplier switched on inside software you already run also needs an intake decision before it starts.
- Stop: Stop: no review starts
- Not decided yet, or not known: Get the intake decision first
- A tier is set: Describe the feature and draw its data flow
In the pack
- P25-A03 LLM Application Security Review ProcedureWhat sets the depth
- P24-A03 AI Use Case Intake & Approval ProcedureStage 1 (IS-1): Propose (rule AG-09)
- P24-A03 AI Use Case Intake & Approval ProcedureStage 2 (IS-2): Screen
Outcome
Stop: no review starts
P24 has said Stop, because of a prohibited practice or special category personal data. There is no route to approval, so no review is started. A changed use is a new request through the intake.
In the pack
- P24-A03 AI Use Case Intake & Approval ProcedureStop
- P25-A03 LLM Application Security Review ProcedureWhat sets the depth
Outcome
Get the intake decision first
A feature with no intake decision has no tier, so the depth cannot be set. Ask the owner for the intake and wait for the decision. The review is not a way round the intake.
In the pack
- P24-A03 AI Use Case Intake & Approval ProcedureStage 1 (IS-1): Propose (rule AG-09)
- P25-A03 LLM Application Security Review ProcedureScope
Step
Describe the feature and draw its data flow
Copy the feature's use ID, tier and data level from its P24 inventory entry. Draw the data flow on one page and answer five questions: does it retrieve company content, what level of tools has it (none, read or write), does it read untrusted content, keep memory or send anything outside. Say whether the organisation built the feature (building on a supplier's model API counts), put its name on it or changed what it is meant for, and tell Legal if so. P24 holds such a new feature at Tier 3 until Legal records the role. A deployer role sets the depth again from the new tier. A provider or other role keeps it at Tier 3 and Depth 3. A running feature carries it as a dated condition.
In the pack
- P25-A03 LLM Application Security Review ProcedureStage 1 (RP-1): Describe
Decision
Is it Tier 3, or do all three risky properties hold?
Tier 3 at the intake sets Depth 3. So do all three properties of the rule of two: it reads untrusted content, reaches sensitive data and can change state or communicate outside the organisation. If the owner cannot say whether a property is true, treat it as true until the data flow shows otherwise.
- Yes, or not known: Depth 3: an independent tester tests every selected class
- No: Tier 2, tools, memory, company data or two properties?
In the pack
- P25-A03 LLM Application Security Review ProcedureWhat sets the depth
- P25-A03 LLM Application Security Review ProcedureThe rule of two (rule GS-24)
Step
Depth 3: an independent tester tests every selected class
At Depth 3 someone who did not build the feature tests every selected attack class under a written red team plan. A feature with tools also gets the agent permission review. Where all three risky properties hold, a person approves every action the feature takes. The approvers are the executive decision-maker your procedure names and the Head of Information Security. The pack's default decision time is 30 working days.
In the pack
- P25-A02 Generative AI Security StandardThe review depth
- P25-A03 LLM Application Security Review ProcedureReview depth
- P25-A03 LLM Application Security Review ProcedureWho signs
Decision
Tier 2, tools, memory, company data or two properties?
Any one of these makes it at least Depth 2: a Tier 2 use, retrieval of company content above Public, tools (read or write), memory kept between sessions, or two of the three risky properties. When none applies and the tier is 1, the review is Depth 1: the data flow, the standard check and the configuration checklist.
- Yes, or not known: Depth 2: Depth 2: the team tests and the Head of InfoSec reviews
- No: Depth 1: Check the standard and the configuration checklist
In the pack
- P25-A03 LLM Application Security Review ProcedureWhat sets the depth
Step
Depth 2: the team tests and the Head of InfoSec reviews
At Depth 2 the team tests the selected attack classes, a tester who did not build the feature is expected and the review states who tested, and the Head of Information Security reviews the evidence and signs as well. A third-party feature adds the provider questionnaire, and a feature with tools adds the agent permission review. Where two properties hold, the review records the residual risk. The pack's defaults are a decision within 15 working days and a review of the approval every 6 months.
In the pack
- P25-A02 Generative AI Security StandardThe review depth
- P25-A03 LLM Application Security Review ProcedureReview depth
- P25-A03 LLM Application Security Review ProcedureThe rule of two
Step
Check the standard and the configuration checklist
The developer marks each of the thirty-one requirements met, not met or not applicable, with evidence. The developer and the IT owner then verify each applicable configuration check, with evidence and a date. Of the 30 checks, 14 hold the release if they fail or are not verified. Report both as counts, for example 14 of 17 applicable checks verified, never as a share.
In the pack
- P25-A03 LLM Application Security Review ProcedureStage 3 (RP-3): Check the standard
- P25-A05 Generative AI Deployment Configuration ChecklistChecklist
Decision
Does an outside provider supply the model or the service?
A feature built on a provider's model, or switched on in a supplier's product, relies on settings, contract terms and data handling you do not control. The organisation's side stays yours: the settings, the data put in and what the feature can reach. Answer yes if any part comes from outside.
- Yes, or not known: Send the provider questionnaire and review the answers
- No: Does the feature have tools or connectors?
In the pack
- P25-A03 LLM Application Security Review ProcedureStage 4 (RP-4): Assess the provider
- P25-A02 Generative AI Security StandardModel and provider
Step
Send the provider questionnaire and review the answers
Procurement sends the AI vendor questionnaire and Security reviews the answers. The review procedure requires it from Depth 2 when an outside provider supplies the model or service, and its evidence list asks for the answered questionnaire then. At Depth 1 Security reads the provider's published security statement instead. Count the answers: questions answered with evidence out of those that apply, with the open ones listed. The answers inform the supplier decision under the third-party pack and do not replace it.
In the pack
- P25-A03 LLM Application Security Review ProcedureStage 4 (RP-4): Assess the provider
- P25-A06 AI Vendor & Model Provider Security QuestionnaireResult
Decision
Does the feature have tools or connectors?
A feature in which the model chooses which tools to call is an agent, and P24 treats a system that can act on its own as Tier 3 until assessed. A tool is any function the model can ask the application to run: search, read a file, send an email, run a query, run code. A connector gives access to another system. Any feature with tools is at least Depth 2. If you are not sure, answer yes.
- Yes, or not known: Review the agent's permissions and set the approval for each action
- No: Test the selected attack classes at the depth
In the pack
- P25-A03 LLM Application Security Review ProcedureWhat sets the depth
- P25-A09 AI Agent Permission & Tool-Access Review ChecklistInstructions
Step
Review the agent's permissions and set the approval for each action
List every tool, the identity it uses and every action it can take, with whether it can be undone and whether it leaves the organisation. The pack gives the approval for each kind of action. A payment, a change of supplier bank details and a decision about a person are never the agent's. Sending outside, deleting, changing access and running code outside a sandbox need a person each time. With all three risky properties, a person approves every action.
In the pack
- P25-A09 AI Agent Permission & Tool-Access Review ChecklistApproval Rules
- P25-A09 AI Agent Permission & Tool-Access Review ChecklistChecklist
Step
Test the selected attack classes at the depth
At Depth 1 the configuration checks are the test. At Depth 2 the team runs the tests for each selected class and writes down what it tried. At Depth 3 an independent tester runs them under a written plan, approved before anything is sent. Where a provider owns the model or service, its terms must allow the test or it must agree in writing. A test never releases a payment or changes supplier bank details.
In the pack
- P25-A03 LLM Application Security Review ProcedureStage 5 (RP-5): Test
- P25-A07 AI Red Team Test Plan TemplateSafety and data handling rules
Step
Rate each finding and put it in the register
The Head of Information Security rates each confirmed gap on impact and likelihood, each 1 to 4. The band is its severity. It gets an owner and a due date counted from the day it is confirmed. The pack's defaults are 30 days for Critical, 90 for High, 180 for Medium and 365 for Low. An open Medium or Low finding does not hold the release and becomes a condition with an owner and a date.
In the pack
- P25-A03 LLM Application Security Review ProcedureRating a finding
- P25-A03 LLM Application Security Review ProcedureWhat each severity needs
- P25-A08 AI Security Findings & Exceptions RegisterFindings
Decision
Is a High or Critical finding open without an approved exception?
Two release gates hold the release while a Critical or High finding is open without an approved exception. Judgement: treat an unrated finding as not known, so go back and rate it first. The finding's owner is never among the approvers of its exception.
- Critical, with no approved exception: Hold, or take a Critical exception to the board or its equivalent
- High with no approved exception, and no Critical: Hold, or take a High exception to two approvers
- Not rated yet, or not known: Rate each finding and put it in the register (back to an earlier step)
- None open, or each has an approved exception: Do the evidence, blocking checks and test report all pass?
In the pack
- P25-A03 LLM Application Security Review ProcedureThe release gates (rule RG-3)
- P25-A03 LLM Application Security Review ProcedureExceptions
Outcome
Hold, or take a Critical exception to the board or its equivalent
A Critical finding reaches the gate only with an exception approved by the board or its equivalent: a board risk committee, the management board in a two-tier structure, or executive management where there is no board. The pack's defaults are a decision within 5 working days, at most 30 days and one renewal. Otherwise fix and retest, or hold. A feature that releases a payment takes no exception. A High finding open at the same time needs its own exception. Once the exception is approved or the fix is retested, answer the question before this one again.
In the pack
- P25-A03 LLM Application Security Review ProcedureWhat each severity needs
- P25-A03 LLM Application Security Review ProcedureExceptions
- P25-A02 Generative AI Security StandardFindings and exceptions
Outcome
Hold, or take a High exception to two approvers
A High finding reaches the gate only with an exception approved by both the Head of Information Security and the accountable executive. The pack's defaults are a decision within 10 working days, at most 90 days and one renewal. The request names the finding, why it cannot be fixed by the due date and the compensating actions, each with an owner. Otherwise fix and retest, or hold. Once the exception is approved or the fix is retested, answer the question before this one again.
In the pack
- P25-A03 LLM Application Security Review ProcedureWhat each severity needs
- P25-A03 LLM Application Security Review ProcedureExceptions
Decision
Do the evidence, blocking checks and test report all pass?
Three gates remain. Every item of required evidence for the depth is on file. No configuration check that blocks release has failed or is unverified. At Depth 3 the independent report has been received and its findings are in the register. The AI governance lead runs the gates in order and writes down each one that fails. If you cannot tell, answer no.
- Yes: Approvers sign: Release, or Release with conditions
- No, or not known: Hold: name the failed gates and restart where the gap is
In the pack
- P25-A03 LLM Application Security Review ProcedureThe release gates
- P25-A03 LLM Application Security Review ProcedureEvidence the review holds
Outcome
Hold: name the failed gates and restart where the gap is
A gate that fails holds the release. The decision record names each failed gate and what clears it, and the review restarts at the stage that holds the missing item. A new feature does not go live. For a feature already running, the AI governance lead may suspend it while the approvers decide.
In the pack
- P25-A03 LLM Application Security Review ProcedureThe three outcomes
Outcome
Approvers sign: Release, or Release with conditions
The AI governance lead convenes the decision. The approvers of the higher of the P24 tier and the depth sign, and the Head of Information Security signs as well from Depth 2. Nobody approves a use they own, and any approver may hold the release. Release if nothing is open. Release with conditions if a check is unverified or a finding is open under a plan or an exception, each with an owner and a date. Then switch monitoring on and set the next review date.
In the pack
- P25-A03 LLM Application Security Review ProcedureWho signs
- P25-A03 LLM Application Security Review ProcedureStage 7 (RP-7): Release and watch
Practical checklist
- Get the intake decision first; do not review a use the intake stopped.
- Draw the data flow and copy the use's tier and data level from the inventory.
- Set the depth from the tier, the three risky properties, tools, memory and company data.
- Check the standard and the configuration checklist with evidence, and report them as counts.
- Send the provider questionnaire from Depth 2 where an outside provider supplies the model or service.
- Review every tool's identity and actions, and set the approval each kind of action needs.
- Test the selected attack classes at the depth, and rate each finding into the register.
- Run the gates in order, then sign Release or Release with conditions, or Hold and name the failed gates.
Evidence to have ready
- The data flow, the depth and the reasons that set it.
- The standard check and the configuration checklist, with evidence and dates for each verified item.
- The answered provider questionnaire, the agent permission review and the test report, naming who tested.
- The findings register with severity, owner, due date and any approved exception.
- The decision record: gates passed or failed, approvers, conditions with owners and dates, the settings copy and the next review date.
Assumptions
- The use has been through the P24 intake and is on the inventory with a named owner. The review follows that decision and changes none of P24's rules.
- You can see the feature's settings and its provider's answers, or can ask for them. The depths, days and gates shown are the pack's defaults, and your own standard may set others.
- You have a findings register and a way to take an exception to the approver its band sets. The approver for a Critical exception is the board or its equivalent in your governance structure.
- The depth routes the review. It says nothing about how the EU AI Act classifies the feature, which counsel confirms.
Not covered here
- Whether the use may go ahead at all. That is “How do we decide whether a proposed AI use case can go ahead?”.
- How to assess a feature your own team is building, from design onward. That is “How do we assess the security of a GenAI feature we are building ourselves?”.
- How to test the feature the way an attacker would. That is “How do we test an LLM application the way an attacker would?”.
- What to do when a live feature leaks data or is manipulated. That is “If an LLM application leaks data or is manipulated into a harmful action, then what do we do?”.
Related questions
- How do we assess the security of a GenAI feature we are building ourselves?
- How do we decide whether a proposed AI use case can go ahead?
- What should an AI agent be allowed to do on its own, and what needs a person's approval?
- How do we check an AI vendor or model provider before we rely on it?
- How do we test an LLM application the way an attacker would?