If…, then how…
If an administrator uses their admin account for email or browsing, then what?
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The short answer
- Recommendation
- Treat it as a possible exposure of the account's credential. Stop the use and end its sessions at once, change its password and revoke its tokens, check what it touched and what it did, and fix the cause within 1 month by the pack's default.
- Reasoning
- An administrator account must have no mailbox and sign in only from an administration device of its tier. A mailbox or website is where phishing and malicious downloads land, and a credential typed into a lower-tier system can be captured by whoever controls it. A new password alone leaves a captured session token working, so tokens are revoked too. The review cadence is the detection time, so the steps run from the day the breach was found.
- Considerations
- The 1-working-day and 1-month deadlines are the CISO Times privileged access pack's defaults. Your own standard may set others. Treat an account holding Tier 0 rights, or of unknown tier, as Tier 0.
- Any sign of compromise in what the account touched makes it a security incident. The incident does not wait for the breach steps, and the breach steps still finish.
- Preserve the administrator's own activity and have someone else review it before they help investigate. The reviewer holds no administrator rights in the account's tier.
- If a policy should have blocked the sign-in, or the same anomaly appears in two reviews running, raise a finding as well.
The decision, step by step
Select any step for the reasoning behind it and where the pack covers it.
- Start
- Step
- Decision
- Outcome
Keyboard: Tab to a step, arrow keys move along the flow, Enter pins its explanation, + and − zoom, 0 fits the diagram, Esc closes. The text version below has the same content.
Where a step quotes a number, it is the default in the CISO Times pack. Your own standard may set a different one.
Read as text
The same flow written out: each step, its reasoning and where the pack covers it. 17 steps.
Start
An admin account was used for email, browsing or another tier
An administrator account must have no mailbox, must never be used for email or web browsing, and signs in only from an administration device of its tier. Used for email or browsing, or outside its tier, it is treated as a possible exposure of its credential. The same steps run whether a session review, an alert or the person themselves found it.
In the pack
- P14-A02 Privileged Access StandardSeparate accounts and devices (rule PA-04)
- P14-A02 Privileged Access StandardTiers (rule PA-13)
- P14-A03 Privileged Access Request, Elevation & Revocation ProcedureResponding to a tier breach
Step
Stop the use and end the account's sessions at once
The first step is at once, whoever found it: stop the use and end every session the account holds. The deadlines that follow run from the day the breach was found. In the pack's example, the weekly review found a breach two working days after it happened: the review cadence is the detection time.
In the pack
- P14-A03 Privileged Access Request, Elevation & Revocation ProcedureResponding to a tier breach
- P14-A08 Administrative Tier Model & Separation MatrixSeparation rules
- P14-A08 Administrative Tier Model & Separation MatrixTier breaches
Step
Tell the Head of IT and Head of Information Security today
A tier breach goes to the Head of IT and the Head of Information Security the same day, and the procedure's steps start at once. The session reviewer records it as an anomaly: the account, the system and the time, what was approved and what the logs show.
In the pack
- P14-A07 Privileged Session Review RecordEscalating what the review finds
- P14-A07 Privileged Session Review RecordPart C: each anomaly
Decision
Is anything still happening that the administrator did not do?
Look at the account's current sessions and recent sign-ins: a session still open somewhere, a sign-in the administrator does not recognise, or a change they did not make. The incident triage procedure sends anything still happening straight to the incident manager. Not sure counts as yes.
- Yes, or not sure: Report a security incident and keep the breach steps going
- No: Is it a Tier 0 account?
In the pack
- P09-A05 Incident Triage & First-Hour Assessment ProcedureThe six triage questions
- P14-A07 Privileged Session Review RecordEscalating what the review finds
Decision
Is it a Tier 0 account?
Tier 0 controls the directory, the cloud identity tenant, the backups and device management. One stolen Tier 0 credential is a compromise of the whole estate, so its password changes at once. An account holding Tier 0 rights alongside others counts as Tier 0. Not known counts as yes.
- Yes, or not known: Change the password and revoke tokens at once
- No: Change the password and revoke tokens within 1 working day
In the pack
- P14-A02 Privileged Access StandardAdministrative tiers
- P14-A08 Administrative Tier Model & Separation MatrixDefinitions
Step
Change the password and revoke tokens at once
Change the account's password and revoke its sessions and tokens at once. A new password alone leaves a captured session token working, which is why tokens are revoked too. In the pack's example, a Tier 0 account found signed in to a file server had its password changed and its sessions ended the day the review found it.
In the pack
- P14-A03 Privileged Access Request, Elevation & Revocation ProcedureResponding to a tier breach
- P14-A02 Privileged Access StandardWorked example: the first two weeks
Step
Change the password and revoke tokens within 1 working day
For a Tier 1 or Tier 2 account, change the password and revoke its sessions and tokens within 1 working day by the pack's default. The sessions already ended in the first step; this step makes anything captured with the credential useless.
In the pack
- P14-A03 Privileged Access Request, Elevation & Revocation ProcedureResponding to a tier breach
- P14-A03 Privileged Access Request, Elevation & Revocation ProcedureTiming targets
Decision
What did the account touch?
The check depends on where the credential went. A mailbox or website is where phishing and malicious downloads land. A lower-tier system may already be in an attacker's hands, and a credential typed into it can be captured there. If it touched both, check both.
- Email or the web: Check what it received, opened or downloaded
- A system of another tier: Check the lower-tier system it signed in to
In the pack
- P14-A02 Privileged Access StandardWhat an account may do on each tier
- P14-A02 Privileged Access StandardTier separation (rule SR-2)
Step
Check what it received, opened or downloaded
Within 1 working day, check the mailbox or browsing it touched for signs of compromise, such as messages opened, links followed, files downloaded and anything that ran. If the account has a mailbox or an office licence at all, remove it: an administrator account should have neither.
In the pack
- P14-A03 Privileged Access Request, Elevation & Revocation ProcedureResponding to a tier breach
- P14-A02 Privileged Access StandardBuilt-in controls (rule PA-04)
- P14-A02 Privileged Access StandardSeparate accounts and devices
Step
Check the lower-tier system it signed in to
Within 1 working day, check the system it touched for signs of compromise. A higher-tier credential on a lower-tier system could have been captured by anyone who controls that system. In the pack's example, the Information Security Manager checked the file server the next day and found no sign of compromise.
In the pack
- P14-A03 Privileged Access Request, Elevation & Revocation ProcedureResponding to a tier breach
- P14-A08 Administrative Tier Model & Separation MatrixSeparation matrix
- P14-A08 Administrative Tier Model & Separation MatrixTier breaches
Step
Review everything the account did since the breach
Within 1 working day, review what the account did from the breach onward. Where the review finds something, widen it to every event of the same account in the period. The reviewer holds no administrator rights in the account's tier.
In the pack
- P14-A03 Privileged Access Request, Elevation & Revocation ProcedureResponding to a tier breach
- P14-A07 Privileged Session Review RecordSampling
- P14-A07 Privileged Session Review RecordWho reviews
Decision
Is there any sign of compromise or misuse?
If the mailbox, site or system it touched shows any sign of compromise, the pack makes it an incident under the incident management pack. Misuse of privileged access is an incident too. If you are not sure, the incident triage procedure treats not sure as yes.
- Yes, or not sure: Report a security incident and keep the breach steps going
- No: Fix the cause within 1 month
In the pack
- P14-A03 Privileged Access Request, Elevation & Revocation ProcedureResponding to a tier breach
- P14-A02 Privileged Access StandardRelated documents
- P09-A05 Incident Triage & First-Hour Assessment ProcedureDecision point — close, near miss or declare
Outcome
Report a security incident and keep the breach steps going
Contain at once and report it as a security incident; the Head of Information Security is told at once. The incident does not wait for the breach steps, and the breach steps do not stop for the incident: the password change, the review and the fix within 1 month still happen. The administrator's own activity is preserved and reviewed by someone else before they take part in the investigation.
In the pack
- P14-A07 Privileged Session Review RecordEscalating what the review finds
- P09-A05 Incident Triage & First-Hour Assessment ProcedureDeclaration
- P14-A02 Privileged Access StandardDuties kept apart (rule SOD-SO-04)
Step
Fix the cause within 1 month
Give the person an account of the right tier, and a policy that blocks the same sign-in next time: group policy denying higher-tier groups sign-in on lower-tier systems, no mailbox or licence on administrator accounts, and an administration device with browsing limited to administration portals. In the pack's example, an account holding two tiers' rights was split into a Tier 0 and a Tier 1 account.
In the pack
- P14-A03 Privileged Access Request, Elevation & Revocation ProcedureResponding to a tier breach
- P14-A02 Privileged Access StandardBuilt-in controls
- P14-A08 Administrative Tier Model & Separation MatrixSeparation rules
Decision
Should a policy have blocked it, or has it happened before?
If a policy should have stopped the sign-in and did not, the breach is also a finding: the control failed. The same anomaly in two reviews running is a finding too, reported to the Head of Information Security in the monthly report. Not known counts as yes.
- Yes, or not known: Raise a finding with an owner and a date for each fix
- No: Record it in the session review and close the steps
In the pack
- P14-A03 Privileged Access Request, Elevation & Revocation ProcedureResponding to a tier breach
- P14-A07 Privileged Session Review RecordEscalating what the review finds
Outcome
Raise a finding with an owner and a date for each fix
Raise it as a finding in your control review, with one action, an owner and a due date for each fix, and close it when every action is done. The control review's tier test passes only when no account of another tier has signed in to the system in the last 30 days.
In the pack
- P14-A06 Privileged Access Control Review WorkbookFindings
- P14-A06 Privileged Access Control Review WorkbookTest guide (rule CT-12)
- P14-A07 Privileged Session Review RecordField guidance
Outcome
Record it in the session review and close the steps
Record the breach in your session review record, with the steps taken and their dates, in the next review at the latest. Close it when every step is done. Until the fix is in place, check the account by name in each session review, as the pack's example does.
In the pack
- P14-A03 Privileged Access Request, Elevation & Revocation ProcedureResponding to a tier breach
- P14-A07 Privileged Session Review RecordWhen the review finds a tier breach
- P14-A07 Privileged Session Review RecordWorked example: the first weekly Tier 0 review
Practical checklist
- Stop the use and end every session the account holds, at once.
- Tell the Head of IT and the Head of Information Security the same day.
- Report anything still happening that the administrator did not do as a security incident.
- Change the password and revoke sessions and tokens: at once for Tier 0, within 1 working day for Tier 1 and Tier 2.
- Within 1 working day, check the mailbox, site or system the account touched for signs of compromise.
- Within 1 working day, review everything the account did since the breach.
- Within 1 month, give the person an account of the right tier and a policy that blocks the same sign-in.
- Record the breach in your session review record by the next review, with each step and its date.
Evidence to have ready
- The session review entry: the account, system and time, what was approved and what the logs show.
- When the sessions ended and the password and tokens were changed, against the deadline for the tier.
- The compromise check of what the account touched and the review of its activity since the breach, with who did each.
- The fix: the right-tier account and the blocking policy, with the date each was in place.
- Any finding, with an owner and due date for each action, and the incident reference if one was declared.
Assumptions
- Administrator accounts are separate from daily accounts, named for one person and one tier, with no mailbox, so misuse can be recognised.
- Sign-in logs reach a store the administrators cannot change, so you can see where and when the account was used.
- The 1-working-day and 1-month deadlines are the CISO Times privileged access pack's defaults. Your own standard may set others.
Not covered here
- Running the incident once compromise is suspected. Use your incident procedure; “How do we decide an incident's severity when the facts are still unclear?” sets its severity.
- Whether a password reset is enough after a session token was exposed. That is “If a session token was exposed, is a password reset enough?”.
- Setting up separate tiered administrator accounts in the first place. That is “How do we control administrator access without a PAM platform?”.
- Deciding whether what you found is an incident at all. That is “How do we decide whether something is an incident or just an event?”.
Related questions
- How do we control administrator access without a PAM platform?
- If a session token was exposed, is a password reset enough?
- How do we decide an incident's severity when the facts are still unclear?
- How do we decide whether something is an incident or just an event?
- How do we review privileged and administrator access?