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The CISO Decision Brief

Patch Management Standard

Sets patch timeframes by asset class and severity, testing requirements and acceptable deferral conditions.

Available soon

Format
Word
Size
73 KB
Length
25 pages
Version
1.0
Updated

What's inside

What changed

  1. 1.0

    Published.

Changes across this pack

Preview

The document from section 1, as you will receive it. Highlighted [[text]] is for you to replace; shaded guidance boxes are for you to delete before approval. The cover and document control pages are in the file.

Purpose

This standard sets how [[Organisation Name]] keeps its software and firmware patched: which systems are covered, who patches each one, how fast, how patches are tested and deployed, how a deployment is proved, and what happens when a patch cannot go in on time. It turns the commitment in the [[Information Security Policy]] to keep systems maintained into rules that can be measured.

It works with the Vulnerability & Exposure Management Standard. That standard finds weaknesses and decides how urgent each one is. This standard delivers the vendor's fix. It never sets a security deadline of its own: a patch is due when the vulnerability it fixes is due (PM-02).

The rules are numbered PM-01 to PM-19. The other documents in this pack cite them by number, so keep the numbers when you adapt the text.

Scope

This standard applies to:

  • every system in the asset inventory owned, managed or operated by or for [[Organisation Name]]: end-user devices, servers, network and security appliances, business applications and the components they are built on, and cloud services under our administrative control;
  • systems patched for us by a service provider, and the cloud and software services a provider patches, where the contract gives the provider that job (PM-13);
  • every patch a vendor releases for them: security patches, fixes with no security content, firmware and version upgrades;
  • everyone who patches, approves, or owns a system that is patched.

It does not cover weaknesses that no vendor patch fixes, such as a setting changed or a service turned off: those go through the Vulnerability Triage & Remediation Operating Procedure. Nor does it cover how software the organisation builds is written and tested: that is the [[Secure Development Standard]]. A vulnerability in our own code is fixed on the same P01 deadline.

Guidance — delete before approval

Patching is most often weakest where nobody thinks of it as "IT": warehouse and shop-floor PCs, appliances bought by a department, and the libraries inside a web application. Name them in the asset inventory before you approve this standard, so PM-01 reaches them.

How this standard works with the vulnerability standard

The two standards divide the work. Read across a row to see which one governs each step. Where a row names a P01 rule, the Vulnerability & Exposure Management Standard decides.

Activity

Vulnerability & Exposure Management (P01)

This standard

Finding weaknesses

Scans, advisories and exploitation sources find them and record each as a finding (VM-01 to VM-07, VM-11).

Reads each vendor release and asks whether it applies (PM-03).

How urgent, and by when

The rating model sets each finding's priority and deadline, from first detection (VM-08, A04).

Uses those deadlines unchanged, and chooses the route that meets them (PM-02, PM-11, PM-12).

Getting the fix onto systems

Tracks the finding until it is closed (VM-11).

Tests, deploys in rings and windows, and restarts (PM-04 to PM-09).

Proving the fix worked

Closes a finding only on a scan or other objective evidence (VM-13).

Asks for that scan as the last verification step (PM-10).

When the deadline cannot be met

An exception before the deadline passes (VM-16 to VM-18).

The deferral form, which feeds the P02 exception register (PM-14, PM-15).

Systems past vendor support

Recorded with compensating controls and a retirement date, reviewed quarterly (VM-15).

The end-of-life register holds the plan for each (PM-17).

Weaknesses no patch fixes

Configuration changes and other fixes, through the triage procedure (A03).

Not covered: P17 handles only vendor updates.

Reporting

Scan coverage, time to remediate, deadline adherence, overdue exposure (VM-20).

Patch coverage, latency, systems past support and expired deferrals; deadline adherence imported from P01 (PM-19).

Guidance — delete before approval

If you have not adopted the CISO Times Vulnerability & Exposure Management Standard, adopt its priority table and its rules on first detection (VM-08) and exceptions (VM-16 to VM-18) with this standard, or write your own equivalents first. This standard depends on them for every deadline.

Roles and responsibilities

Role

Responsibilities under this standard

Head of IT

[[e.g. Head of IT]]

Owns this standard and the cycle, approves emergency changes, and is accountable that every system is patched.

IT Operations Manager

[[e.g. IT Operations Manager]]

Runs the monthly cycle: release review, rings, windows, verification and the monthly report. Owns the end-of-life register.

Head of Information Security

[[e.g. Head of Information Security or CISO]]

Owns the vulnerability standard (P01), rates exploited flaws with the owner, approves deferrals as P02 sets, and receives the measures.

Approver

[[e.g. Chief Operating Officer]]

Approves this standard with the vulnerability standard (P01), and approves Priority 1 deferrals (P01 VM-18).

System owner

[[the business owner of each system or service]]

Agrees the system's maintenance window, checks the service after patching and requests any deferral for it (P01 VM-16).

Application team

[[e.g. the ordering platform team]]

Patches the applications and components it builds or runs, on the same deadlines.

Service provider

[[e.g. managed IT provider]]

Deploys patches where the contract gives it the job, with scan evidence, never just a "done".

Pilot users

[[2]] people from each department and site

Use the pilot ring's devices for their normal work and report anything that stops working.

On-call approver

[[the on-call approver list]]

Approves an emergency change out of hours, by phone, never for a change they will deploy themselves.

Guidance — delete before approval

In a small organisation the Head of IT and the IT Operations Manager may be one person. Keep two separations even then: nobody approves an emergency change they will deploy themselves (PM-11), and nobody approves a deferral for patching they run (P02 EX-05).

Inventory and asset classes

PM-01 Every system in the asset inventory (P01 VM-01) must have a patch owner, an asset class, a ring or server group and a maintenance window. A system a provider patches is recorded as such, with the contract clause that binds the provider.

The asset class decides how a patch is delivered and tested. It never changes the deadline, which is always the P01 priority's.

Class

Covers

Who patches

How

Test before wider deployment

AC-1

End-user devices

Laptops, desktops and tablets: their operating system, office software, browsers, document readers and other installed applications.

IT operations, through device management

Three rings (RG-0 to RG-2), automatically through device management; the restart forced on the cycle's restart date

Pilot ring, [[2]] working days

AC-2

Servers

Server operating systems, databases and server applications, on premises and in the organisation's own cloud subscriptions.

IT operations, or the provider the contract names

By server group in its maintenance window; one member of a redundant pair at a time

Test server or the first group, then the rest

AC-3

Network and security appliances

Firewalls, remote access gateways, switches, wireless controllers and storage appliances.

IT operations, or the network provider

Firmware one high-availability member at a time in the window; internet-facing devices first

The vendor's release notes and one member of the pair

AC-4

Business applications

Line-of-business applications, web applications and the components and libraries they are built on.

The application team or the application's supplier

In the application's own window, after the supplier has certified any operating system patch it depends on

A test or staging copy of the application

AC-5

Cloud and software services the provider patches

Software as a service, and hosting where the provider patches the platform beneath what the organisation runs.

The provider, under the contract clause (PM-13); the organisation patches its own side

The provider's own process; the organisation checks the provider's notices every month and patches its clients, agents and connectors

The provider's; the organisation tests its own side

Guidance — delete before approval

A system that fits two classes takes the class of the part being patched. A business application's operating system is patched as a server (AC-2), and the application itself as AC-4, each in its own window.

Record "patched by provider" in the inventory for every AC-5 service, with the contract reference. That is what PM-13 and the coverage measure rely on.

Deadlines

Security patches

PM-02 A security patch is due when the P01 finding it fixes is due: the deadline of its P01 priority, counted in calendar days from first detection (P01 VM-08). This standard never sets a different deadline. For Priority 1 the 72-hour mitigation applies as well (P01 VM-09).

The deadlines below are the Vulnerability & Exposure Management Standard's, unchanged. The route is how this standard meets each one (PM-03, PM-11, PM-12).

Priority

Typical case

Deadline

Route

Priority 1

Exploited vulnerability on an internet-facing or Critical system

Mitigate within 72 hours; fix within 7 days

Emergency (RT-E)

Priority 2

Exploited vulnerability on an internal system; Critical or High severity on an internet-facing system

14 days

Monthly cycle (RT-C), or expedited (RT-X) where the cycle would not have it installed and verified by the deadline

Priority 3

Critical or High severity on an internal system; Medium severity on an internet-facing system

30 days

Monthly cycle (RT-C), or expedited (RT-X) where the cycle would not have it installed and verified by the deadline

Priority 4

Medium severity on internal systems; Low severity anywhere

90 days

Monthly cycle (RT-C), or expedited (RT-X) where the cycle would not have it installed and verified by the deadline

Each fix is rated with the P01 model at the release review, system by system. It asks four questions: is the vulnerability being exploited; is the system internet-facing; how severe is it technically; how critical is the system. Internet-facing means: reachable from the internet, directly or through a published service, without first connecting to the organisation's private network; or reachable from any network the organisation does not fully control, such as partner links, guest Wi-Fi or third-party connections. One release can therefore carry different priorities on different systems, and each system keeps its own deadline.

Deadlines run in calendar days from the day the vulnerability was first detected on the system (P01 VM-08). A vendor's release day is not the start: most systems are first detected the day after release, when the scanner's definitions update. When a finding's priority is raised later, for example because it is newly reported as exploited, its new deadline is set by the P01 model and is never later than the one it had.

Guidance — delete before approval

A patch released on the release day for a Priority 2 system is usually due 15 days after the release day: first detected 1 day after release, then 14 days. The monthly cycle installs it in Window B at the latest, 12 days after the release day, and verifies it within 1 working day. That is why PM-07 asks for a window at least once a month, timed against the release day.

Updates with no security content

PM-18 Updates with no security content follow this standard's own timetable, because P01 sets none: in the next monthly cycle where a system needs them and within [[90]] days of release at the latest. Version upgrades are planned [[6]] months before the running version's support ends.

P01 sets no deadline for updates with no security content. These timetables are this standard's own. An update that fixes a vulnerability, even alongside other changes, is a security patch and takes the P01 deadline.

Kind of update

When it is installed

Fixes and improvements with no security content

In the next monthly cycle where a system needs them, and within [[90]] days of release at the latest

Firmware with no security content

In the next quarterly window of the device, and within [[90]] days of release at the latest

Version upgrades (a new operating system or application version)

Planned [[6]] months before the running version's support ends, and in the end-of-life register from [[12]] months before (PM-17)

Release review and routes

PM-03 Every vendor release that applies to an in-scope system must be reviewed within [[1]] working day of its release: each fix rated with the P01 model and routed to the monthly cycle, the expedited route or the emergency route.

Each fix takes one of three routes. The route depends on the P01 priority and on whether the monthly cycle has the patch installed and verified by its deadline.

Route

When it applies

Approval

RT-C

Monthly cycle

Priority 2 to 4 patches whose P01 deadline falls on or after the date the cycle has them installed and verified.

The month's pre-approved standard change

RT-X

Expedited

Any patch whose P01 deadline would pass before the cycle has it installed and verified: typically a Priority 2 fix released between cycles (PM-12).

A normal change, approved by the Head of IT within [[1]] working day

RT-E

Emergency

Every Priority 1 patch: an exploited vulnerability on an internet-facing or Critical system (PM-11).

An emergency change, approved by the Head of IT or the on-call approver, never by the person deploying it

PM-12 A patch whose P01 deadline would pass before the monthly cycle has it installed and verified must take the expedited route: the next window inside its deadline, or an extra window.

The decision is mechanical. Priority 1 always takes the emergency route. For any other priority, compare the date the cycle would have the patch installed and verified on that system (its window plus [[1]] working day, PM-10) with the system's deadline: if the cycle date is later, the patch is expedited; if not, it stays in the cycle. Nobody chooses the cycle for a patch the cycle would verify late.

Guidance — delete before approval

Vendors release outside their release day too. A browser or firewall fix released between cycles is reviewed within the same review time (PM-03), and its date is compared with the next cycle's windows. A Priority 2 fix released in the week before a release day will almost always be expedited.

Sources, integrity and testing

PM-04 Patches must come only from the vendor or the vendor's own update service, be checked for integrity before they are deployed, and be deployed with the organisation's management tools wherever the product allows.

PM-05 Every patch must be installed on the pilot ring, or on a test server or test copy for servers and applications, and observed for [[2]] working days before it goes wider. An emergency patch is tested for [[2]] hours on one system.

The pilot ring is the test for end-user devices. It is made up of the people and devices most likely to show a fault early: every hardware model and every business application in use. Servers and applications are tested on a test server or a test copy where one exists, and otherwise on the first server group, which holds the servers whose loss nobody notices for a night.

Guidance — delete before approval

"We have no test system" is common and is never a reason to skip testing or to defer a patch (PM-15). The pilot ring and the first server group are the test. Keep the pilot ring's membership up to date as hardware and applications change.

Rings, server groups and windows

PM-06 End-user devices must be patched in three rings, pilot, early and broad, each starting only when the one before has passed its rollback criteria. Servers are patched by group, and the two members of a redundant server pair never in the same window. The two members of a high-availability appliance pair are patched in the same window, one at a time (GR-4).

PM-07 Every server and appliance must have a maintenance window, agreed by its system owner, at least once a month, and timed so that a Priority 2 patch released on the release day can be installed and verified inside its deadline.

Rings for end-user devices

Ring

Who is in it

Starts

Observed for

RG-0

Pilot

The IT team's own devices, test servers, and [[2]] pilot users from each department and site: about [[5]]% of devices, covering every hardware model and every business application in use

The day after the release review

[[2]] working days

RG-1

Early

About [[25]]% of devices, spread across every site and department, and never more than half of any one team

When the pilot has passed its rollback criteria

[[2]] working days

RG-2

Broad

Every other device

When the early ring has passed its rollback criteria

Until the forced restart date

Server groups and appliances

Rule

What it requires

GR-1

Every server belongs to one group, and every group to one maintenance window.

GR-2

The two members of a redundant server pair (domain controllers, clustered nodes, load-balanced web servers) are in different groups with different windows, so one is always running and a faulty patch reaches only one.

GR-3

The first server group is patched only after the pilot ring and the test servers have passed their rollback criteria.

GR-4

The two members of a high-availability appliance pair (firewalls, remote access gateways) are in the same group and patched in the same window, one at a time: the standby first, the other only after the first is back in service and has passed its service check. A pair never runs two firmware versions for longer than the window.

GR-5

Internet-facing systems are in the earliest group their redundancy allows, because their deadlines are the shortest (P01).

GR-6

A system whose supplier must certify each patch has its own group, whose window falls after the certification date the contract sets.

The windows

Windows are counted in calendar days from the release day. Each system owner agrees the window for their system, and the agreement is recorded in the ring and window plan.

Window

When

Days after the release day

Used for

MW-A

Window A

The Wednesday of the week after the release day, [[20:00 to 23:00]]

8

Server group A, and the appliance pairs whose group uses it (both members, one at a time, GR-4)

MW-B

Window B

The Sunday after Window A, [[02:00 to 06:00]]

12

Server group B, the appliances whose group uses it, and systems with a Sunday change window

MW-E

Emergency window

Any time the emergency change sets (PM-11)

As needed

Priority 1 patches, and expedited patches with no window inside their deadline

The Patch Deployment Ring & Maintenance Window Plan records every ring, group and window, and the system owner's agreement to each.

Rollback

PM-08 Every ring and server group must have rollback criteria agreed before deployment. A rollback stops the next ring until the cause is known, and the patch is re-planned inside its deadline or deferred under PM-14.

Any one of these stops the next ring or group and starts a rollback:

Criterion

What triggers it

RB-1

Any pilot device fails to start, loses its network connection or cannot sign in after the patch.

RB-2

A business application on the pilot test list fails to start or to do its main task.

RB-3

More than [[2]]% of a ring's devices fail to install the patch after two attempts.

RB-4

A server's service check fails [[30]] minutes after the restart and cannot be fixed inside the window.

RB-5

The vendor withdraws or replaces the patch, or publishes a known issue that affects a system or application in use.

When a rollback starts:

  • Stop the next ring or group at once; nothing further is deployed until the cause is known.
  • Roll back the affected systems inside the window: uninstall the patch, or restore the snapshot or backup taken before it.
  • Tell the Head of Information Security the same day, because the vulnerability is open again.
  • Re-plan the patch inside its P01 deadline, with the vendor's fix or workaround; if that cannot be done, request a deferral before the deadline passes (PM-14).

Guidance — delete before approval

Before each deployment, check that the rollback works for that patch: some cumulative updates cannot be uninstalled, and a server then needs its snapshot or backup. Take the snapshot before the window, not during it.

Restarts

PM-09 A patch that needs a restart is installed only once the system has restarted. Users may postpone a restart until the cycle's forced restart date, [[14]] days after the release day, and no later.

Systems that cannot be restarted

PM-16 A system that cannot be restarted to patch must be handled in this order: patch one node at a time behind its redundancy; agree a window inside the deadline; use the vendor's live patching where it is supported; and only then mitigate and defer under PM-14. The lasting fix is put on a plan with a date.

Option

How

RO-1

Use the redundancy

Patch one node at a time: move the load, patch and restart, check, then swap. Most services that cannot stop already run on two nodes.

RO-2

Agree a window inside the deadline

A short planned outage at the quietest hour, agreed with the system owner, usually costs less than an exception. Book it at the release review.

RO-3

Live patching

Where the vendor supports it for that system, apply the fixes it can without a restart. The rest wait for the next window, and the system is not verified until they are in.

RO-4

Mitigate and defer

Block the vulnerable service, restrict who can reach the system and watch it more closely, test that, then request a deferral to the next window before the deadline passes (PM-14).

RO-5

Fix the cause

Put a lasting answer on a plan with a date: a second node, a standing monthly window, or a supplier who certifies patches in time.

Guidance — delete before approval

"It can't be rebooted" usually means nobody has agreed a time. Ask the system owner what a planned outage of one hour at the quietest time of the week would cost, and compare it with the risk the deferral leaves open. Most owners choose the outage once the comparison is in front of them.

Verification

PM-10 A deployment is complete only when the patch is confirmed installed, the system has restarted, its owner has checked the service, and a scan confirms the vulnerability is gone (P01 VM-13). Every asset still missing the patch is listed and rescheduled inside its deadline, or deferred.

Check

How it is done

Evidence

VF-01

Installed

The management tool reports the patch, or the version or build number it sets, on every asset in the ring or group.

Management tool report, dated

VF-02

Restarted

No restart is pending, and the system has started since the patch was installed.

Restart status in the same report

VF-03

Service restored

The system owner, or the service's own health check, confirms the service starts and does its main task within [[30]] minutes of the restart.

Owner's confirmation or health check result on the change

VF-04

Scanner confirms

A targeted rescan no longer finds the vulnerability, and P01 closes the finding (VM-13).

Scan report, attached to the finding

VF-05

Gaps handled

Every asset still missing the patch is listed with the reason, and rescheduled inside its deadline or deferred before the deadline passes (PM-14).

Straggler list; deferral reference where one was needed

A patch counts as installed only when it is the patch is on the system and in effect: the management tool reports it, and any restart it needs has happened. A patch waiting for a restart is not installed. It counts as verified only when it is installed, the service checked by its owner, and a scan no longer finds the vulnerability (P01 VM-13). The deadline is met on the day all of these are true, so start the checks the working day after the window, not at the end of the month.

The emergency route

PM-11 A Priority 1 patch must take the emergency route: decided within [[4]] hours of the advisory, an emergency change approved by the Head of IT or the on-call approver and never by the person deploying it, the mitigation within 72 hours (P01 VM-09) and the patch within 7 days. Any sign the vulnerability was used against us is reported as an incident at once (P09 IM-01), and the incident manager then leads.

The Emergency Out-of-Band Patching Procedure sets the steps, in order, with a target time for each inside P01's 72 hours and 7 days. The mitigation comes first because it is fast: a vendor's workaround, a firewall rule or blocking the system from the internet can usually be in place the same day, while the patch is tested.

Any of these is a sign the vulnerability may already have been used against us, and is reported as an incident at once:

  • The vendor's indicators of compromise are found on an affected system.
  • Files, accounts, scheduled tasks or web pages appear that nobody in IT created.
  • The affected system made connections to addresses the advisory or threat feeds name, or that it never normally contacts.
  • The monitoring provider alerts on the affected system in the period since the flaw was first exploited anywhere.
  • Logs that should exist are missing or were cleared.

From then on the incident is run under the [[Security Incident Management Policy]], and the emergency route serves it. Patching a compromised system does not remove an attacker who is already in.

Providers and cloud services

PM-13 Where a provider patches a cloud or software service, the contract must carry the vulnerability management clause of the third-party pack (P06 CL-08), and the provider's security notices must be checked every month. The organisation patches its own side: clients, agents, connectors and configuration. For an exploited flaw in a provider's service, the organisation applies its own mitigation within P01's 72 hours while the provider fixes it.

The clause is CL-08 in the Supplier Contract Security Clause Library. In summary, it asks the provider to:

  • find and fix vulnerabilities in the systems, software and components it uses to provide the service, applying critical patches and high ones within the periods the clause sets, or an effective mitigation in those periods;
  • tell the organisation within the period the clause sets when a critical vulnerability cannot be fixed in time, with the mitigation it applied;
  • where it supplies software, provide security updates for the supported versions, and give notice before ending support for a version in use.

Where a provider patches systems we own under a managed service, the provider follows this standard's deadlines, rings and windows, and gives the management tool's report and the scan as evidence (PM-10). A message saying "done" is not evidence.

Guidance — delete before approval

Check that the provider's periods in CL-08 are no longer than the P01 deadlines for the same systems. If a provider can only offer longer ones, record the difference as an exception under the Security Exception & Waiver Standard, or apply your own mitigation within the P01 deadline.

Deferrals

PM-14 A patch that will not be installed by its P01 deadline must be deferred as a P02 exception, requested before the deadline passes (P01 VM-16), scored with the P02 model and approved by the approver its band sets (P02 EX-05). It expires no later than the band's maximum or [[90]] days (P01 VM-17), whichever is shorter. A Priority 1 deferral needs the 72-hour mitigation in place first and the approver P01 VM-18 names. Moving a patch to a later window inside its deadline is not a deferral.

PM-15 A deferral is approved only for a reason on the accepted list, with a compensating control that has been tested and a date the patch will be installed. Workload, the lack of a test system and a missed window are never reasons.

Who approves, and for how long

The deferral is scored with the P02 model: impact times likelihood after compensating controls, each 1 to 4. The band sets the approver and the decision time (P02 EX-05). The longest a deferral may run is the band's maximum or P01's 90 days, whichever is shorter.

Band

Score

Approver

Decision within (working days from a complete request)

Longest deferral

Low

1–3

Control owner

5

90 days (P02 allows 365; P01 caps it)

Medium

4–6

Head of Information Security

10

90 days (P02 allows 180; P01 caps it)

High

8–9

Head of Information Security and the accountable executive (risk owner)

10

90 days

Critical

12–16

The board, or a board risk committee it has delegated this to; in a two-tier structure, the management board; where there is no board, such as in an owner-managed company, executive management

5

30 days

These always apply on top of the band:

When

What applies

DA-1

Priority 1

Only once the 72-hour mitigation is in place (P01 VM-09), and approved by the approver of the vulnerability standard (P01 VM-18), or by the band's approver where that approver is more senior.

DA-2

The risk left is outside appetite, or scored Critical

The P05 approver for that position signs as well: the stricter of the two always applies (P05).

DA-3

The approver requested the deferral, or runs the patching

The approval passes to the next level up (P02 EX-05).

DA-4

A Critical band deferral

Approved by the board, or a board risk committee it has delegated this to; in a two-tier structure, the management board; where there is no board, such as in an owner-managed company, executive management; a renewal beyond its limit goes to [[the full board, or its equivalent]] (P02 EX-08).

Accepted reasons

Reason

What it is

DR-1

The patch failed in the pilot or a test with a confirmed fault, or the vendor withdrew it or published a known issue that affects us.

DR-2

The system's supplier has not yet certified the patch, and installing it uncertified would end the supplier's support.

DR-3

The system cannot be restarted inside the deadline without stopping a critical service, and none of the other options in PM-16 works in time.

DR-4

No patch exists: the vendor has not released one, or the system is past support (PM-17).

DR-5

The system is being retired before the next window, on an approved date.

These are never reasons for a deferral:

  • The team was busy, or short of staff.
  • There is no test system.
  • The window was missed.
  • The system is internal only: exposure is already in the P01 priority.
  • It has always been done this way.

A request is made on the Patch Deferral Request Form, before the deadline passes. Once approved, it is entered in the organisation's one exception register under the Security Exception & Waiver Standard, and it is tracked, renewed and closed there. A patch installed after its deadline with no approved deferral is reported as overdue and escalated as the Vulnerability & Exposure Management Standard sets (VM-19).

Guidance — delete before approval

A deferral moves the date. It does not lower the priority, and the finding stays open in the vulnerability tracker until it is verified (PM-10). Report deferred patches in the monthly report by name.

End-of-life software and unsupported systems

PM-17 Every system and product within [[12]] months of the end of vendor support, or past it, must be in the end-of-life register with its owner, end date and plan, and reviewed at least quarterly (P01 VM-15). Until it is retired, a system past support with no extended support needs isolation and tested compensating controls, a P02 exception and a retirement date; where the risk is outside appetite, the P05 approver signs as well.

For a system past support, work through these in order, and stop at the first that settles it:

Option

How

EO-1

Still needed?

Ask the owner. If the system is no longer needed, retire it now.

EO-2

Upgrade or replace

Move to a supported version or product. This is the only lasting answer.

EO-3

Extended support

Buy the vendor's extended security updates where they are offered, for the time it takes to replace the system. The system stays in the register.

EO-4

Isolate

Its own network segment, only the connections it needs, no internet, no email or browsing, and its administration interfaces off.

EO-5

Compensating controls

Application allow-listing, closer monitoring, checked backups and the fewest accounts possible, each tested.

EO-6

Record and decide

A P02 exception with its expiry, a retirement date, a quarterly review (P01 VM-15), and the P05 approver's signature as well where the risk is outside appetite.

The End-of-Life Software & Unsupported System Register gives each system one of these statuses at each review:

Status

Meaning

Past support: no security patches

The vendor no longer releases security patches, and no extended support is in place. Needs the controls and decision in EO-4 to EO-6.

Past normal support: on extended support

Security patches the vendor still releases, usually for a fee, for a limited time after the end of normal support. A system on extended support is still recorded in the end-of-life register.

Support ends within 12 months

In the register now, with a plan, so the replacement is done before support ends (look-ahead 12 months).

Supported

Not in the register.

Guidance — delete before approval

Ask each vendor for its support dates and put them in the register when the system is bought, not when the support ends. The supplier contract clause CL-08 asks for notice of the end of support; use it.

Measures and reporting

PM-19 The headline measures must be reported monthly to the security and IT leadership team, and any measure outside tolerance to the next executive committee with its plan. Any other departure from this standard is a P02 exception, and a Critical exception is approved by the board or its equivalent.

Every measure goes monthly to the security and IT leadership team. A measure outside tolerance goes to the next executive committee with its plan. The headline measures are these. Two are taken unchanged from the metric catalogue of the [[Security KPI & KRI Catalogue]], so the figures agree with the vulnerability and exception packs.

Measure

Definition

Target

PCM-01

Patch coverage

Assets in scope with every security patch deployed to their ring or server group installed and verified at the period end, out of all assets in scope, by asset class. Services a provider patches are left out and assured through the contract (PM-13).

[[95%]]

PCM-02

Patch latency

For each deployment in the period, the calendar days from the vendor's release to the day [[95%]] of the ring or server group had the patch installed and verified, shown by P01 priority and by ring or group, each against its P01 deadline. The figure judged is the share of deployments that met their deadline.

Every deployment within its P01 deadline

PCM-03

Deadline adherence

(P01, catalogue MC-03)

Findings closed in the period within their deadline ÷ findings closed in the period. Reported for the findings that patching closed, with Priority 1 and 2 shown apart, as the board measure for critical exposure counts them (P03 BM-02).

[[Target, e.g. ≥ 90%]]

PCM-04

Systems past vendor support

Systems in use at the period end that are past the end of vendor support with no extended support, each shown with whether it has an unexpired P02 exception and a retirement date. The figure judged is how many have neither.

[[None without an unexpired exception and a retirement date]]

PCM-05

Expired exceptions

(P02, catalogue MC-06)

Exceptions past their expiry date that are neither closed nor renewed, as a share of all open exceptions. Reported for patch deferrals.

Zero High or Critical; below 5% overall

The Patch Compliance Dashboard calculates these each month, with the trend and a status against target. A measure outside tolerance goes to the next executive committee with the plan to bring it back.

Records

Record

Where held

Minimum retention

Asset inventory with patch owner, asset class, ring or group and window

[[Asset inventory or device management tool]]

[[Current, with changes kept for 12 months]]

Release review records, with each fix's rating and route

[[Change or ticketing system]]

[[3 years]]

Standard, normal and emergency change records

[[Change management system]]

[[3 years]]

Pilot go or no-go decisions and rollback records

[[Change management system]]

[[3 years]]

Deployment reports, service checks and confirming scans

[[Management tool and scanner exports]]

[[12 months, and 3 years for the confirming scans]]

Deferral requests and decisions

The organisation's exception register (P02)

[[3 years after expiry]]

End-of-life register and its quarterly reviews

[[Location]]

[[3 years after the system is retired]]

Monthly reports and escalations

[[Location]]

[[3 years]]

Approved versions of this standard

[[Document management system]]

[[Life of the management system plus 3 years]]

Guidance — delete before approval

Align retention with your records retention schedule. Regulated financial entities usually keep ICT risk records for longer; confirm your own obligations.

Compliance

Compliance is monitored through the monthly measures (PM-19) and checked through [[internal audit / independent review]]. The table lists what a reviewer usually asks to see for each group of rules.

Rules

What the reviewer asks

What shows it

PM-01

Pick ten systems from the asset inventory. Each has a patch owner, an asset class, a ring or server group and a window.

The inventory export, with the four fields filled for every row

PM-02, PM-12

Pick five security patches from last quarter. Each was installed and verified by the deadline of the P01 finding it fixed.

The finding's first detection date and priority, and the confirming scan's date

PM-03

Show the review of last month's releases.

The release review record: each fix, its P01 rating and its route, dated within the review time

PM-04, PM-05

Show where last month's patches came from and how they were tested.

The update source settings; the pilot ring's go or no-go record with its date

PM-06, PM-07, PM-08

Show the rings, the server groups and the windows, and the rollback criteria agreed for each.

The ring and window plan, approved by the system owners

PM-09, PM-10

Show that last month's deployment was verified.

The management tool report, the service checks, the rescan and the straggler list

PM-11

Show the last emergency.

The emergency change, its approver, and the times of detection, mitigation, deployment and rescan

PM-13

Show that the providers who patch your services are bound to do it.

The contract clause, and last month's check of each provider's security notices

PM-14, PM-15, PM-16

Show every patch installed after its deadline in the last six months.

For each, a deferral approved before the deadline, or the overdue report and escalation

PM-17

Show the systems past vendor support.

The end-of-life register, its last quarterly review, and the exception and retirement date of each system

PM-18

Show how updates with no security content are scheduled.

The cycle record showing them deployed, and the version upgrade plan

PM-19

Show the last three monthly reports.

The reports, the leadership team's minutes, and any escalation to the executive committee

A missed deadline with no approved deferral is escalated as the vulnerability standard sets. Repeated failures by a provider are handled under the contract's performance terms.

Review

This standard is reviewed at least every 12 months, with the Vulnerability & Exposure Management Standard, and also after a significant incident caused by a missing patch, a change in the systems in scope or in how they are run, or a change in applicable regulation.

Worked example

EXAMPLE, not part of the standard. The organisation is the one used throughout the pack: a wholesale distributor with about 900 staff, three warehouses and an online ordering service that takes 60% of its orders. It approved this standard on 3 Sep 2026 (approved by the approver of the vulnerability standard, and owned by the Head of IT), and September 2026 was its first cycle under it.

The month's releases

Release

What it was

Released

First detected

Severity

Exploited

REL-01

Monthly operating system and office software updates, with the month's browser and document reader updates

8 Sep 2026

9 Sep 2026

Critical

No

REL-02

Firewall firmware security fix

2 Sep 2026

3 Sep 2026

High

No

REL-03

Security fix to the search component the ordering platform is built on

1 Sep 2026

2 Sep 2026

High

No

REL-04

Emergency security release of the ordering platform's web commerce software, for a remote code execution flaw the vendor reports is being exploited

24 Sep 2026

24 Sep 2026, 09:15

Critical

Yes

What the rules decided

One line per ring or group and release, with the priorities the P01 model gave its systems and the earliest deadline among them.

Ring or group

Release

Route

Priority

Deadline

Verified

Met

RG-0

REL-01

RT-C

3

9 Oct 2026

10 Sep 2026

Yes

RG-1

REL-01

RT-C

3

9 Oct 2026

15 Sep 2026

Yes

RG-2

REL-01

RT-C

3

9 Oct 2026

23 Sep 2026

Yes

SG-A

REL-01

RT-C

2 and 3

23 Sep 2026

17 Sep 2026

Yes

SG-B

REL-01

RT-C

2 and 3

23 Sep 2026

21 Sep 2026

Yes

SG-W

REL-01

RT-C

2

23 Sep 2026

28 Sep 2026

No

NW-1

REL-02

RT-C

2

17 Sep 2026

17 Sep 2026

Yes

Ordering platform

REL-03

RT-X

2

16 Sep 2026

23 Sep 2026

No

Ordering platform

REL-04

RT-E

1

1 Oct 2026

28 Sep 2026

Yes

The emergency (RT-E): REL-04 was rated Priority 1 on both web servers, because the flaw was exploited and the servers are internet-facing. The hosting provider applied a firewall rule 4 hours after first detection, inside P01's 72 hours, and the patch went in on 27 Sep 2026, inside the 7 days (PM-11). EXAMPLE

The deferral (PM-14): the warehouse management system's supplier had not certified the update before Window B, and the system has no second node and only a Sunday window. The system owner asked for a deferral on 21 Sep 2026, before the 23 Sep 2026 deadline, with a tested host firewall rule in place. It scored 3, Low. The band's approver runs the patching, so the Head of Information Security approved it (DA-3), to 29 Sep 2026. The update went in on 27 Sep 2026. EXAMPLE

The late one with no deferral, the search component (REL-03): routed as expedited at the release review on 2 Sep, because neither window would have both web servers verified by the 16 Sep deadline: Window A installs WEB-01 on the deadline day, verified the next working day, and Window B comes after it. Deployed on 22 Sep: the ordering platform team is two engineers short (P05 TA-03). No deferral was requested before the deadline; the finding was reported overdue and escalated to the asset owner's manager on 17 Sep (P01 VM-19). The standard did what it should: the overdue patch was reported and escalated. A shortage of staff is never a reason for a deferral (PM-15); it is tracked as a risk treatment instead. EXAMPLE

End of life (PM-17): the new register found 1 system past support with no extended support, document storage appliance at Warehouse 3 goods-in: scanned delivery notes, which carry customer names and addresses. It was isolated and put under a P02 exception (DEF-2026-02, Medium) until its retirement on 30 Nov 2026. EXAMPLE

The month in one sentence, as reported to the leadership team: September's cycle reached 97% of devices, servers and appliances, and 7 of 9 deployments met their deadline. The exploited ordering platform flaw was mitigated within 4 hours and patched three days later. The two late deployments were the warehouse system, deferred under an approved exception, and the ordering platform's search component, a week late while that team is short of staff. Coverage was 639 of 657 (97%), on target; deployments within deadline 7 of 9, below target, within tolerance. EXAMPLE

Document

Relationship

[[Information Security Policy]]

Parent policy

Vulnerability & Exposure Management Standard

Sets every security deadline this standard uses, the priority model, first detection, exceptions and overdue escalation

Monthly Patch Cycle Operating Procedure

Runs the monthly cycle: PM-03 to PM-10 and PM-19

Patch Deployment Ring & Maintenance Window Plan

Records the rings, groups, windows and rollback criteria: PM-06 to PM-08

Emergency Out-of-Band Patching Procedure

Runs the emergency and expedited routes: PM-11 to PM-13

Patch Deployment Verification Checklist

The verification checks: PM-10

End-of-Life Software & Unsupported System Register

The end-of-life register: PM-17

Patch Compliance Dashboard

The headline measures: PM-19

Patch Deferral Request Form

Requests a deferral: PM-14 to PM-16

Security Exception & Waiver Standard

Scores, approves and records every deferral as an exception (P02)

Risk Acceptance Form & Approval Record

Adds the risk approver's signature where a deferral leaves a risk outside appetite (DA-2)

Supplier Contract Security Clause Library

The provider clause PM-13 relies on (CL-08)

Security Incident Management Policy

Takes over when an exploited vulnerability may have been used against us (PM-11)

Adapting this template

Guidance — delete before approval

Small organisation: you may merge this standard with the Monthly Patch Cycle Operating Procedure into one document. Keep the deadline table, PM-02, PM-10, PM-11 and PM-14 as written: they are what an auditor tests. Let device management run the rings and force the restart, and keep staff time for servers, appliances and whatever fails.

Tailoring exception to PM-06 (small organisation): With fewer than [[50]] end-user devices, the three rings PM-06 requires may be two: the pilot (RG-0), observed for [[2]] working days and still covering every hardware model and business application in use, then every other device. This is the only tailoring exception to PM-06. Keep the forced restart, and every server still has a group and a window.

Regulated entity (NIS2, DORA): the NIS2 Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2690 asks the digital providers it covers for patch procedures that apply patches within a reasonable time, test them, take them from trusted sources and check their integrity, and record the reasons where a patch is not applied. DORA's technical standards ask financial entities for patch procedures with emergency procedures, testing, deadlines and escalation where deadlines cannot be met. This standard is written to that level. Approve it within your ICT risk management framework, and keep the records for the period your regulator expects.

IT run by a service provider: put the deadline table, the rings, the windows and PM-10 into the service agreement, and ask for the management tool's report and the scan every month. The release review (PM-03) and the decision on deferrals stay with [[Organisation Name]].

Replace every [[placeholder]], then delete this section before approval.

Framework references

These references show where this document supports an external framework. They indicate relevance only and do not reproduce the text of any standard. Editions referenced: ISO/IEC 27001:2022 incl. Amd 1:2024; NIST CSF 2.0; Directive (EU) 2022/2555 (NIS2) and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2690; Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 (DORA) and Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1774.

Framework

Reference

Supported by

ISO/IEC 27001:2022

Annex A 8.8 — Management of technical vulnerabilities

The whole standard: technical vulnerabilities fixed by patching on P01's deadlines

ISO/IEC 27001:2022

Annex A 8.19 — Installation of software on operational systems

PM-04 to PM-09: patches installed on operational systems from trusted sources, tested, in rings and windows

ISO/IEC 27001:2022

Annex A 8.32 — Change management

PM-03, PM-11 and PM-12: each route's change approval

ISO/IEC 27001:2022

Annex A 5.22 — Monitoring, review and change management of supplier services

PM-13: providers' patching checked every month

ISO/IEC 27001:2022

Annex A 5.36 — Compliance with policies, rules and standards for information security

PM-14 and PM-19: departures recorded as exceptions

NIST CSF 2.0

PR.PS-02 — “Software is maintained, replaced, and removed commensurate with risk”

The whole standard

NIST CSF 2.0

PR.PS-03 — “Hardware is maintained, replaced, and removed commensurate with risk”

Asset class AC-3: firmware of network and security appliances

NIST CSF 2.0

ID.RA-06 — “Risk responses are chosen, prioritized, planned, tracked, and communicated”

PM-03, PM-11 and PM-12: each fix routed by its priority

NIST CSF 2.0

ID.RA-07 — “Changes and exceptions are managed, assessed for risk impact, recorded, and tracked”

PM-14 and PM-15: deferrals assessed, recorded and tracked

NIST CSF 2.0

ID.AM-08 — “Systems, hardware, software, services, and data are managed throughout their life cycles”

PM-17 and PM-18: systems managed through to the end of support

NIST CSF 2.0

GV.OV-03 — “Organizational cybersecurity risk management performance is evaluated and reviewed for adjustments needed”

PM-19: monthly measures and escalation

NIS2 — Directive (EU) 2022/2555

Article 21(2)(e) — “security in network and information systems acquisition, development and maintenance, including vulnerability handling and disclosure”

The whole standard

NIS2 — Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2690

Article 1 — lays down the technical and methodological requirements of the Article 21(2) measures, and further specifies when an incident is significant, for DNS service providers, TLD name registries, cloud computing, data centre and content delivery network providers, managed service and managed security service providers, providers of online marketplaces, online search engines and social networking services platforms, and trust service providers

Who the Implementing Regulation binds; for other entities it shows what is expected

NIS2 — Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2690

Annex, point 6.6.1 — “The relevant entities shall specify and apply procedures, coherent with the change management procedures referred to in point 6.4.1 as well as with vulnerability management, risk management and other relevant management procedures, for ensuring that: (a) security patches are applied within a reasonable time after they become available; (b) security patches are tested before being applied in production systems; (c) security patches come from trusted sources and are checked for integrity; (d) additional measures are implemented and residual risks are accepted in cases where a patch is not available or not applied pursuant to point 6.6.2.”

PM-02 (a reasonable time), PM-05 (tested), PM-04 (trusted sources, integrity), PM-14 to PM-17 (measures where a patch is not applied)

NIS2 — Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2690

Annex, point 6.6.2 — “By way of derogation from point 6.6.1(a), the relevant entities may choose not to apply security patches when the disadvantages of applying the security patches outweigh the cybersecurity benefits. The relevant entities shall duly document and substantiate the reasons for any such decision.”

PM-14 and PM-15: the reasons for not applying a patch recorded and approved

DORA — Regulation (EU) 2022/2554

Article 9(4)(e) — “implement documented policies, procedures and controls for ICT change management, including changes to software, hardware, firmware components, systems or security parameters, that are based on a risk assessment approach and are an integral part of the financial entity’s overall change management process, in order to ensure that all changes to ICT systems are recorded, tested, assessed, approved, implemented and verified in a controlled manner”

PM-03 to PM-12: patches recorded, tested, approved, deployed and verified as changes

DORA — Regulation (EU) 2022/2554

Article 9(4)(f) — “have appropriate and comprehensive documented policies for patches and updates”

The whole standard

DORA — Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1774

Article 10(2)(f) — the vulnerability management procedures shall “prioritise the deployment of patches and other mitigation measures to address the vulnerabilities identified”

PM-02, PM-03, PM-11 and PM-12: deployment prioritised by P01 priority

DORA — Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1774

Article 10(3) — “financial entities shall develop, document and implement patch management procedures”

The whole standard and the procedures it names

DORA — Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1774

Article 10(4) — the patch management procedures shall “(a) to the extent possible identify and evaluate available software and hardware patches and updates using automated tools; (b) identify emergency procedures for the patching and updating of ICT assets; (c) test and deploy the software and hardware patches and the updates referred to in Article 8(2), points (b)(v), (vi) and (vii); (d) set deadlines for the installation of software and hardware patches and updates and escalation procedures in case those deadlines cannot be met.”

PM-03 (identify), PM-11 (emergency), PM-05 to PM-09 (test and deploy), PM-02 and PM-14 (deadlines and escalation)

ISO/IEC 27001 references name the clause or control this document relates to. They do not say that meeting it meets any other framework's requirement.

Definitions

Term

Meaning in this standard

Compensating control

A measure that makes a vulnerability harder to exploit while the patch is not installed: blocking the vulnerable service, restricting who can reach the system, disabling the affected feature or isolating the system. It counts only once it has been tested (P02 EX-07).

Cumulative update

A monthly update that contains every earlier fix for the product, so installing the latest one is enough.

Deferral

Installing a patch after its P01 deadline, approved in advance as a P02 exception (PM-14). Moving a patch to a later window that is still inside its deadline is not a deferral.

Emergency route

Deploying a patch for a Priority 1 vulnerability out of band, with an emergency change, the 72-hour mitigation and a short test (PM-11).

End of support

The date after which the vendor no longer releases security patches for a product or version.

Expedited route

Deploying a patch outside the monthly cycle because its P01 deadline would pass before the cycle has it installed and verified (PM-12).

Extended support

Security patches the vendor still releases, usually for a fee, for a limited time after the end of normal support. A system on extended support is still recorded in the end-of-life register.

Installed

The patch is on the system and in effect: the management tool reports it, and any restart it needs has happened. A patch waiting for a restart is not installed.

Internet-facing

Reachable from the internet, directly or through a published service, without first connecting to the organisation's private network; or reachable from any network the organisation does not fully control, such as partner links, guest Wi-Fi or third-party connections.

Latency

Calendar days from a vendor's release to the day a ring or server group had the patch installed and verified.

Live patching

Applying some fixes to a running system without a restart, where the vendor supports it for that product. Fixes it cannot apply wait for the next restart.

Maintenance window

An agreed, recurring time when a system may be patched and restarted, approved by its system owner.

Monthly cycle

The routine that takes each month's releases from review through testing, deployment in rings and windows, and verification, on fixed days counted from the release day.

Patch

An update from a software or hardware vendor that changes installed code or firmware. A security patch fixes one or more vulnerabilities; other patches fix faults or add features.

Patch owner

The person who makes sure a system is patched: deploys the patch, or makes sure the team or provider who does it has done so.

Release

One publication of patches by a vendor, on its release day or out of turn, with the vendor's advisory saying what each fixes and how severe it is.

Release day

The day a vendor publishes its regular patches. For the largest operating system and office software vendors it is the second Tuesday of the month; other vendors release monthly, quarterly or whenever a fix is ready.

Ring

A group of end-user devices that receives a patch at the same stage. Pilot first, then early, then broad, each starting only when the one before has passed its rollback criteria.

Rollback

Removing a patch, or restoring the system to its state before the patch, because the patch broke something.

Server group

A group of servers or appliances patched in the same maintenance window. The two members of a redundant server pair are always in different groups; the two members of a high-availability appliance pair are in the same group and patched one at a time.

Verified

Installed, the service checked by its owner, and a scan no longer finds the vulnerability (P01 VM-13).

Prepared by Zero One Cybersecurity · Published by CISO Times

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