AI Acceptable Use & Security Policy
States permitted AI uses, prohibited uses, data rules and accountability; the AI domain's single policy.
Available soon
- Format
- Word
- Size
- 77 KB
- Length
- 26 pages
- Version
- 1.1
- Updated
What's inside
- Purpose
- Scope
- How this policy works
- Permitted, conditional and prohibited uses
- Data rules by classification
- What the law asks and when
- Policy statements
- Roles and responsibilities
- Compliance and consequences
- Exceptions
- Related documents
- Definitions
- Document control
- Worked example: the first seven weeks
- Adapting this template
- Framework references
What changed
- 1.1
Internal data, like Confidential, goes into an AI tool only under a contract term that bars the supplier from training on it, as the information classification standard's CL-19 requires; a vendor setting verified off is an added technical control and no longer a substitute. A supplier's written statement no longer stands in for the term.
- 1.0
Published.
Preview
The document from section 1, as you will receive it. Highlighted [[text]] is for you to replace; shaded guidance boxes are for you to delete before approval. The cover and document control pages are in the file.
Purpose
Most organisations do not build AI. They use other people's AI: an assistant inside the office suite, a forecasting feature in a system they already run, a chatbot a supplier offers, or a free tool a member of staff finds on their own. Governing that use proportionately starts with knowing what is in use. For each use, the organisation then decides what data it may touch, who answers for it and how much checking it needs. A small use with low-risk data needs a short screen and a named owner. A use that touches Confidential data, faces customers, acts on its own or helps decide something about a person needs an assessment and a senior decision first. A few uses are never allowed. The result is a list the organisation keeps, with counts of what is approved, held, declined and due for review. It is never one score.
This policy commits [[Organisation Name]] to the same approach. It says which AI tools people may use for work, with which information, who must check what the tools produce, when people must be told that AI was involved, and what is never allowed. It sets 22 rules, AG-01 to AG-22. Every other document in the AI Security Governance & Acceptable Use pack cites them by number.
The other documents put the policy into practice: the AI Use Case Intake & Approval Procedure decides each new use, the AI Governance Responsibility Matrix says who does what, the AI System & Use Case Inventory lists every use, the AI Use Case Risk & Impact Assessment assesses the larger ones, the AI Tool Approval & Data Permission Matrix lists the approved tools and the data each takes, the EU AI Act Role & Risk Classification Worksheet records the organisation's reasoning against the EU AI Act, and the AI Literacy & Staff Training Plan trains the people. The rules below are the part that does not change from one tool to the next.
Legal note. This document helps you govern the AI your organisation uses. It is not legal advice, and following it is not a statement that you comply with the EU AI Act, the GDPR or any standard. Whether the Act binds you, in which role, and which of its duties apply to each system depends on the facts and on how your Member State applies the Act: confirm it with counsel.
Guidance — delete before approval
This is a Policy-tier document in the Security Policy Management pack: approved by executive management and reviewed at least every 12 months. It is the single policy for AI use. If your organisation already has an acceptable use policy, add the rules below to it or refer to this policy from it, and keep the rule numbers.
Start with the list of what is already in use. A policy written before anyone knows which tools staff use tends to describe tools nobody uses and miss the ones they do. The inventory (A05) is the programme. This policy is its rulebook.
Scope
This policy applies to:
- People: everyone who works for [[Organisation Name]] and uses an AI system for work, whether on a work device or a personal one: employees, contractors, temporary staff and supplier staff who hold our accounts (AG-01).
- AI built into other software: AI tools that a person chooses, and AI features inside software the organisation already runs, such as a forecasting feature in a business system, a summarising button in a meeting tool or a machine-learning filter in a security service. A supplier can switch on such a feature in a release, and it is then a new use (AG-09).
- Information: everything a person types, pastes or uploads into an AI tool, and everything the tool returns. The information classification levels of the Information Classification & Handling pack decide what may go in (AG-03).
- Suppliers: AI tools and AI features supplied to us, under the third-party security pack (AG-11).
Excluded: [[anything deliberately left out, and where it is covered instead, e.g. AI embedded in a product the organisation sells, which a separate product governance process covers; or "None"]]. Use of AI in a purely personal, non-professional activity is outside the EU AI Act's obligations for deployers (Article 2(10)) and outside this policy, but a personal account is never used for work (AG-04).
Guidance — delete before approval
The Act applies to roles. This policy is written for an organisation that uses other people's AI, which the Act calls a deployer (Article 3(4)). Building an application or feature on a supplier's model API, whether for staff or for customers, counts as building. If you also build, brand, sell or supply an AI system, AG-17 sends the decision to Legal before anything starts, and you will need more than this policy. A supplier's finished product used as supplied is not building.
Contractors and supplier staff are in scope when they use our accounts or our information. Say so in the contract and in the onboarding pack, not only here.
How this policy works
Five things are asked of every person who uses AI for work.
What to do | In practice |
|---|---|
Use only approved tools | Check the approved list (A07). If the tool or the data is not on it, ask first (AG-02, AG-09). |
Mind the data | The data level decides which tools may take it. Special category data never goes in (AG-03). |
Check the output | A person who can judge it reads it before it is relied on, sent or published (AG-07). |
Say when AI was involved | Tell customers they deal with AI and label realistic generated content (AG-08). |
Report mistakes | Report an AI-related event at once. Nobody is blamed for a report made in good faith (AG-13). |
Every proposed use gets one of four outcomes, and the outcome sets how much checking it needs before it starts. The AI governance lead sets the tier from the intake answers (A03). Values in [[brackets]] are the pack's defaults.
Outcome | What it needs | Who decides | Decision within | Approval reviewed every |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Tier 1: screen | A screen against the intake questions. No assessment. | AI governance lead | [[5]] working days | [[12]] months |
Tier 2: assessment | The risk and impact assessment (A06), the supplier decision under P06 where a supplier is involved, and the Data Protection Officer's advice where personal data is used. | AI governance lead and Head of Information Security, with the use owner consulted (the owner signs the conditions it accepts and does not approve) and the Data Protection Officer's advice recorded where personal data is used | [[15]] working days | [[6]] months |
Tier 3: assessment and executive decision | Everything in Tier 2, the EU AI Act worksheet (A08) confirmed by Legal, a data protection impact assessment where Article 35 of the GDPR applies, and HR where staff are affected. | The executive decision-maker your procedure names (executive management by default; the board or its equivalent where your governance structure puts it), on the AI governance lead's recommendation | [[30]] working days | [[6]] months |
Stop | The use is not allowed as proposed. It matches a prohibited practice, or special category data would go into the tool. The use owner changes the use, or drops it. | The AI governance lead, who tells Legal | At screening | Not applicable |
Guidance — delete before approval
A small use with low-risk data needs a short screen and a named owner. Do not send every request for a senior decision: the tiers exist so that the senior decision is kept for the few uses that carry real risk.
Permitted, conditional and prohibited uses
Uses fall into three groups. The groups are not a list of tools. They describe what a use needs before it may begin, and the approved list (A07) names the tools.
Permitted
A use is permitted when it has an intake decision of Approve or Approve with conditions, runs on a tool that is on the approved list (A07), keeps within the data level the list allows for that tool, and meets its conditions (AG-02, AG-03, AG-09). A person who is unsure asks the AI governance lead before using the tool, not after. Public information may go into any tool (P15 CL-19), but never through a work account and never under the organisation's name.
A tool on the approved list has one of three states:
State | What it means |
|---|---|
Approved | Approved up to the stated data level with the baseline conditions (BC-1 to BC-5) and nothing further. |
Approved with conditions | Approved up to the stated data level with the baseline conditions and the further conditions listed for the tool. A condition with a date is a condition of the approval, and the tool is switched off if it is not met. |
Not approved | Not approved for work. Only Public information with no personal data in it may go into it (P15 CL-19), and never through a work account. |
Allowed only after approval
A use needs approval before it starts, and it is not started until the decision is made, when any of the following is true (AG-06, AG-09, AG-16, AG-17). The tier rises as the risk rises.
- Confidential information, personal data, or customers and the public are involved (Tier 2).
- The use informs a decision about a person, or a wrong output or a stoppage would affect a core service or a material sum (Tier 2).
- The use decides or shapes a decision about a person, falls in an area of Annex III of the EU AI Act, acts or sends output on its own, or could otherwise make the organisation a provider of an AI system (Tier 3). A new feature built on a supplier's model API is Tier 3 and held until Legal records the role. If Legal records the deployer role, the tier is set again from the answers. If Legal records the provider role or another role, the hold clears but the use stays Tier 3, and the executive decision-maker decides. A feature already running when this policy starts carries the hold as a condition with a date.
Worked examples, sorted by outcome, with the case after Legal records the deployer role shown beside the case before it. The outcome of each is the intake method's (A03), applied to the answers a person would give.
Use | Outcome | Rule that decides |
|---|---|---|
Draft and summarise internal text with the approved office assistant | Tier 1 | AG-09 |
Customer price lists compared by an AI tool | Tier 2 | AG-03 |
Confidential contract text, but the supplier has not agreed to bar training | Tier 2 Hold H-2 first | AG-03 |
A chatbot that answers customers on its own | Tier 3 | AG-16 |
A tool that ranks job applicants | Tier 3 | AG-06 |
We would sell our own assistant, built on a supplier's model, to customers | Tier 3 Hold H-4 first | AG-17 |
Staff would use an assistant we build on a supplier's model API, with Internal data (Legal has not recorded the role) | Tier 3 Hold H-4 first | AG-17 |
The same assistant after Legal records the deployer role | Tier 1 | AG-09 |
The same new assistant, but Legal records the provider role: H-4 clears as a hold, and the use stays Tier 3 | Tier 3 | AG-17 |
A video-call tool that reports the mood of the team | Not allowed | AG-05 |
Occupational health notes summarised by an assistant | Not allowed | AG-03 |
Never allowed
The practices that Article 5 of the EU AI Act prohibits are never allowed, in any use, whoever supplies the tool (AG-05). Ten items make up the checklist in the EU AI Act Role & Risk Classification Worksheet, and a proposed use is checked against all of them at intake. The first eight have applied since 2 February 2025. The last two apply from 2 December 2026.
Item | Practice | Article 5(1) | Applies from |
|---|---|---|---|
PP-01 | Subliminal, manipulative or deceptive techniques | point (a) | 2 Feb 2025 |
PP-02 | Exploiting vulnerabilities | point (b) | 2 Feb 2025 |
PP-03 | Social scoring | point (c) | 2 Feb 2025 |
PP-04 | Predicting offences from profiling | point (d) | 2 Feb 2025 |
PP-05 | Untargeted scraping of faces | point (e) | 2 Feb 2025 |
PP-06 | Inferring emotions at work or in education | point (f) | 2 Feb 2025 |
PP-07 | Biometric categorisation of sensitive traits | point (g) | 2 Feb 2025 |
PP-08 | Real-time remote biometric identification for law enforcement | point (h) | 2 Feb 2025 |
PP-09 | Intimate images of a real person without consent | point (ba) | 2 Dec 2026 |
PP-10 | Child sexual abuse material | point (bb) | 2 Dec 2026 |
The organisation adds three prohibitions of its own, and two absolute limits on data and on money (AG-05, AG-03, AG-16):
- Using AI to impersonate a person, including cloning a voice or a face.
- Using AI to get around a security control, such as writing a script that defeats a filter or a sign-in check.
- Using AI to write malware or tools meant to harm systems that the organisation does not own or has not authorised testing.
- Putting special category personal data into any AI tool. This takes no exception (AG-03, AG-20).
- Letting an AI system release a payment or change a supplier's bank details (AG-16).
Guidance — delete before approval
Emotion inference at work is the prohibition most likely to arrive by accident. A video-call tool or a call-centre product that reports the mood of staff or candidates matches item PP-06, with an exception only for medical or safety reasons. A feature of that kind is stopped at intake and Legal is told. The intake method stops such a proposal (example IC-M).
If a person is unsure whether a use matches an item, the answer on the checklist is Unsure, and the use stops until Legal has looked at it.
Data rules by classification
What may go into an AI tool depends on the information's level under the Information Classification & Handling pack, on the tool's state on the approved list, and on whether personal data is involved. The rules agree with P15 CL-19. A collection, an export or a copy takes the highest level of anything in it (P15 CL-13). Special category personal data never goes into an AI tool at any level (AG-03). In short: Public information with no personal data in it into any tool (personal data inside Public information still needs a tool approved for personal data); Internal only into a tool approved for Internal, signed in with the work account, under a contract term that bars training on our data; Confidential only into a tool approved for Confidential, under the same contract term, after the supplier's documented decision. A vendor setting that stops training, verified off, is an added technical control and never replaces the contract term: the supplier can change a setting, and only the contract binds it.
The same rules as a lookup. Each tool is assumed to meet its baseline conditions. The answer for a real tool comes from its row on the approved list, using the method of the AI Tool Approval & Data Permission Matrix.
Tool state and level | Public | Internal | Confidential | Special category |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Not approved | Yes | No | No | No |
Approved up to Internal | Yes | Yes | No | No |
Approved up to Confidential, supplier decision recorded | Yes | Yes | Yes | No |
Personal data adds one more condition: the tool must itself be approved for personal data, under processor terms (AG-03). A tool that is not approved for personal data takes none at any level, and a tool that is not approved takes none at all.
Conditions of every approved tool
A tool is approved only if it meets the baseline conditions that apply at the highest level of data it takes.
Condition | What it requires | Applies from |
|---|---|---|
BC-1 | Staff sign in with the work account through single sign-on (P13). No personal or free account. A feature built into a service follows that service's own access rules (P07, P13). | Internal, and above |
BC-2 | The contract bars the supplier from training on the organisation's data (ST-1; P15 CL-19). Where the tool also has a setting that stops training, it is kept off and checked at each review as an added technical control; it never replaces the contract term. | Internal, and above |
BC-3 | The tool and its supplier are in the inventory (A05) and, for Internal and Confidential data, in the supplier register (P06). | Internal, and above |
BC-4 | Confidential data and above only after the supplier's documented decision is Approve or Approve with conditions (P06 TP-05; P15 CL-16). | Confidential, and above |
BC-5 | Personal data only where the tool is approved for it, under processor terms (P06 clause CL-06). | Public |
What the contract must say
Procurement puts the eight AI terms ST-1 to ST-8 into the contract with the supplier of any AI tool, or of any software with an AI feature (AG-11). They cover no training on our data, processor terms, sub-processors, locations, incident notice, return and deletion on exit, notice of new AI features and the supplier's statement of intended purpose. The AI Tool Approval & Data Permission Matrix lists each term and the Supplier Contract Security Clause Library clause that carries it.
Guidance — delete before approval
The third-party pack has no clause that bars a supplier from training its models on your data (ST-1), and none that asks for the intended purpose and instructions for use (ST-8). Add both to the contract in your own words. Until the term that bars training is in the contract, no Internal or Confidential data goes into the tool; a use already running when this policy starts gets a dated condition to add it (H-2).
A tool that is built into a service you already run follows that service's own access rules for sign-in (BC-1). A free assistant on a personal account never meets the baseline.
What the law asks and when
This section says, in summary, what the EU AI Act asks of an organisation that uses AI. It does not say that following this policy meets any of it. Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 binds the operators of its Article 2(1): providers, deployers, importers, distributors, product manufacturers and authorised representatives. An organisation that uses another party’s AI system under its own authority for its business is a deployer (Article 3(4)). An organisation that sells goods and is called a distributor in its trade is not an AI Act distributor unless it makes an AI system available on the Union market (Article 3(7)). Which role an organisation holds for each system depends on the facts, and counsel confirms it.
The Act came into application in steps. The dates below are those of Article 113 as amended by Regulation (EU) 2026/1744.
From | What applies | On 9 Oct 2026 |
|---|---|---|
2 Feb 2025 | Chapters I and II: the definitions, AI literacy (Article 4) and the prohibited practices (Article 5, points (a) to (h)). | Applies |
27 Jul 2026 | Regulation (EU) 2026/1744 in force: the replaced Article 4, and the new date for Annex III systems. | Applies |
2 Aug 2026 | The general date of application, including the transparency duties of Article 50. Providers of generative systems placed on the market before this date have until 2 December 2026 for Article 50(2). | Applies |
2 Dec 2026 | Article 5(1) points (ba) and (bb), with Article 5(1a) and (1b): intimate images without consent and child sexual abuse material. | Not yet |
2 Dec 2027 | Chapter III, Sections 1, 2 and 3 for systems high-risk under Article 6(2) and Annex III, including the deployer duties of Article 26. | Not yet |
2 Aug 2028 | Chapter III, Sections 1, 2 and 3 for systems high-risk under Article 6(1) and Annex I (safety components of regulated products). | Not yet |
For an organisation that only uses AI, four parts of the Act matter most, and the policy answers each:
Part of the Act | What it asks of a deployer | Where the policy answers |
|---|---|---|
Article 4 AI literacy | Take measures to support the AI literacy of staff and other people who work with AI systems on the organisation's behalf, fitted to their knowledge, the context and the people the system is used on. The Act does not require anyone to guarantee a specific level of literacy. | AG-18; the literacy plan (A09) |
Article 5 Prohibited practices | Do not use an AI system for a practice that Article 5 prohibits. | AG-05; the checklist PP-01 to PP-10 (A08) |
Article 50 Transparency | Deployers of emotion recognition or biometric categorisation tell the people exposed to it, and deployers of deep fakes and certain public-interest text disclose that they are artificially generated or manipulated. Providers carry the duty to tell people they deal with an AI system and to mark synthetic output. | AG-08 |
Article 26 High-risk systems | Deployers of high-risk systems use them as the instructions say, assign trained human oversight, monitor, keep logs, tell workers and the people affected, and cooperate with authorities. This applies from 2 December 2027 to systems in the areas of Annex III. | AG-06, AG-07, AG-12, AG-21; the duties DD-1 to DD-9 (A08) |
Draft and proposed texts. Commission guidelines on the classification of high-risk systems (Article 6(5)): a draft published on 19 May 2026, consultation to 23 July 2026. The Act asked for them by 2 February 2026. The Commission's proposal COM(2025) 837 to amend Regulation (EU) 2016/679 and related law, in committee in the European Parliament on 8 October 2026. This policy relies on neither.
Roles. A business that distributes goods, such as a wholesale distributor, is not a distributor under the AI Act. The Act's distributor makes an AI system available on the Union market. An organisation that uses AI tools in its own work is looking at the deployer test.
Penalties. Member States lay down the rules on penalties, and the Act sets ceilings. Infringing a prohibition can bring a fine of up to EUR 35 000 000 or, for an undertaking, up to 7 % of total worldwide annual turnover, whichever is higher (Article 99(3)). Failing a deployer or transparency obligation can bring a fine of up to EUR 15 000 000 or 3 % (Article 99(4)).
Classification is a legal question. This worksheet records your own reasoning against the text of the Act. It does not say that any system is or is not prohibited, high-risk or subject to a transparency duty, and it does not say that you are a provider, a deployer or any other operator. Counsel confirms each conclusion.
Guidance — delete before approval
Ask Legal to confirm, once, which role the organisation holds for each system it uses, and to re-confirm when the purpose, the supplier or the law changes. The worksheet (A08) holds the reasoning, so Legal reviews it rather than starting again.
Policy statements
The statements keep the rule IDs AG-01 to AG-22 that every document in the AI Security Governance & Acceptable Use pack cites. Values in [[brackets]] are the pack's defaults; set your own before approval. Each statement names the evidence an auditor looks at.
Using AI at work
AG-01 This policy applies to everyone who works for the organisation (staff, contractors and supplier staff who hold our accounts) whenever they use an AI system for work, on any device or account. It covers AI built into other software as well as AI tools.
Evidence: the scope in this policy, and the acknowledgement record showing that staff, contractors and supplier staff with our accounts have read it.
AG-02 Use an AI tool for work only if it is on the approved list (A07), and only with data the list allows for it. Public information with no personal data in it may go into any tool (P15 CL-19), but never through a work account and never under the organisation's name. An unapproved use found is stopped within [[3]] working days of discovery, and the people involved are helped to a tool they may use.
Evidence: the approved list of tools with the data level each takes; for each unapproved use found, the date found, the date stopped and the tool it moved to.
AG-04 Sign in to approved tools with your work account through single sign-on (P13). Never use a personal or free account for work, never type a work password or access key into an AI tool, and never register for an AI tool with a work email address before it is approved (P13 JML-12).
Evidence: single sign-on records showing each approved tool connected; the survey or discovery results for personal and free accounts; the registration check made when a new tool is requested.
AG-09 No new AI use, and no new AI feature switched on in software already in use, starts before an intake decision under A03. Every decision is recorded in the inventory (A05). Nobody approves a use they own: the use owner is consulted and signs the conditions it accepts, and where a tier's approver owns the use the executive decision-maker takes that approver's place. If the executive decision-maker owns a Tier 3 use, the board or its equivalent decides it (D-42). A use found already running is recorded at the tier its answers give; at Tier 2 or 3 it gets its assessment within [[90]] calendar days of the inventory closing.
Evidence: an intake decision for every use in the inventory, dated before the use began and signed by the approvers of its tier (the executive decision-maker in place of an approver who owns the use), never by the use owner; for a use found running, its tier and the date its assessment is due.
Uses that are never allowed, and uses that need a senior decision
AG-05 The practices that Article 5 of the EU AI Act prohibits are never allowed, in any use, whoever supplies the tool. They include inferring the emotions of staff at work, scoring people on social behaviour, and generating intimate images of a real person without consent. The checklist is PP-01 to PP-10. Staff also never use AI to impersonate a person, to get around a security control, or to write malware.
Evidence: the prohibited-practice checklist completed at intake for every proposed use; the record of any use stopped under it and passed to Legal.
AG-06 No AI output decides, alone, a matter that affects a person's job, pay, discipline, credit, access to a service or legal position (GDPR Article 22). A named person makes the decision after reading the evidence. A use that decides or shapes such a decision, or that falls in an area of Annex III of the EU AI Act whatever it does, is Tier 3 and is not started before the Tier 3 decision. A use that only informs such a decision is Tier 2.
Evidence: for each use that decides or shapes a decision about a person, the Tier 3 file, the Tier 3 decision and the name of the person who makes the decision about the person; for each use that only informs one, the Tier 2 file.
AG-16 An AI system that can act on its own (send messages, change records, approve or release payments, run commands) is Tier 3 until assessed. It runs under a named identity with the least access it needs, and it never releases a payment or changes supplier bank details.
Evidence: for each system that can act on its own, the Tier 3 file, the named identity it runs under, its access list, and the controls that stop it releasing a payment or changing bank details.
AG-17 Nobody builds an application or feature on a supplier's model API (prompts, retrieval, tools or code around a model the organisation calls), whether for staff or for customers, fine-tunes for others, brands, sells or supplies an AI system to a third party, or puts the organisation's name on a supplier's AI system, without Legal's decision first. Using a supplier's finished product as supplied is not building. Building can make the organisation a provider (EU AI Act Articles 3(3) and 25), so Legal records which role the organisation holds before the use starts. A new use is Tier 3 until then. When Legal records the deployer role the tier is set again from the answers; when Legal records the provider role or another role the use stays Tier 3, because it is outside this policy's deployer governance. A use already running carries the hold as a condition with a date.
Evidence: Legal's recorded decision for any proposal to build on a supplier's model API, brand, sell or supply an AI system; the role reasoning on the EU AI Act worksheet (A08).
AG-21 Before an AI system monitors or evaluates staff, HR and Legal check the national rules on monitoring at work and on telling or consulting staff representatives. Where the system is high-risk, employers tell the workers' representatives and the workers affected before it is used (EU AI Act Article 26(7), from 2 December 2027 for Annex III systems).
Evidence: for each system that monitors or evaluates staff, the record of HR's and Legal's check of the national rules; where the system is high-risk, the notice to workers' representatives and the workers affected.
Data
AG-03 Follow the classification: Public information with no personal data in it into any tool; Internal only into a tool approved for Internal; Confidential only into a tool approved for Confidential; special category personal data never (P15 CL-14, CL-19). Personal data goes only into a tool approved for personal data, under processor terms (P06 clause CL-06), whatever the level of the information around it: personal data inside Public information does not go into just any tool. A collection, export or copy takes the highest level of anything in it (P15 CL-13).
Evidence: the approved list showing each tool's highest data level and whether it takes personal data; the result of the inventory check that compares each use's data with its tool (IV-10); the processor terms for each tool that takes personal data.
AG-14 Material that belongs to a customer, a supplier or another third party, or that is under a confidentiality agreement, is treated as Confidential and goes into an AI tool only if the contract allows it and the tool is approved for Confidential.
Evidence: the contract or confidentiality terms checked before any customer or supplier material went into a tool; the tool's approval for Confidential data.
AG-15 AI-generated code, scripts and configuration go through the same review, testing and approval as any other change before they reach production, and secrets never go into a prompt (P16 LM-10).
Evidence: change records showing review and testing of AI-generated code and configuration; the secret-scanning results for prompts and repositories where the organisation runs them.
Human oversight and disclosure
AG-07 A person who is competent to judge the output reads it before it is relied on, sent outside the organisation or published. That person has the authority to reject it. The inventory names who this is for each use. AI output is never treated as a verified fact, a legal opinion or a finished piece of code.
Evidence: for each use in the inventory, the named person who checks the output and has the authority to reject it; spot checks of outputs sent outside the organisation.
AG-08 Tell people when they deal with AI. A customer who talks to a chatbot is told so at the start. Realistic AI-generated images, audio or video of real people, places, objects or events are labelled as artificially generated or manipulated, and so is AI-generated text published to inform the public on a matter of public interest unless a person has reviewed it and holds editorial responsibility (EU AI Act Article 50, from 2 August 2026).
Evidence: the notice shown at the start of each customer-facing assistant; the labelling rule for generated images, audio and video, and a sample of published items.
The inventory and suppliers
AG-10 The inventory lists every use with an owner, a purpose, a tool, the highest data level, a tier, an approver, a status and a review date. Owners review their uses at the tier's interval, and the whole inventory is reviewed at least every [[6]] months. A trigger (A05) forces a review within [[10]] working days. Pending that review the AI governance lead may suspend an approved running use; the approvers of its tier decide whether it resumes.
Evidence: the inventory with every field completed; the review dates of each use; the record of the six-monthly review of the whole inventory and of each review started by a trigger; the record of any suspension of an approved running use and the approvers' decision on whether it resumes.
AG-11 A supplier of an AI tool, or of software with an AI feature, is assessed under the third-party pack before it receives Internal or Confidential data, and before a Tier 2 or Tier 3 use of it starts even with Public data (P06 TP-01, TP-05; P15 CL-16 asks for it for Confidential data only), and again on a material change (P06 TP-09). The contract carries the AI terms ST-1 to ST-8. A supplier that adds an AI feature gives notice (P06 clause CL-20), and the feature goes through intake before it is switched on.
Evidence: for each supplier that receives Internal or Confidential data, its decision under the third-party pack; the contract showing the AI terms ST-1 to ST-8; the notice of each new AI feature and the intake decision that followed.
Accountability and competence
AG-18 Everyone who uses or oversees an AI tool completes the AI essentials module (AL-01) before access is switched on, or within [[60]] calendar days of the plan's launch if they already have access, and refreshes it every [[12]] months. People in the roles of A09 take the role modules. The organisation keeps an internal record of what each person completed. No certificate is needed (EU AI Act Article 4).
Evidence: the internal literacy record for each person with access to an AI tool: module, date completed and next due; the list of people whose access was switched on after completion.
Records and incidents
AG-12 Keep the intake file, the assessment, the approval and its conditions for each use until the use ends and for [[3]] years after, or longer where law or a contract asks. Keep the literacy record (A09) for the same period. A high-risk system's logs that the organisation controls are kept at least 6 months (EU AI Act Article 26(6), from 2 December 2027 for Annex III systems).
Evidence: the intake file, assessment and approval for each use, kept for the period this policy sets; the literacy record; for any high-risk system, the log retention setting.
AG-13 Report an AI-related security event or mishandling at once through the incident route (P09 IM-01). The triggers that hand over are AT-1 to AT-8. Nobody is blamed for a report made in good faith. The incident pack decides whether it is an incident and what must be reported, and its clocks apply.
Evidence: reports made through the incident route that cite an AI trigger (AT-1 to AT-8); the incident pack's decision on each; the absence of any action against a person who reported in good faith.
Review, exceptions and measures
AG-19 The policy is reviewed at least every [[12]] months, and when the law, a standard, a major tool or an incident changes the picture. Everyone acknowledges it within [[10]] working days of joining and each year (P04).
Evidence: the document control table with the approval date and next review date; the acknowledgement record for joiners and for each yearly round.
AG-20 A departure from this policy is a P02 exception, scored and approved by the approver its band sets (EX-05). The Article 5 prohibitions (AG-05) and the rule on special category data (AG-03) take no exception.
Evidence: the entries in the exception register against this policy, each scored and approved at its band; no entry against AG-05 or AG-03.
AG-22 The AI governance lead reports the headline measures (AIM-01 to AIM-05) monthly to the security and IT leadership team, as counts such as 4 of 7, with every gap named. A measure is never combined into a score or a share.
Evidence: the monthly report of the five headline measures, each as a count with the gaps named.
Guidance — delete before approval
Keep the rule IDs. If you remove a rule, keep its number and mark it "Withdrawn in version x.y", so records that cite it still point to the right text. AG-03 and AG-05 take no exception (AG-05 and AG-03): do not weaken them.
Set the bracketed values once, here, and use the same values in the procedure, the inventory, the approved-tool matrix and the literacy plan. Shortening the time to stop an unapproved use (AG-02) is the cheapest improvement you can make.
Roles and responsibilities
Every AI use has one AI use owner, recorded by role in the inventory. The owner answers for the use and for what it produces. The AI governance lead owns this policy. One person may hold several roles in a small organisation, with one limit: nobody approves a use they own. Where a tier's approver owns the use, the executive decision-maker takes that approver's place.
Role | Responsibilities under this policy |
|---|---|
Executive management [[e.g. Executive Committee, or the management body]] | Approves this policy. Decides Tier 3 uses by default, unless the governance structure puts that decision with the board or its equivalent (AG-06, AG-16, AG-22). Signs as well for a High risk outside appetite; a Critical risk goes to the board or its equivalent (P05 RM-04), not to executive management as such. |
AI governance lead [[e.g. Head of Risk]] | Owns the AI policy and the approved list, screens every proposed use, keeps the inventory, approves Tier 1 uses and Tier 2 uses (with the Head of Information Security), may suspend an approved running use pending review, advises on Tier 3 and reports the measures. |
AI use owner [[the manager accountable for the business activity the AI supports]] | Proposes the use, answers the intake questions, answers for its output, names the people who check it, is consulted on the decision and signs the conditions it accepts, and asks for a review when anything changes. Never approves a use it owns. |
Head of Information Security [[e.g. Head of Information Security]] | Assesses the security factor, agrees the tool's conditions and approves Tier 2 uses with the AI governance lead. |
Data Protection Officer [[or the privacy lead where no DPO is appointed]] | Advises on personal data in any use, decides with the use owner whether a data protection impact assessment is needed, and is consulted on every use of personal data. |
Legal [[in-house or external counsel]] | Confirms the AI Act role and category of each system, reads supplier terms, and decides whether the organisation could be a provider. |
HR [[e.g. HR Business Partner]] | Advises on any use that touches recruitment, pay, performance or monitoring of staff, and on telling and consulting staff or their representatives. |
Procurement [[e.g. Procurement Manager]] | Makes sure no AI tool or AI feature is bought or switched on without an intake decision, and puts the AI terms into the contract (ST-1 to ST-8). |
System owner [[the manager accountable for the system]] | Owns the system an AI feature sits in, and tells the AI governance lead when a supplier adds or changes an AI feature. |
Head of IT [[e.g. Head of IT]] | Connects approved tools to single sign-on, applies the tool's settings and keeps the technical list of what is installed. |
Executive decision-maker [[e.g. Executive Committee, or the management body]] | Decides Tier 3 uses: executive management by default, or the board where the governance structure puts it. Signs as well for a High risk outside appetite (P05). Does not accept a Critical risk as executive management: it goes to the board or its equivalent (P05 RM-04). |
Line manager [[each person's manager]] | Gives time for the literacy plan, checks that the team uses only approved tools, and sends proposals to the use owner. |
Awareness lead [[e.g. Information Security Manager]] | Runs the literacy modules and keeps the completion record, with the learning system. |
User [[everyone who uses an AI tool for work: staff, contractors and supplier staff]] | Uses only approved tools within their data limits, checks the output, discloses AI use where the policy says, and reports mistakes. |
The AI Governance Responsibility Matrix sets out who is responsible, accountable, consulted and informed for each of 16 activities under these rules. A Critical exception to any rule is approved by the board or its equivalent: the board, or a board risk committee it has delegated this to; in a two-tier structure, the management board; where there is no board, such as in an owner-managed company, executive management.
Guidance — delete before approval
Name an owner by role, never a team. The owner of a use is the manager accountable for the business activity the AI supports, not the person in IT who switched the tool on. If the owner or the person who checks the output leaves, the use is reviewed within the working days AG-10 sets.
In a small organisation the managing director is often the AI governance lead and the executive decision-maker at once. Where that happens, ask an outside adviser or a non-executive director to read the Tier 3 files.
Compliance and consequences
How compliance is checked. The AI governance lead compares the inventory with single sign-on records, with the spending that P13 JML-12 discovers, and with a short survey of staff at least [[every six months]]. Line managers check that their teams use only approved tools. [[Internal audit]] tests the policy [[every year]], including one Tier 2 use from intake to review.
Measures. The AI governance lead reports five headline measures each month (AG-22). Each is a count with the gaps named. None is combined into a score or a share.
Measure | What it counts | Target |
|---|---|---|
AIM-01 AI uses with a current approval | Uses on the inventory with a status of Approved or Approved with conditions and a review date that has not passed at the period end, out of all uses on the inventory. | All uses in use |
AIM-02 Tier 2 and 3 uses with a completed assessment | Tier 2 and Tier 3 uses that are approved or held and have a completed risk and impact assessment, out of all such uses. | All |
AIM-03 AI reviews past their date | Approved uses whose review date has passed at the period end. | Zero |
AIM-04 AI tool users who completed AI essentials | People with access to an approved AI tool who have completed AL-01 within the plan's window, out of all people with access. | All |
AIM-05 Unapproved AI uses found and stopped | Unapproved uses found in the period, and how many were stopped within 3 working days of discovery. | All stopped in time |
Consequences of not complying. Nobody is disciplined for a mistake they report at once, or for a report made in good faith (AG-13). Deliberately using an unapproved tool after being told to stop, putting Confidential information into a personal or free account, hiding a use, or putting special category data into any tool may lead to action under the [[disciplinary procedure]]. For a supplier, mishandling our information is a breach of the security terms of its contract, handled under them.
Guidance — delete before approval
EXAMPLE, as at 30 Sep 2026: AIM-01 4 of 5 uses in use or proposed have a current approval; AI-003 is held. AIM-02 2 of 3 Tier 2 and 3 uses have a completed assessment; AI-006 is waiting, and its due date has not passed. AIM-03 0 approvals are past their review date. AIM-04 104 of 131 people with an AI tool have completed AI essentials, and the other 27 are not yet due. AIM-05 1 of 1 unapproved uses found was stopped in time.
Exceptions
Any departure from these rules is requested, scored and approved under the Security Exception & Waiver Standard [[document ID]] (Security Exception, Waiver & Segregation of Duties pack), using the Security Exception Request & Approval Form, before the departure begins (AG-20). An exception names the rule, the use, the reason, the compensating measures and an expiry date, and is recorded in the Security Exception Register. Agreement by email, in a meeting or by a manager is not an exception.
AG-05 and AG-03 take no exception: the prohibitions of Article 5 of the EU AI Act, and the rule that special category data never goes into an AI tool. An exception never changes a legal duty. Personal data is protected under data protection law, and an incident is reported, exception or not.
Guidance — delete before approval
EXAMPLE: the warehouse forecasting module (AI-002) was found running as a feature in the supplier's 2025 release, before its supplier was assessed. It is approved with a dated condition that the assessment ends in Approve or Approve with conditions by 20 Oct 2026, or the module is switched off. That is a condition of the approval and not an exception while it holds. If the date slips, it becomes one.
Related documents
Document | Relationship |
|---|---|
AI Use Case Intake & Approval Procedure | Decides each proposed use: the questions, the tiers and the hold conditions (AG-09) |
AI Governance Responsibility Matrix | Who does what for each activity under these rules |
AI System & Use Case Inventory | Every AI use, with its owner, data level, tier, status and review date (AG-10) |
AI Use Case Risk & Impact Assessment | The risk and impact assessment of a Tier 2 or Tier 3 use |
AI Tool Approval & Data Permission Matrix | The approved tools and the data each may take (AG-02, AG-03) |
EU AI Act Role & Risk Classification Worksheet | The organisation's reasoning against the EU AI Act: roles, prohibited practices, Annex III areas and duties (AG-05, AG-17) |
AI Literacy & Staff Training Plan | The AI literacy modules, who takes them and the record (AG-18) |
Information Classification & Handling Policy | The three classification levels and rule CL-19 on AI tools; Information Classification & Handling pack |
Third-Party Security Policy; Supplier Contract Security Clause Library | Assessing an AI supplier and the contract clauses (AG-11); Third-Party Security Risk Management pack |
Security Incident Management Policy; Personal Data Breach Response Playbook | Reporting an AI-related event, and deciding whether it is an incident (AG-13); Security Incident Management pack |
Regulatory Notification Operating Procedure | The reporting duties and clocks that the incident pack applies; Regulatory Incident Notification & Reporting pack |
Security Exception & Waiver Standard | The route for every exception to this policy (AG-20); Security Exception, Waiver & Segregation of Duties pack |
Access Control Policy; Joiner-Mover-Leaver & Access Provisioning pack | Single sign-on, and the discovery of systems bought with a card (AG-04) |
Annual Security Awareness Plan; Security Awareness Programme pack | The baseline awareness course, which the AI essentials module (AL-01) sits beside and does not replace (AG-18) |
[[Information Security Policy]] | [[Parent policy]] |
[[Privacy policy and record of processing activities]] | [[Whether processing personal data is lawful; what is processed and why]] |
[[Disciplinary procedure]] | [[Action for deliberate breach]] |
Definitions
Term | Meaning in this policy |
|---|---|
AI system | A machine-based system that infers from the input it receives how to generate outputs such as predictions, content, recommendations or decisions (EU AI Act Article 3(1)). A chat assistant, an image generator, a forecasting feature and a spam filter that learns are all AI systems. A fixed formula is not. |
AI use | One way the organisation uses an AI system, for one purpose, with one owner: summarising meeting notes with the office assistant, or forecasting stock with the warehouse system. One tool can have several uses. The inventory lists uses. |
Prompt | What a person types, pastes or uploads into an AI tool. Everything in a prompt counts as data put into the tool. |
Output | What the AI system returns. An output can be wrong, invented, biased or copied from somewhere else, and it is never checked by the tool. |
Deployer | An organisation that uses an AI system under its own authority for its business (EU AI Act Article 3(4)). Most organisations are deployers of the AI they use. |
Provider | An organisation that develops an AI system, or has one developed, and puts it on the market or into service under its own name or trademark (EU AI Act Article 3(3)). Building a tool for others, or selling another party's tool under your own brand, can make an organisation a provider. Building an application or feature on a supplier's model API (prompts, retrieval, tools or code around a model you call) counts as building for this policy, whether it is for staff or for customers; using a supplier's finished product as supplied does not. The question is a signal that sends the use to Legal, and it is not a finding that the organisation is a provider. Counsel decides. |
Approved tool | An AI tool on the approved list (A07) with a state of Approved or Approved with conditions, and the data levels it may take. |
Unapproved use | Any use of an AI tool for work that is not on the approved list, or with data above what the list allows. Sometimes called shadow AI. |
Tier | How much checking a proposed use needs before it starts: Tier 1 a screen, Tier 2 an assessment, Tier 3 an assessment and an executive decision. A fourth outcome, Stop, means the use is not allowed. |
Human oversight | A named person who is competent to judge the output reads it before it is relied on, sent outside the organisation or published, and has the authority to reject it. |
AI literacy | Skills, knowledge and understanding that let people make an informed use of AI systems and be aware of the opportunities, risks and possible harm (EU AI Act Article 3(56)). |
Prohibited practice | An AI practice that Article 5 of the EU AI Act prohibits outright, such as inferring the emotions of staff at work (with medical or safety exceptions). |
Training on our data | A supplier using what the organisation puts into a tool, or what the tool returns, to train or improve the supplier's models. The approved list records whether the contract or the tool's settings bar it. |
Work account | The account the organisation gives a person, signed in through single sign-on (P13). A personal or free account is not a work account. |
Document control
Approval record
Version | Approved by | Date | Evidence of approval | Next review by |
|---|---|---|---|---|
[[1.0]] | [[Executive management]] | [[YYYY-MM-DD]] | [[e.g. minutes of meeting, reference and item]] | [[YYYY-MM-DD]] |
Review. This policy is reviewed at least every 12 months, and sooner after: a major incident, or an incident the document should have prevented; a material change to the organisation's activities, systems or suppliers; a change in law, regulation or a contract the document supports; an audit or assessment finding against the document; a significant change in the threats the document addresses. A change in the AI Act or its guidelines, a major new tool, and an incident that this policy did not prevent always trigger a review (AG-19).
Acknowledgement. Everyone in scope acknowledges the policy within [[10]] working days of joining and each year after (AG-19). The current approved version is published at [[location everyone in scope can reach]].
Guidance — delete before approval
This is a Policy-tier document: approved by executive management. Nobody approves a document they own or wrote: if the owner sits on the approving body, the rest of it approves.
Worked example: the first seven weeks
EXAMPLE, not part of the policy. The organisation is the one used throughout the pack: a wholesale distributor with about 900 staff, three warehouses and an online ordering service that takes 60% of its orders, an important entity under NIS2 in its Member State. Not a financial entity, so DORA's reporting duties do not apply. Replace it with your own, or delete this section before approval.
Date | What happened | Rule |
|---|---|---|
11 Aug 2026 | This policy approved by the Executive Committee, at the Policy tier, owned by the AI governance lead (the Head of Risk). | AG-19 |
1 Sep 2026 | AI essentials launched. Existing users have until 31 Oct 2026. | AG-18 |
14 Sep 2026 | Survey of AI use opened; it ran to 25 Sep 2026. It found seven uses, including one that the card-spend and sign-on discovery of 15 Sep could not see. | AG-09, AG-10 |
18 Sep 2026 | AI-005 found: draft campaign wording in a free assistant on personal accounts. Reported through the incident route as an event. Triage found Internal information only, so it was not declared an incident. | AG-02, AG-04 |
21 Sep 2026 | AI-005 stopped, one working day after it was found. The four users moved to the approved assistant (AI-001). | AG-02 |
22 Sep 2026 | AI-007, a job-applicant ranking add-on, declined at screening: it ranks candidates (Annex III point 4) and decides about people. | AG-06 |
29 Sep 2026 | AI-003, a customer-facing chatbot, held by the Executive Committee until its supplier is assessed, a bar on training and processor terms are in place, and the Data Protection Officer has advised. | AG-11, AG-16 |
The seven uses at 30 Sep 2026. The tier is the intake method's, from the answers given.
Use | Tier | Status | Rules behind the tier |
|---|---|---|---|
AI-001 Drafting and summarising internal text with the office-suite assistant | 1 | Approved with conditions | AG-09 |
AI-002 Demand forecasting inside the warehouse management system | 2 | Approved with conditions | AG-10, AG-11 |
AI-003 A customer-service chatbot, proposed by the outsourced contact centre, that answers order-status questions | 3 | Held | AG-16, AG-03, AG-08, AG-11 |
AI-004 Generating images for campaign material in the design tool | 1 | Approved with conditions | AG-09 |
AI-005 Drafting campaign wording in a free public assistant on personal accounts | 1 | Stopped | AG-09, AG-03 |
AI-006 Machine-learning anomaly detection in the managed security monitoring service | 2 | Approved with conditions | AG-03 |
AI-007 A job-applicant ranking add-on to the recruitment system, proposed by HR | 3 | Declined | AG-06, AG-03 |
The position for the leadership team: 4 of 5 AI uses in use or proposed have a current approval; 2 of 3 Tier 2 and 3 uses have a completed assessment; 0 approvals are past their review date; 104 of 131 people with an AI tool have completed AI essentials; 1 of 1 unapproved uses found were stopped in time.
Guidance — delete before approval
AI-005 shows why AG-02 sets a time to stop, and why the help to move comes with it. The four users were not blamed. They moved to a tool they may use, and finished the module by 28 Sep. AI-006 is a machine-learning feature inside a managed security service. It existed before the policy, so it is approved with a dated condition, and its assessment is due by 24 Dec 2026.
Adapting this template
Small organisation
Guidance — delete before approval
Keep all 22 rules; they cost little when few tools are in use. Begin with the list: ask every team what they use, on any account, and make the answers safe to give (AG-13 protects the person who answers). Approve one good assistant for Internal information with the baseline conditions before you ban anything: people who have a good approved tool stop using the free one.
The managing director may be the AI governance lead and the approver of Tier 3 at once. Keep a short written record of each Tier 2 and Tier 3 decision, and ask an outside adviser to read the first few.
Regulated entity (NIS2, DORA, GDPR, EU AI Act)
Guidance — delete before approval
An essential or important entity under NIS2, and a financial entity under DORA, keep the same rules and check with counsel whether their own sector rules ask for more about AI, third-party arrangements and incident reporting. The incident pack and the regulatory reporting pack hold the reporting duties and clocks. This policy restates none of them.
Under the GDPR, a use that puts personal data into an AI tool may need a data protection impact assessment, and a decision about a person may engage Article 22. Involve the Data Protection Officer at Tier 2 and above (AG-03, AG-06).
If any use may fall in an area of Annex III of the EU AI Act, treat it as Tier 3 and ask counsel to read the worksheet before the use starts. Do not wait for the application date: the deployer duties start from 2 December 2027, and a recruitment or monitoring tool bought now will still be in use then.
IT and services run by suppliers
Guidance — delete before approval
Your managed IT provider, cloud providers and outsourced service provider may already use AI in the services they give you. Ask each for the AI features it uses on your data, and for notice before it adds one (ST-7). The AI governance lead stays accountable. Put the AI terms ST-1 to ST-8 into the contract with the clauses of the Supplier Contract Security Clause Library.
Delete this section before approval.
Framework references
These references show where this document supports an external framework. They indicate relevance only and do not reproduce the text of any standard. Editions referenced: Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 (the EU AI Act) as amended by Regulation (EU) 2026/1744; ISO/IEC 27001:2022 incl. Amd 1:2024; ISO/IEC 42001:2023 (by number and title only); NIST CSF 2.0; NIST AI RMF 1.0; Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (GDPR); as published and read on 8 October 2026.
Framework | Reference | Supported by |
|---|---|---|
ISO/IEC 27001:2022 | Annex A 5.10 — Acceptable use of information and other associated assets | The whole policy: rules for the acceptable use of information and of AI tools |
ISO/IEC 27001:2022 | Annex A 5.1 — Policies for information security | Policy statements; Document control; Review (AG-19) |
ISO/IEC 42001:2023 | Clause 5.2 — AI policy | Purpose and Policy statements: a policy for AI use |
ISO/IEC 42001:2023 | Annex A 2.2 — AI policy | Policy statements: the AI policy itself |
ISO/IEC 42001:2023 | Annex A 2.3 — Alignment with other organizational policies | Related documents: how the policy sits with the security, privacy and third-party policies |
ISO/IEC 42001:2023 | Annex A 2.4 — Review of the AI policy | Document control: review at least every 12 months and on a trigger (AG-19) |
ISO/IEC 42001:2023 | Annex A 9.2 — Processes for responsible use of AI systems | Permitted, conditional and prohibited uses: the processes for responsible use (AG-02, AG-09) |
ISO/IEC 42001:2023 | Annex A 9.4 — Intended use of the AI system | Human oversight: the intended use of a system and who checks it (AG-07) |
NIST CSF 2.0 | GV.PO-01 — “Policy for managing cybersecurity risks is established based on organizational context, cybersecurity strategy, and priorities and is communicated and enforced” | The whole policy: established, communicated and enforced |
EU AI Act — Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 | Article 3(4) — “deployer” means “a natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other body using an AI system under its authority except where the AI system is used in the course of a personal non-professional activity” | Scope and Definitions: most organisations use other people's AI and are deployers (AG-01, AG-17) |
EU AI Act — Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 | Article 4(1), as replaced by Regulation (EU) 2026/1744 — providers and deployers of AI systems “shall take measures to support the development of AI literacy of their staff and other persons dealing with the operation and use of AI systems on their behalf”, taking into account their technical knowledge, experience, education and training, the context the systems are used in and the persons on whom they are used; “This obligation does not require providers or deployers to guarantee any specific level of AI literacy of any individual.” Article 4(2) and (3) have the Commission and the Member States support deployers, in particular SMEs, with practical examples, and have the AI Board adopt recommendations. The replaced text applies from the Omnibus’s entry into force on 27 July 2026; Article 4 itself has applied since 2 February 2025 | Accountability and competence: measures for AI literacy fitted to the people and the use; no certificate is needed (AG-18) |
EU AI Act — Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 | Article 5(1), points (a) to (h) — prohibited, from 2 February 2025: AI that deploys subliminal, purposefully manipulative or deceptive techniques that materially distort behaviour and cause significant harm (a); exploits vulnerabilities due to age, disability or a specific social or economic situation (b); evaluates or classifies people by social behaviour or personal characteristics, with detrimental treatment in unrelated contexts or that is unjustified or disproportionate (c); assesses the risk of a person committing a criminal offence based solely on profiling or personality traits (d); creates or expands facial recognition databases by untargeted scraping of facial images from the internet or CCTV (e); infers emotions in the areas of workplace and education institutions, except for medical or safety reasons (f); categorises people by biometric data to infer race, political opinions, trade union membership, religious or philosophical beliefs, sex life or sexual orientation (g); and, with narrow exceptions, real-time remote biometric identification in publicly accessible spaces for law enforcement (h). Regulation (EU) 2026/1744 adds points (ba) and (bb) (AI that generates or manipulates realistic intimate images of an identifiable person without consent, and AI that generates or manipulates child sexual abuse material), with Article 5(1a) and (1b), from 2 December 2026 | Uses that are never allowed: the prohibited practices PP-01 to PP-10 (AG-05) |
EU AI Act — Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 | Article 5(1)(f) — prohibits “the placing on the market, the putting into service for this specific purpose, or the use of AI systems to infer emotions of a natural person in the areas of workplace and education institutions, except where the use of the AI system is intended to be put in place or into the market for medical or safety reasons” | Emotion inference at work: PP-06 (AG-05) and the check before any staff monitoring (AG-21) |
EU AI Act — Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 | Article 99(3) — non-compliance with the prohibitions of Article 5 is subject to administrative fines of up to EUR 35 000 000 or, for an undertaking, up to 7 % of total worldwide annual turnover for the preceding financial year, whichever is higher | Compliance and consequences: why the prohibitions take no exception (AG-20) |
EU AI Act — Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 | Article 26(1) — deployers of high-risk AI systems “shall take appropriate technical and organisational measures to ensure they use such systems in accordance with the instructions for use accompanying the systems”. The obligations of Article 26 applies from 2 December 2027 to systems classified as high-risk under Article 6(2) and Annex III, and from 2 August 2028 to those under Article 6(1) and Annex I (Article 113, third paragraph, point (c), as amended by Regulation (EU) 2026/1744) | Uses that need a senior decision: decisions about people and employment uses are Tier 3 (AG-06, AG-12, AG-21) |
EU AI Act — Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 | Article 50(1) — providers ensure that AI systems intended to interact directly with natural persons are designed so that the persons are informed that they are interacting with an AI system, “unless this is obvious from the point of view of a natural person who is reasonably well-informed, observant and circumspect” | Human oversight and disclosure: telling customers they deal with an AI system (AG-08) |
EU AI Act — Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 | Article 50(4) — deployers of an AI system that generates or manipulates image, audio or video content constituting a deep fake “shall disclose that the content has been artificially generated or manipulated”; deployers of an AI system that generates or manipulates text published “with the purpose of informing the public on matters of public interest” disclose that the text has been artificially generated or manipulated, unless it has undergone human review or editorial control and a person holds editorial responsibility for the publication | Human oversight and disclosure: labelling realistic generated content and public-interest text (AG-08) |
EU AI Act — Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 | Article 113, as amended — the Regulation applies from 2 August 2026, except that Chapters I and II (including Articles 4 and 5) apply from 2 February 2025, with Article 5(1) points (ba) and (bb) and Article 5(1a) and (1b) applying from 2 December 2026; Chapter III Section 4, Chapter V (general-purpose AI models), Chapter VII and Chapter XII and Article 78 apply from 2 August 2025, except Article 101; and Chapter III Sections 1, 2 and 3, except Article 6(5), apply from 2 December 2027 as regards systems classified as high-risk under Article 6(2) and Annex III, and from 2 August 2028 as regards those under Article 6(1) and Annex I. Article 50 is not listed in an exception and so applies from 2 August 2026 | What the law asks and when: the dates in the table |
EU AI Act — Regulation (EU) 2026/1744 (Digital Omnibus on AI) | Regulation (EU) 2026/1744 of 8 July 2026 amending Regulations (EU) 2024/1689, (EU) 2018/1139 and (EU) 2023/1230 as regards the simplification of the implementation of harmonised rules on artificial intelligence (Official Journal, 24 July 2026); in force on the third day after publication (its Article 4), 27 July 2026. Its Article 1 amends Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 | What the law asks and when: the replaced Article 4 and the dates |
EU AI Act — Commission guidelines (non-binding) | Commission Guidelines on prohibited artificial intelligence practices established by Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 (AI Act), C(2025) 5052 final, 29 July 2025; non-binding | Uses that are never allowed: how the Commission reads the prohibitions (non-binding) |
EU AI Act — Commission guidelines (non-binding) | Commission Guidelines on the implementation of the transparency obligations for certain AI systems under Article 50 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1689, C(2026) 5054 final, 20 July 2026; non-binding | Human oversight and disclosure: how the Commission reads the transparency duties (non-binding) |
NIST AI RMF 1.0 | GOVERN 1.1 — “Legal and regulatory requirements involving AI are understood, managed, and documented.” | What the law asks and when; review of the policy (AG-19) |
NIST AI RMF 1.0 | GOVERN 2.1 — “Roles and responsibilities and lines of communication related to mapping, measuring, and managing AI risks are documented and are clear to individuals and teams throughout the organization.” | Roles and responsibilities: documented and clear to people (AG-10, AG-13) |
NIST AI RMF 1.0 | GOVERN 3.2 — “Policies and procedures are in place to define and differentiate roles and responsibilities for human-AI configurations and oversight of AI systems.” | Human oversight and systems that act: who oversees the AI (AG-07, AG-16) |
NIST AI RMF 1.0 | MAP 3.5 — “Processes for human oversight are defined, assessed, and documented in accordance with organizational policies from the GOVERN function.” | Human oversight: the person who checks the output, named for each use (AG-07) |
GDPR — Regulation (EU) 2016/679 | Article 5(1)(c) — personal data shall be “adequate, relevant and limited to what is necessary in relation to the purposes for which they are processed (‘data minimisation’)” | Data: only the personal data a use needs goes into a tool (AG-03) |
GDPR — Regulation (EU) 2016/679 | Article 5(1)(f) — personal data shall be “processed in a manner that ensures appropriate security of the personal data, including protection against unauthorised or unlawful processing and against accidental loss, destruction or damage, using appropriate technical or organisational measures (‘integrity and confidentiality’)” | Data and accounts: security of personal data put into tools (AG-03, AG-04) |
GDPR — Regulation (EU) 2016/679 | Article 9(1) — “Processing of personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, or trade union membership, and the processing of genetic data, biometric data for the purpose of uniquely identifying a natural person, data concerning health or data concerning a natural person's sex life or sexual orientation shall be prohibited.”, unless one of the conditions of Article 9(2) applies | Data: special category data never goes into an AI tool (AG-03, AG-20) |
GDPR — Regulation (EU) 2016/679 | Article 22(1) — “The data subject shall have the right not to be subject to a decision based solely on automated processing, including profiling, which produces legal effects concerning him or her or similarly significantly affects him or her.” Article 22(3) requires, for the cases in Article 22(2), points (a) and (c), at least the right to obtain human intervention, to express a point of view and to contest the decision | Decisions about people: no output decides alone (AG-06) |
GDPR — Regulation (EU) 2016/679 | Article 28(1) — use only processors providing sufficient guarantees of appropriate technical and organisational measures | Data and suppliers: processor terms for any tool that takes personal data (AG-03, AG-11) |
GDPR — Regulation (EU) 2016/679 | Article 32(1) — appropriate technical and organisational measures to ensure a level of security appropriate to the risk, taking into account the likelihood and severity of risk to people's rights and freedoms | Accounts and systems that act: security measures suited to the risk (AG-04, AG-16) |
NIS2 — Directive (EU) 2022/2555 | Article 21(2)(i) — “human resources security, access control policies and asset management” | The inventory of AI uses (AG-10) and the duties of staff and contractors (AG-01, AG-18) |
ISO/IEC 27001 and ISO/IEC 42001 references name the clause or control this document relates to, by number and title only. ISO/IEC 42001 is a paid standard whose text was not read for this document. A reference does not say that meeting a clause or control meets any requirement of the EU AI Act.
This pack does not say which ISO/IEC 42001 or ISO/IEC 27001 controls, or which NIST AI RMF outcomes, meet a requirement of the EU AI Act. Each reference says what the source asks for and which CISO Times document helps with that work. Using a document does not by itself show that a requirement is met. The Commission’s guidelines explain how the Commission reads the Act. They are not binding, and only the Court of Justice of the European Union gives an authoritative interpretation of the Act. Member States lay down the penalties for infringements (Article 99(1)) and designate the authorities that enforce the Act, and no national text was read for these documents.